People v. Solis

46 Cal.App.5th 762

259 Cal.Rptr.3d 854

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Rogelio Vasquez SOLIS, Defendant and Appellant.

G057510

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3, California.

Filed March 18, 2020

Richard A. Levy, Torrance, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant Attorney General, Tamar Pachter and Nelson R. Richards, Deputy Attorneys General, as amicus curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Todd Spitzer, District Attorney, and Seton B. Hunt, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

FYBEL, J.

INTRODUCTION

Senate Bill No. 1437, enacted in 2018, amended Penal Code sections 188 and 189, and added section 1170.95. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2-4.) (All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated.) The intent of the legislation was to limit application of the felony murder rule and murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine by modifying the mens rea element of those crimes. The legislation also created a procedure by which a defendant previously convicted of murder under either of those theories could file a petition for resentencing.

Defendant Rogelio Vasquez Solis, who had been convicted of second degree murder based on the doctrine of natural and probable consequences, filed such a petition. The Orange County District Attorney opposed defendant's petition on the ground Senate Bill No. 1437 unconstitutionally amended two voter-approved initiatives. The trial court agreed and denied the petition. For the reasons we shall explain, we hold that Senate Bill No. 1437 is constitutional. People v. Cruz (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 740, ––– Cal.Rptr.3d ––––, 2020 WL 1283482, filed concurrently with this opinion, reaches the same conclusion based on similar reasoning.

Legislation unconstitutionally amends an initiative statute if it changes that statute " ‘ "by adding or taking from it some particular provision." ’ " ( People v. Superior Court (Gooden) (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 270, 279, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 239 ( Gooden ), quoting People v. Superior Court (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 564, 570-571, 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 227 P.3d 858 ( Pearson ).) Legislation may address the same subject matter as an initiative, and may even augment the provisions of an initiative, without amending it. The key to our analysis is determining " ‘whether [the legislation] prohibits what the initiative authorizes, or authorizes what the initiative prohibits.’ " ( Gooden, supra , at pp. 279-280, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 239.)

Senate Bill No. 1437 addresses the elements of the crime of murder and is directed to the mental state and conduct of those accused of murder. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f), (g).) It does not authorize anything the two initiatives prohibited, nor prohibit anything they authorized. Senate Bill No. 1437 neither adds any particular provision to nor subtracts any particular provision from either initiative.

We reverse the trial court's order and direct the trial court to consider the merits of defendant's petition.

STATEMENT OF FACTS ¹

In 1993, a confrontation occurred at a state beach in San Clemente. Members of the San Clemente Vario Chico (SCVC) gang threw a variety of objects at a vehicle in which the victim was riding. One of the objects, a paint roller handle, struck the victim in the head, causing his death. Both defendant and his codefendant identified other SCVC gang members as having thrown paint rollers and having boasted about hurting someone. Various painting materials, including a cover for a paint roller, were recovered from the codefendant's vehicle by police after the attack. Members of the victim's group saw SCVC gang members "celebrating and ‘high-fiving’ each other" after the attack.

At trial, a gang expert testified the confrontation was gang-related, and that defendant and his codefendant were both SCVC gang members. Defendant denied being an SCVC gang member, but admitted he associated with the gang. Defendant admitted throwing a rock at the vehicle in which the victim was riding, but claimed he was acting in self-defense because the vehicle was approaching at a high speed.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1997, a jury convicted defendant of second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and various other crimes. The jury found true gang sentencing enhancement allegations for all counts. (§ 186.22, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for 15 years to life for second degree murder, and either imposed concurrent terms or stayed imposition of sentence on all other counts and enhancements. Defendant appealed from the judgment. A panel of this court affirmed in an unpublished opinion, concluding in relevant part that there was sufficient evidence defendant aided and abetted the second degree murder of the victim based on the doctrine of natural and probable consequences. (People v. Penuelas and Solis, supra , G021570.)

