People v. Sorto

324 Cal.Rptr.3d 625

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Eddie SORTO, Defendant and Appellant.

B331652

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3.

Filed August 21, 2024

West Codenotes

Recognized as Unconstitutional

Cal. Penal Code § 1170(d)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Lisa S. Coen, Judge. Reversed and remanded. Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. VA090994

James R. Bostwick, Jr., Claremont, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Jonathan Grossman, Stockton, and Mi Kim for Pacific Juvenile Defender Center as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

EGERTON, J.

A court sentenced Eddie Sorto to more than 100 years in prison for crimes he committed when he was 15 years old. After serving 15 years of his sentence, Sorto petitioned for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d) (section 1170(d)).¹ Sorto acknowledged the statute expressly applies only to juvenile offenders sentenced to explicit life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) terms. Nevertheless, he argued equal protection guarantees relief to offenders, like himself, sentenced to long prison terms that are the functional equivalent of LWOP.

About a year before the trial court considered Sorto’s petition, the court in People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 299 Cal.Rptr.3d 634 (Heard) held juvenile offenders sentenced to functionally equivalent LWOP terms are entitled to section 1170(d) relief under the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. Despite this authority, the trial court denied Sorto’s petition on the ground that he had not been sentenced to an explicit LWOP term. On appeal, Sorto raises the same equal protection argument and urges us to follow Heard. The Attorney General argues Heard was wrongly decided and is contrary to California Supreme Court precedent.

We reject the Attorney General’s arguments and conclude offenders sentenced to functionally equivalent LWOP terms—like Sorto—are entitled to section 1170(d) relief under the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. We also hold parole eligibility under section 3051 does not render those offenders ineligible for relief under section 1170(d). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Sorto’s petition and remand the case for the court to consider whether Sorto meets the other requirements for relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The convictions and sentence

Sorto committed a series of crimes against members of a rival gang in August 2005, when he was 15 years old. A jury convicted him of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), assault (§ 240), second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246). The jury also found true multiplemurder and gang-murder special-circumstance allegations (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3), (22)), as well as various firearm and gang enhancement allegations (§§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d), 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). The trial court sentenced Sorto to a determinate term of 10 years plus an indeterminate term of 130 years to life.²

2. Sorto’s petition for recall and resentencing

In 2023, Sorto filed a petition for recall and resentencing under section 1170(d), arguing he satisfied all the statutory requirements for relief. Sorto asked the court to recall his sentence and send his case to the juvenile court for a transfer hearing under Proposition 57 (as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016)).

Sorto acknowledged that section 1170(d) expressly applies only to juvenile offenders sentenced to explicit LWOP terms. Nevertheless, he argued he is entitled to relief because his sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP. In support, Sorto cited Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 299 Cal.Rptr.3d 634, which held a juvenile offender sentenced to a term that is the functional equivalent of LWOP was eligible for section 1170(d) relief under the guarantee of equal protection.

The People opposed Sorto’s petition. Among other things, the People argued Sorto is not serving a functionally equivalent LWOP sentence because he is eligible for parole during his 25th year of incarceration under section 3051. The People also urged the court not to apply Heard, arguing it was wrongly decided.

In a reply brief, Sorto argued Heard is binding precedent and trial courts are required to follow it.

The court denied Sorto’s petition. Without explanation, the court stated it did not find Heard to be "on point with our specific factual scenario." The court then explained that, because Sorto is eligible for parole after 25 years under section 3051, he is not serving an LWOP sentence. The court held, "as a matter of law, because the defendant was not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, he is not entitled to relief under [section 1170(d)]." The court did not directly address Sorto’s equal protection argument.

Sorto timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Sorto argues the trial court erred by denying his section 1170(d) petition because he was not sentenced to an explicit LWOP term. Sorto concedes section 1170(d) expressly applies only to juvenile offenders sentenced to explicit LWOP terms. Nevertheless, he argues the statute violates the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions to the extent it denies relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP.

1. Equal protection

[1] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the California Constitution prohibit the denial of equal protection of the laws. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).) "At core, the requirement of equal protection ensures that the government does not treat a group of people unequally without some justification." (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 379, 410 P.3d 9 (Chatman).)

[2–4] Where, as here, the challenged law is not based on a suspect classification and does not burden fundamental rights, the law denies equal protection "only if there is no rational relationship between a disparity in treatment and some legitimate government purpose." (Chatman, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 288–289, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 379, 410 P.3d 9; see Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 631–634, 299 Cal. Rptr.3d 634 [applying rational basis review to a claim that section 1170(d) violates equal protection].) Under rational basis review, we presume a classification in a statute is rational until the party challenging it establishes there is no conceivable rational basis for the unequal treatment. (Chatman, at p. 289, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 379, 410 P.3d 9.) "The underlying rationale for a statutory classification need not have been ‘ "ever actually articulated’ " by lawmakers, and it does not need to ‘ "be empirically substantiated." ’ [Citation.] Nor does the logic behind a potential justification need to be persuasive or sensible—rather than simply rational." (Ibid.)

[5] "This core feature of equal protection sets a high bar before a law is deemed to lack even the minimal rationality neces- sary for it to survive constitutional scrutiny. Coupled with a rebuttable presumption that legislation is constitutional, this high bar helps ensure that democratically enacted laws are not invalidated merely based on a court’s cursory conclusion that a statute’s tradeoffs seem unwise or unfair." (Chatman, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 289, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 379, 410 P.3d 9.)

[6] In cases like this one, where the "plaintiffs challenge laws drawing distinctions between identifiable groups or classes of persons, on the basis that the distinctions drawn are inconsistent with equal protection, courts no longer need to ask at the threshold whether the two groups are similarly situated for purposes of the law in question. The only pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged difference in treatment is adequately justified under the applicable standard of review." (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 850–851, 318 Cal.Rptr.3d 513, 543 P.3d 960 (Hardin).)

[7] We independently review equal protection claims. (People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 345, 282 Cal. Rptr.3d 151.)

2. Section 1170(d) and related law

In Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (Graham), our nation’s high court held the Eighth Amendment prohibits LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders who committed non-homicide offenses. (Id. at p. 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011.) In response to Graham, the Legislature enacted section 1170(d), creating a recall and resentencing procedure for certain juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP terms. (See In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1049–1050, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 876, 393 P.3d 364 (Kirchner).)

Section 1170(d) provides, in relevant part, "[w]hen a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing." (§ 1170, subd. (d)(1)(A).) The petition must include a statement describing the defendant’s remorse, identifying any work towards rehabilitation, and stating one of four qualifying circumstances is true. (Id., subd. (d)(2).)

As originally enacted, subdivision (d)(2) of section 1170 directed the trial court to hold a hearing to consider whether to recall a defendant’s sentence if the court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the statements in the petition to be true. (See former § 1170, subd. (d)(2)(E), Stats. 2012, ch. 828, § 2.) In 2016, the Legislature amended the statute to require courts to recall the sentence of any defendant who meets the eligibility criteria. (§...