People v. Stevenson

12 N.E.3d 179

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.Martin J. STEVENSON, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 4–13–0313.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

June 11, 2014.

Rehearing denied July 15, 2014.

Jason Chambers, State's Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Linda Susan McClain (argued), all of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, Jacqueline L. Bullard, Amber Corrigan, and Nancy Vincent (argued), all of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Springfield, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In August 2012, a McLean County grand jury indicted defendant, Martin J. Stevenson, for endangering the life of a child (720 ILCS 5/12–21.6(a) (West 2010)). In February 2013, defendant filed two motions in limine. The first motion in limine requested the trial court to prohibit the State from introducing evidence (1) about his “history of prior substance abuse,” (2) defendant sought treatment for his substance abuse, (3) he had previously been prescribed Suboxone “on more than one occasion,” (4) he was prescribed Suboxone on the day before the child died, and (5) the Suboxone prescription was a result of his “relapse.” Defendant asserted the probative value of this evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial nature. The second motion in limine requested the trial court to prohibit the State from introducing evidence (1) defendant had been prescribed Suboxone before the date the offense was alleged to have occurred; (2) he was questioned by police and told police he had been prescribed Suboxone on May 6, 2012, and had been previously prescribed Suboxone ; (3) he told police he had “last been prescribed” Suboxone “1 1/2 to 2 years” before the alleged offense; and (4) records would indicate defendant's “last” Suboxone prescription “had been written during the last three months of 2011.” Defendant asserted his statements and these records were “collateral” and could not be used as an exception to the hearsay rule. In April 2013, after a hearing, the court granted defendant's motions in limine.

¶ 2 The State argues the trial court erred when it granted defendant's motions in limine. The State argues the court erroneously concluded the indictment did not encompass the acts of defendant administering, giving, or providing Suboxone to the child. It argues evidence of defendant's drug addiction is (1) part of the continuing narrative of the events giving rise to the offense, (2) admissible to show his state of mind, and (3) relevant to its ability to inquire on cross-examination whether Suboxone affected defendant's memory and ability to recall events of the crime. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In August 2012, a McLean County grand jury indicted defendant for endangering the life of a child (720 ILCS 5/12–21.6(a) (West 2010)). The indictment stated as follows:

“[D]efendant willfully caused the life of [L.S.], a child under the age of 18 years, to be endangered in that the defendant placed the child in proximity to or permitted access to the drug Suboxone, a controlled substance, and said proximity to or access to the Suboxone was the proximate cause of the death of [L.S.]”

¶ 5 A. Suboxone

¶ 6 Suboxone is a brand-name prescription drug. It contains buprenorphine and naloxone.

¶ 7 B. Defendant's Motions in Limine

¶ 8 In February 2013, defendant filed two motions in limine. The first motion stated the State had evidence, including (1) defendant's “history of prior substance abuse,” (2) “defendant sought treatment for substance abuse/addi [c]tion,” (3) defendant was prescribed “on more than one occasion a medication known as Suboxone,” (4) defendant “was prescribed Suboxone on the day before the death of his minor daughter which gives rise to this charge,” and (5) the May 6, 2012, Suboxone prescription was “issued due to the defendant's ‘relapse ’ (usage of non-prescribed drugs) shortly before the date on which this offense is alleged to have occurred.” Defendant argued the circumstances behind the Suboxone prescription were “irrelevant and immaterial” to the charged offense and highly prejudicial. Defendant requested the State be prohibited from “using, referring to or attempting to introduce the evidence” referenced.

¶ 9 The second motion in limine requested the trial court to prohibit the State from introducing evidence (1) defendant had been prescribed Suboxone before the date the offense was alleged to have occurred; (2) defendant was questioned by police and “stated to police that he had been prescribed Suboxone on May 6, 2012, and had previously been prescribed Suboxone in the past”; (3) defendant told police he had “last been prescribed” Suboxone “1 1/2 to 2 years” before the alleged offense; and (4) records would indicate defendant's “last” Suboxone prescription “had been written during the last three months of 2011.” Defendant asserted his statements and these records were “collateral” and could not be used as an exception to the hearsay rule, namely as an admission against interest or a false exculpatory statement. Defendant requested the State be prohibited from “using, referring to or attempting to introduce the evidence” referenced.

