People v. Shane

187 A.D.3d 1219

131 N.Y.S.3d 227 (Mem)

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,

v.Clifford SHANE, appellant.

2016–05702

Ind. No. 2004/14

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—September 17, 2020

October 28, 2020

Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Rebecca J. Gannon of counsel), for appellant.

Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (Johnnette Traill, William H. Branigan, and Katherine A. Triffon of counsel), for respondent.

ALAN D. SCHEINKMAN, P.J., HECTOR D. LASALLE, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, ANGELA G. IANNACCI, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Richard L. Buchter, J.), rendered May 17, 2016, convicting him of rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree (four counts), sexual abuse in the first degree, and endangering the welfare of a child, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Daniel Lewis, J.), of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree (four counts), sexual abuse in the first degree, and endangering the welfare of a child in relation to conduct perpetrated by the defendant against his stepdaughter.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the People met their burden of establishing that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ) before making statements to law enforcement officials (see Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382–383, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 ; People v. Thomas, 22 N.Y.3d 629, 641, 985 N.Y.S.2d 193, 8 N.E.3d 308 ). At the suppression hearing, the testimony of a detective established that the detective gave the defendant written Miranda warnings and that the defendant read the written warnings, wrote "yes" and signed his name next to each of the warnings, and indicated that he understood his rights and was willing to speak with the detective. This evidence was sufficient to establish a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver (see People v. Sirno, 76 N.Y.2d 967, 968, 563 N.Y.S.2d 730, 565 N.E.2d 479 ; People v. Fuentes, 185 A.D.3d 960, 961, 128 N.Y.S.3d 221 ; People v. Peraza, 288 A.D.2d 689, 690, 733 N.Y.S.2d 510 ). Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination denying that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in permitting the testimony of the People's expert witness on the subject of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. The expert's testimony was properly admitted to explain the issue of delayed disclosure, to counter the defense claim that the complainant fabricated the sexual abuse allegations, and to explain why the complainant might not recall with specificity when certain of the alleged incidents occurred (see People v. Nicholson , 26 N.Y.3d 813, 828–829, 28 N.Y.S.3d 663, 48 N.E.3d 944 ; People v. Tebout , 179 A.D.3d 1099, 1101, 114 N.Y.S.3d 679 ; People v. Gopaul , 112 A.D.3d 966, 966, 977 N.Y.S.2d 95 ). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the majority of the expert's testimony neither bolstered nor vouched for the complainant's credibility, as the expert spoke in general terms and did not suggest that the charged...