In December 2018, defendant, in propria person, filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. The District Attorney filed opposition to the petition; through appointed counsel, defendant filed a written reply. The trial court denied the petition on the ground Senate Bill No. 1437 was unconstitutional; the court did not address the District Attorney's alternative argument that defendant was statutorily ineligible for relief under section 1170.95. The court concluded that Senate Bill No. 1437 "materially amends Penal Code § 190 as enacted by the electorate via Proposition 7 in a manner inconsistent with the electorate's intent and without the electorate's approval," and "materially amends Penal Code § 189 and § 190.2, as amended by the electorate via Proposition 115, in a manner inconsistent with the electorate's intent and without the required two-thirds majority of both houses of the California Legislature." (Boldface, underscoring, and some capitalization omitted.) Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal from the postjudgment order.

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review questions regarding the constitutionality of a statute de novo. ( Stennett v. Miller (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 284, 290, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 872.)

"[I]n resolving a legal claim, a court should speak as narrowly as possible and resort to invalidation of a statute only if doing so is necessary." ( People v. Kelly (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1008, 1047, 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 222 P.3d 186.) "Courts should exercise judicial restraint in passing upon the acts of coordinate branches of government; the presumption is in favor of constitutionality, and the invalidity of the legislation must be clear before it can be declared unconstitutional." ( Dittus v. Cranston (1959) 53 Cal.2d 284, 286, 1 Cal.Rptr. 327, 347 P.2d 671.) "[O]ne of the fundamental principles of our constitutional system of government is that a statute, once duly enacted, ‘is presumed to be constitutional. Unconstitutionality must be clearly shown, and doubts will be resolved in favor of its validity.’ " ( Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1055, 1086, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 225, 95 P.3d 459.) The power to define crimes is vested in the Legislature. ( People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 943, 236 Cal.Rptr.3d 316, 422 P.3d 973.)

II. LIMITATIONS ON THE LEGISLATURE'S ABILITY TO AMEND A VOTER-APPROVED INITIATIVE

A statute enacted by voter initiative may be amended or repealed by the Legislature only with the approval of the electorate, unless the initiative statute otherwise provides. ( Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (c).) " ‘[T]he purpose of California's constitutional limitation on the Legislature's power to amend initiative statutes is to "protect the people's initiative powers by precluding the Legislature from undoing what the people have done, without the electorate's consent." ’ " ( People v. Kelly, supra , 47 Cal.4th at p. 1025, 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 222 P.3d 186 ; see Gooden, supra , 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 279, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 239.)

For purposes of article II, section 10 of the California Constitution, legislation amends an initiative if it " ‘ "change[s] an existing initiative statute by adding or taking from it some particular provision." ’ " ( Gooden, supra , 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 279, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 239, quoting Pearson, supra , 48 Cal.4th at p. 571, 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 227 P.3d 858.) "[T]his does not mean that any legislation that concerns the same subject matter as an initiative, or even augments an initiative's provisions, is necessarily an amendment for these purposes. ‘The Legislature remains free to address a " ‘related but distinct area’ " [citations] or a matter that an initiative measure "does not specifically authorize or prohibit.’ " [Citations.] In deciding whether this particular provision amends Proposition 115, we simply need to ask whether it prohibits what the initiative authorizes, or authorizes what the initiative prohibits." ( Pearson, supra , at p. 571, 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 227 P.3d 858 ; see Gooden, supra , at pp. 279-280, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 239.)²

In determining whether the Legislature has amended a voter initiative, we have a duty to guard the people's initiative power and to liberally construe it whenever it is challenged to ensure a voter initiative is not improperly annulled. ( Estate of Claeyssens (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 465, 470-471, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 304.) Doubts should be resolved in favor of the initiative power. ( Id. at p. 471, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 304.) Legislative amendments that conflict with the subject matter of a statute enacted by voter initiative must be approved by the voters unless the original initiative permits the Legislature to take such action on its own. ( Ibid. ; see Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (c).) However, the court should not read into an initiative an "undisclosed objective ... that was not presented to the voters." ( Knight v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 14, 18, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 687.)

III. RELEVANT...