People v. Schneider

2019 IL App (5th) 150106

127 N.E.3d 896

431 Ill.Dec. 363

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Paul S. SCHNEIDER, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 5-15-0106

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

Filed January 8, 2019

Rehearing denied January 30, 2019

James E. Chadd, Ellen J. Curry, and Ian C. Barnes, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.

Thomas D. Gibbons, State’s Attorney, of Edwardsville (Patrick Delfino, Patrick D. Daly, and Jennifer Camden, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Ellen J. Curry, Deputy Defender, Ian C. Barnes, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Fifth Judicial District, 909 Water Tower Circle, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864, Attorneys for Appellant

Hon. Thomas D. Gibbons, State's Attorney, Madison County Courthouse, 157 N. Main Street, Suite 402, Edwardsville, IL 62025; Patrick Delfino, Director, Patrick D. Daly, Deputy Director, Jennifer Camden, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, 730 East Illinois Highway 15, Suite 2, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864, Attorneys for Appellee

JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The defendant, Paul S. Schneider, appeals his conviction for attempted unlawful clouding of title ( 720 ILCS 5/32-13 (West 2012) ). The charge was based on a lien the defendant attempted to record, which alleged that a bank owed him $400,000 for two properties he had lost in foreclosure proceedings more than 20 years earlier. He claimed that the bank owed him this debt because its predecessor illegally took the properties from him in court proceedings. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this theory was not recognized as a valid basis for a lien, (2) the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knew that the lien was based on an invalid theory, and (3) reversal is warranted because the court did not fully comply with the requirements of People v. Zehr , 103 Ill. 2d 472, 83 Ill.Dec. 128, 469 N.E.2d 1062 (1984), and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012) during voir dire . We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Two properties owned by the defendant were the subject of foreclosure proceedings in 1990. Although the defendant maintains that he did not have notice of the final hearing in the foreclosure proceedings, he acknowledges that he did have notice that the proceedings were pending. After the court entered judgments of foreclosure, Alton Banking & Trust Company (Alton Banking & Trust) purchased both properties in judicially-approved sales. In 1994, the defendant recorded a document with the Madison County recorder's office, purporting to claim a lien against "all assets owned or held in the name of" Alton Banking & Trust. The defendant claimed in the document that the bank owed him $400,000 due to "the wrongful taking of properties under color of law" in the 1990 foreclosure proceedings. In 1996, criminal charges were filed against the defendant related to the 1994 lien. We note that the statute at issue in this appeal, proscribing unlawful clouding of title, was not enacted until 1997. See Pub. Act 89-682, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 1997). It is not clear what offense the defendant was charged with in 1996. In any case, however, that charge was subsequently dropped.

¶ 4 In May 2013, the defendant attempted to record the lien at issue in this appeal. In it, the defendant sought to amend the lien he filed in 1994 to reflect the fact that Alton Banking & Trust was now part of U.S. Bank. He alleged that U.S. Bank owed him $400,000 because its predecessor, Alton Banking & Trust, "wrongfully, illegally[,] and feloniously" took multiple properties from him in court proceedings. He further alleged that Alton Banking & Trust used a contract he signed with it "to falsely convict and defraud" him of two specified properties "in collusion with City of Alton and County of Madison rogue officials." An employee noticed that the lien looked suspicious. She showed it to her supervisor, who contacted the state's attorney's office. The state's attorney subsequently charged the defendant with attempt (unlawful clouding of title) ( 720 ILCS 5/8-4, 32-13(a) (West 2012) ).

¶ 5 The first witness to testify for the State at the defendant's trial was Terianne Edwards, an employee of the Madison County circuit court clerk's office. Edwards described the procedures involved in transferring properties after foreclosure proceedings. She explained that once a foreclosure judgment is entered, the property can be sold. Next, the sale must be approved by the court. Once that happens, a deed is issued, signed by the judge, and recorded. Edwards testified that the defendant in foreclosure proceedings always receives a summons notifying the defendant of the proceedings.

