People v. Sharpe

839 N.E.2d 492

216 Ill.2d 481

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Kenneth SHARPE, Appellee.

No. 91874.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

October 6, 2005.

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Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, Renee Goldfarb, Annette Collins, Veronica Calderon Malavia and Kathryn A. Schierl, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Edwin A. Burnette, Public Defender, Chicago (Protase M. Tinka, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee.

Chief Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

This case involves the constitutionality of one of the "15/20/25-to-life" sentence-enhancement amendments. See Pub. Act 91-404, § 5, eff. January 1, 2000. Specifically, this court is called upon to evaluate the constitutionality of the sentencing enhancements in the context of first degree murder.

BACKGROUND

Ordinarily, the baseline sentence for the crime of first degree murder is 20 to 60 years' imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a) (West 2000). In 2000, however, the legislature enacted Public Act 91-404, which amended the sentencing provisions of each of several different felonies, including first degree murder (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(i) through (a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2000)), when a firearm is involved in the commission of the felony.¹ See Pub. Act 91-404, § 5, eff. January 1, 2000.

These amendments add a mandatory additional term of years to whatever sentence would otherwise be imposed. The degree of enhancement depends upon the degree of involvement of the firearm. Commission of first degree murder while simply armed with a firearm adds a mandatory 15-year enhancement to the sentence (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(i) (West 2000)); personally discharging a firearm while committing first degree murder adds a mandatory 20-year enhancement (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(ii) (West 2000)); and personally discharging a firearm while committing first degree murder and proximately causing a death or severe bodily injury thereby requires that the circuit court increase the sentence by 25 years' up to life imprisonment (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2000)).

In April 2001, defendant Kenneth Sharpe was indicted in the circuit court of Cook County on six counts of first degree murder in connection with the fatal shooting of Bernard Magett on March 13, 2001. The charges were broken down into three counts of intentional first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2000)) and three counts of first degree murder knowing that he was creating a strong probability of death or great bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2000)). One count of each type of first degree murder alleged that defendant committed the crime while armed with a firearm (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(i) (West 2000)), one count alleged that defendant committed the crime while personally discharging a firearm (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(ii) (West 2000)), and one count alleged that defendant committed the crime while personally discharging a firearm that proximately caused a death (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2000)).²

Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, raising several constitutional challenges to the sentence enhancements. The circuit court rejected all of defendant's challenges except for the proportionate penalties challenge. With respect to this challenge, the court granted defendant's motion in part. The court determined that the 15-year and 20-year enhancements to first degree murder (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(i), (a)(1)(d)(ii) (West 2000)) violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11), but that the 25-to-life enhancement applicable to the commission of first degree murder when the defendant personally discharged a firearm which resulted in death (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2000)) was not unconstitutional.

The State appealed directly to this court. Jurisdiction lies because the circuit court declared a statute unconstitutional. 134 Ill.2d R. 603.

ANALYSIS

The issues presented to this court are fewer than those before the circuit court. The State argues that the circuit court erred in determining that the 15- and 20-year sentence enhancements were unconstitutionally disproportionate. Defendant argues that the circuit court was correct in so concluding, and argues additionally that the 25-to-life sentence enhancement suffers from the same defect. Defendant also argues that the 25-to-life enhancement is unconstitutionally vague and is not reasonably designed to remedy the harm that the legislature sought to address.

I. PROPORTIONATE PENALTIES

The first issue is whether the sentencing amendments pass proportionality review. The constitutionality of a statute is purely a matter of law, and accordingly we review the circuit court's conclusion de novo. People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill.2d 178, 188, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288 (2004). All statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality. People v. Morgan, 203 Ill.2d 470, 486, 272 Ill.Dec. 160, 786 N.E.2d 994 (2003). To overcome this presumption, the party challenging the statute must clearly establish that it violates the constitution. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill.2d 413, 418, 250 Ill.Dec. 670, 739 N.E.2d 433 (2000). We generally defer to the legislature in the sentencing arena because the legislature is institutionally better equipped to gauge the seriousness of various offenses and to fashion sentences accordingly. See People v. Hill, 199 Ill.2d 440, 454, 264 Ill.Dec. 670, 771 N.E.2d 374 (2002). The legislature's discretion in setting criminal penalties is broad, and courts generally decline to overrule legislative determinations in this area unless the challenged penalty is clearly in excess of the general constitutional limitations on this authority. Morgan, 203 Ill.2d at 488, 272 Ill.Dec. 160, 786 N.E.2d 994.

A proportionality challenge derives from article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which provides that "[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship." Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11. A proportionality challenge contends that the penalty in question was not determined according to the seriousness of the offense, and this court has recognized three distinct ways in which such a challenge may be asserted.

"First, a penalty violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community. [Citations.] Second, a penalty violates the proportionate penalties clause where similar offenses are compared and conduct that creates a less serious threat to the public health and safety is punished more severely. [Citations.] Finally, the proportionate penalties clause is violated where offenses with identical elements are given different sentences." People v. Moss, 206 Ill.2d 503, 522, 276 Ill.Dec. 855, 795 N.E.2d 208 (2003).

In this case the circuit court determined that the 15- and 20-year sentencing amendments of Public Act 91-404 failed the second type of challenge, commonly referred to as the cross-comparison test. The cross-comparison test is a two-step analysis. First, the court determines whether the statutes being compared have related purposes. People v. Davis, 177 Ill.2d 495, 506, 227 Ill.Dec. 101, 687 N.E.2d 24 (1997). If not, then the defendant's proportionate penalties challenge must be rejected. If the statutes have common purposes, then the court proceeds to step two of the analysis. In this step, the court determines which offense is more serious, and if the less serious offense is punished more harshly. Davis, 177 Ill.2d at 506-07, 227 Ill.Dec. 101, 687 N.E.2d 24. If the less serious offense has received a harsher penalty, then the penalty is invalid. The circuit court held that the 15- and 20-year enhancements were invalid under this analysis, but that the 25-to-life enhancement did not violate the proportionate penalties clause.

The circuit court's order is confusing. The court compared the 15- and 20-year enhancements to the armed robbery statute (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), (b) (West 2000)) with the penalties for aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2 (West 2000)) and aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2 (West 2000)). The trial court concluded that the 15- and 20-year enhancements were invalid because they punished merely carrying a weapon or discharging a weapon more harshly than discharging a weapon at another person (aggravated discharge of a firearm) or injuring another person with a firearm (aggravated battery with a firearm). From this, the court concluded all of the 15- and 20-year enhancements of Public Act 91-404 were invalid. Of course, the trial court should not have ruled on the validity of any enhancements other than those to which defendant was potentially subjected: those to the murder statute. See Morgan, 203 Ill.2d at 482, 272 Ill.Dec. 160, 786 N.E.2d 994 (party has standing to challenge constitutionality of a statute only if he or she is within class aggrieved by the alleged unconstitutionality). Likewise, the court should not have addressed a cross-comparison challenge involving statutes that are not at issue in this case. Defendant was charged with first degree murder. Nevertheless, the trial court utilized the 15- and 20-year enhancements to armed robbery as the starting point of its cross-comparison analysis. It is not at all clear why the trial judge chose to assess the constitutionality of statutes not at issue in this case when an analysis utilizing the sentencing enhancements under first degree murder would have yielded the same result.

That said, what the...