¶ 10 C. The Motion in Limine Hearing

¶ 11 In April 2013, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motions in limine. Defense counsel informed the court the parties agreed to the following facts: (1) Suboxone is used to treat persons with opiate addiction or dependence; (2) defendant sought treatment for opiate addiction in 2011 and 2012; (3) as a result of his treatment he was prescribed Suboxone ; (4) he had been prescribed Suboxone on May 6, 2012; (5) defendant was in possession of Suboxone on May 7, 2012; (6) the victim, L.S., was a one-year-old child and defendant's daughter; (7) she was taken to the hospital on May 7, 2012, and died; (8) a toxicology report showed Suboxone in her system; and (9) L.S. died as a result of Suboxone intoxication.

¶ 12 Defense counsel argued, in relevant part, as follows:

“The State did certain research, did conduct interviews of persons, and found [out] about that history of substance abuse, * * * found out about the prescription of the medication, and has that body of knowledge, and they're ready to present that at trial. The problem that I see with a number of things that are set forth in the first motion in limine is the following: A history of prior substance abuse, in reality, exists on the part of the defendant; that he sought treatment for that substance abuse is available to the State; that he was prescribed the medication, Suboxone ; that he was prescribed that the day before; that all of these things really are not relevant to the charges that are pending in this case. To put someone on the stand to say, [‘]here's what Suboxone is commonly used for, and in the case of [defendant], was used to treat a substance abuse difficulty or condition that he had,[’] paints him in a manner that is so extremely prejudicial, that even if there were any relevance to that information, that it would be greatly and substantially outweighed by the prejudicial value that would attach to that.

There is no prohibition from the State introducing the testimony that [defendant] was prescribed that, that he admitted that he had that, but the purpose for which it was prescribed, I would suggest that it is irrelevant. They can certainly provide testimony that the ingredients of Suboxone, in certain dosages, can prove to be deleterious to an adult's health, or an adult's life, and certainly can prove to be fatal in the case of an infant, without the need for any reference to [defendant] having those conditions that were precedent to him receiving or obtaining the prescription on that date. * * *

As to the second motion in limine, * * * what I am saying in that motion is, that even if the defendant misspoke, or said something that was inconsistent as to when he had last been prescribed Suboxone before [May] 2012, it's a collateral issue, and it is not something that is indicative of any hearsay exception that ought [to] be allowed at trial in this cause. * * * Whether or not [defendant] was prescribed [Suboxone ] six months before May of 2012, or three years before May of 2012, really is of no import, and does nothing to get us closer to an answer of the issues that will be contained in the instructions given to the jury for this charge.”

Counsel argued defendant's alleged inconsistent statement was about a collateral matter and whether he was prescribed Suboxone “six months before May of 2012, or three years before May of 2012, really is of no import.”

¶ 13 The State responded it sought to introduce evidence about defendant's substance-abuse treatment and Suboxone prescription to show (1) defendant's opportunity to have possession, (2) his identity, (3) absence of mistake or accident, and (4) intent of willfully providing Suboxone to L.S. The State stated police searched defendant's residence on May 7, 2012, and did not discover evidence of the medication. The State asserted there is “an important question about where that Suboxone was on that date and time, and why it wasn't there.” The State added defendant's spouse examined the Suboxone bottle on May 7, 2012, and “she saw a certain pill inside that pill bottle” and “what she found in that pill bottle is important.” Evidence would be presented to show L.S. was not feeling well on May 7, 2012. The State articulated its theory that defendant, “who took this medicine that made him feel better, possibly felt that it would make [L.S.] feel better, and * * * that he provided her with a certain amount of that drug.”

¶ 14 Defense counsel responded “absolutely nothing” in the discovery materials showed defendant gave Suboxone to L.S. The following exchange occurred:

“THE COURT: Well, there's no charge to support that at this point as well, nor

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