¶ 6 Madison County Deputy Recorder Jackie Barlow also testified for the State. She explained that a lien creates a "cloud" on the title to property because it serves as a notice that a debt on the property is due and owing. She testified that the filing of false or fraudulent liens is a growing problem. In an effort to combat the problem, employees of the recorder's office are trained to recognize suspicious filings. She noted, however, that because approximately 60,000 liens are filed with the recorder's office each year, the office does not have the resources to "police" all such filings. She also noted that many of the safeguards that are now in place to identify potentially fraudulent filings were not in place in 1994, when the defendant recorded his first lien.

¶ 7 Barlow then testified about the defendant's attempt to record the lien at issue in this case. She testified that in May 2013, the defendant presented the lien to another employee of the recorder's office for filing. (We note that the employee no longer works for the recorder's office and did not testify at trial.) The employee thought that the lien looked suspicious, so she brought it to Barlow's attention. Barlow, too, thought the lien appeared suspicious.

¶ 8 Asked to explain why she suspected the lien was fraudulent, Barlow noted that the document was not notarized and was not supported by a court judgment awarding the defendant the $400,000 he claimed he was owed. She also noted that the document did not follow the standard format for a lien and that it was uncommon for liens to be filed against banks.

¶ 9 Barlow testified that after reviewing the document, she spoke with the defendant. She told him that she wanted the state's attorney to review the lien to make sure she filed it correctly. She did not confront the defendant with her suspicion that the document was fraudulent because it was the policy of the recorder's office not to do so. She explained that this policy was in place for two reasons—first, it was deemed necessary for the safety of the people who work in the recorder's office, and second, employees who are not attorneys are not able to determine definitively whether suspicious liens are, in fact, fraudulent. Barlow testified that she accepted the defendant's recording fee. Asked why she did so, Barlow explained that she would have recorded the lien if she learned from the state's attorney that it was valid.

¶ 10 Barlow testified that when she told the defendant that someone from the state's attorney's office would look at the lien, he "didn't seem to mind at all." She described the defendant's demeanor as "pleasant" and noted that "he seemed very confident." On cross-examination, defense counsel asked, "So it seemed as though Mr. Schneider believed that document was lawful and legal?" Barlow replied, "I suppose. He didn't seem to mind." Counsel then asked, "And by his demeanor and his actions, it appeared he believed it wasn't [fraudulent]?" Barlow replied, "I assume so."

¶ 11 Barlow testified that it took a few weeks before she heard back from the State's Attorney's office regarding the lien. She testified that during this time, the defendant contacted the recorder's office several times to ask whether the lien had been recorded.

¶ 12 Barlow also was asked about the 1994 lien. She acknowledged that the lien was accepted and recorded, but she testified that if it were presented to her now, she would have questioned its validity. Barlow also acknowledged that no action had been taken to remove the 1994 lien in the intervening years. She testified that once a fraudulent lien has been recorded, it can only be removed by court order.

¶ 13 The State admitted into evidence the judgments of foreclosure on the two properties, reports of sale showing that Alton Banking & Trust purchased the two properties, judge's deeds transferring the properties to Alton Banking & Trust, the lien recorded by the defendant in 1994, and the lien he attempted to record in 2013.

¶ 14 After the State rested, the defendant made an oral motion for a directed verdict. He argued that there was no evidence concerning the defendant's knowledge of the law. He noted that Barlow testified that the defendant's demeanor indicated that he thought he was acting lawfully. The court denied the motion.

¶ 15 The defendant testified on his own behalf. He testified that he has worked as a government contractor doing electrical and plumbing work and "all kinds of work." He also testified that he and his family bought "derelict" properties and restored them. He noted that some of these properties were purchased at tax sales.

¶ 16 The defendant testified that he did not receive notice of the final hearing in the 1990 foreclosure proceedings. However, he acknowledged that not only did he have notice of the proceedings, he appeared in court multiple times. He further acknowledged that the court entered a judgment of foreclosure. Asked by defense counsel whether he had an opportunity to present his case before that judgment was entered, the...