People v. Smith

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TYRONE RAYMOND SMITH, Defendant and Appellant.

C084267

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento)

April 18, 2019

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super. Ct. No. 14F08028)

Following a jury trial, defendant Tyrone Raymond Smith was found guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of ammunition by a felon. Sentenced to two years eight months, defendant appeals. He contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, pursuant to Penal Code¹ section 1538.5, because such evidence was obtained as a result of his unlawfully prolonged detention, inviolation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We disagree and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

IFacts

On December 2, 2014, Sacramento County Sheriff's Deputy Shaun Hampton,² was patrolling the Sacramento area in his unmarked car when he noticed a red Chrysler Pacifica making an illegal lane change. Deputy Hampton began following the car and recognized the license plate (5CQF702), as one potentially involved in two recent crimes: a drive-by shooting on August 19, 2014, and a home invasion robbery on October 22, 2014.

Related to the August shooting, he located a computer aided dispatch event for a "red Chrysler Pacifica with a license plate of 5CQF702," along with a "citizens report that a 'black male in his late 30s or early 40s was in the vehicle and shot at an apartment.' " As to the October home invasion, Deputy Hampton was monitoring traffic in Sacramento "when he heard the dispatch regarding a home invasion robbery on Watt Avenue," and "a citizen eyewitness providing a description of the car and a partial license plate of '702.' "³

Deputy Hampton called for backup, and at 8:23 a.m., roughly nine patrol cars from the Sacramento Sheriff's Department and at least one from the California Highway Patrol assisted him in pulling defendant over on the side of the freeway. In doing so, a portion of the freeway was shut down.⁴ Officers then ordered the driver -- defendant -- and the passenger and registered owner of the car -- Nicky Currie -- out at gunpoint for officer safety. Currie's two children were sitting in the backseat of the car. Currie consented to a search of her car, and two deputies searched it but did not find anything of evidentiary value.

During the search, Deputy Hampton learned defendant lived with Tiffany Royster, a probationer. At 9:02 a.m., and while defendant was still detained, Deputy Hampton and others, drove to defendant's apartment to conduct a search of the home. During the search, deputies found 90 rounds of ammunition, which Royster said belonged to defendant. Royster also said she had seen defendant in possession of a gun.

Upon obtaining the ammunition and Royster's statements, deputies returned to the vehicle, which was still on the side of the freeway. Deputy Hampton conducted a second search of the car and at 10:22 a.m., discovered a stolen gun under the front driver's seat of the car where defendant had been sitting. Defendant was arrested. Approximately two hours elapsed between the initial stop and discovery of the gun.

IIProcedural History

Defendant was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of ammunition by a felon.

Before trial, he moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of his detention. The prosecution submitted an opposition to defendant's motion. Noevidentiary hearing specific to the motion to suppress was held, and the parties stipulated the court could rule on the motion based on the preliminary examination transcript and the parties' briefs, which related the above facts.

The trial court denied defendant's motion. It reasoned the initial stop and first search of the vehicle were proper based on Deputy Hampton's reasonable belief of defendant's involvement in criminal activity. After the first search of the vehicle revealed "nothing," however, the court held the time to detain defendant and search the car had lapsed and there were no articulable facts presented to justify defendant's further detention.

Nevertheless, the inevitable discovery doctrine prevented the court from suppressing the evidence. Even without defendant's detention, the court reasoned, the incriminating evidence would have been discovered because defendant's roommate was on searchable probation. Deputies would have still searched his home, found the ammunition in the kitchen, determined it belonged to defendant, established probable cause to arrest defendant, searched the car a second time, and discovered the handgun.

The jury found defendant guilty on both counts. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the evidence was obtained as a result of an unlawfully prolonged detention, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. He claims the record is void of specific articulable facts known to deputies showing defendant was involved in criminal activity other than a traffic infraction, justifying only a limited detention. Accordingly, he contends any evidence obtained as a result of his prolonged detention, including the ammunition, the firearm, and Royster's and defendant's admissions, should be excluded. He further asserts the inevitable discovery doctrine is inapplicable to his case. We disagree.

When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence.(People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) "In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment." (Ibid.)

First, we address defendant's argument deputies did not have reasonable suspicion to extend the detention beyond what was required for the traffic stop. Defendant's argument, however, assumes he was pulled over for a traffic violation when the court found, and the record demonstrates, Deputy Hampton executed a felony stop to investigate defendant's possible connection to a shooting and home invasion robbery.

Here, Deputy Hampton called for backup prior to initiating the stop, multiple police cars pulled defendant over, blocking part of the freeway, and defendant was ordered out of the car at gunpoint for officer safety. Further, Deputy Hampton testified he was making a felony stop. Hence, defendant's characterization of the detention as an extended traffic stop is flawed, as the facts suggest deputies were making a felony stop to conduct an investigation. To the extent defendant challenges his detention resulting from the felony stop, his argument still fails.

The judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of a detention is a dual one -- whether the deputies' actions were justified at the inception and whether they were reasonably related in scope and duration to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 20 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 905]; People v. Gallardo (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 234, 237-238.)

A detention is justified at its inception when the detaining deputy can point to specific articulable facts which, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation the person may be involved in criminal activity. (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273 [151 L.Ed.2d 740, 749-750]; People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083.) A deputy's subjectively held suspicions must be objectively reasonable, "such as would cause any reasonable police officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his training and experience [citation], to suspectthe same criminal activity and the same involvement by the person in question." (People v. McCluskey (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 220, 225-226.)

Here, upon noticing an illegal lane change, Deputy Hampton, a seasoned deputy, recognized defendant's car -- the make and model, color, and license plate -- from two crimes committed less than four months prior. Both of these crimes were carried out in Sacramento, near where Deputy Hampton noticed defendant. Further, once defendant was pulled over, Deputy Hampton had the ability to confirm defendant's physical characteristics matched those of the August shooting suspect -- "black male in his late 30s or early 40s," -- providing further reasonable suspicion to believe defendant was involved in the past crimes.

Defendant, in claiming the above facts fail to furnish a factual basis for reasonable suspicion, cites to In re Eskiel S. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1638. There, the court held a radio broadcast of a possible gang fight was an insufficient basis for an officer to claim reasonable suspicion to detain a defendant. The court found there was no source to testify to the validity and reliability of the radio broadcast when all the officer saw was the defendant and others fleeing police, and reasoned a radio broadcast alone was comparable to uncorroborated evidence from an anonymous informant. (Id. at p. 1644.) Defendant's reliance on this case is misplaced because Deputy Hampton relied on multiple reports indicating defendant and the car he was driving had been involved in criminal activity. Deputy Hampton further corroborated that information by comparing the reported description of the car and perpetrator with defendant and the car he was driving. "It is well settled that police officers may rely on information coming to them from official sources." (People v. Schellin (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 245, 251.) When an officer receives a dispatch or sees a dispatch report, ...