People v. Stewart

2023 IL App (1st) 210912

219 N.E.3d 1215

467 Ill.Dec. 816

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Wynton STEWART, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-21-0912

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division.

Filed May 4, 2023

James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Stephen L. Gentry, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique Abraham, Noah Montague, and Erin K. Slattery, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

PRESIDING JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Approximately one year after defendant Wynton Stewart was arrested and charged with the first degree murder of Jaquan Reed, defendant sought to waive his fundamental right to the assistance of counsel. At the time of his waiver, the Cook County circuit court did not provide him with the admonishments required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984)—admonishments meant to satisfy the constitutional requirement that a waiver of counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. People v. Haynes , 174 Ill. 2d 204, 235, 220 Ill.Dec. 406, 673 N.E.2d 318 (1996).

¶ 2 Defendant mustered his own defense at trial and was subsequently found guilty of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced defendant to 30 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections for first degree murder, plus an additional 25 years because defendant personally discharged a firearm during the offense that proximately caused Reed's death.

¶ 3 The principal question of this appeal is whether defendant's waiver of counsel substantially complied with Rule 401(a). We hold that it did not. This record does not persuade us that defendant's decision was made with a full awareness of both his rights and the consequences of his decision to abandon those rights. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.¹

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 A. Procedural History

¶ 6 On July 25, 2018, two days after his arrest, the defendant appeared for a bond hearing, at which time the trial court informed defendant that he was charged with "the felony offense of first degree murder." It did not inform defendant that first degree murder is punishable by 20 to 60 years in prison, and there was no discussion of any firearm enhancement that would increase the possible penalties to a range of 45 years to natural life.

¶ 7 Defendant was arraigned on September 4, 2018. Appointed counsel entered a plea of not guilty to, as the trial court put it, "the six counts, which include first degree murder, many theories of it." Once again, there was no discussion on the record of any of the possible penalties or the exact nature of the charges.

¶ 8 On June 25, 2019, defendant informed the trial court that he had fired his appointed public defender. The trial court told defendant that the public defender could not be fired and followed up by asking, "[D]o you want to represent yourself?" Defendant indicated his desire to proceed pro se. After the invocation of defendant's fundamental right to represent himself, the trial court questioned defendant at length about his schooling, work history, history of mental health issues, and previous involvement in the criminal justice system and the fact that the assistant state's attorney was an experienced, trained lawyer. He indicated he understood that his custody status would limit his ability to prepare his defense, and he responded in the affirmative when asked if he understood that "[t]he Public Defender's Office is appointed to represent defendants who cannot afford a lawyer" and that "the Public Defender's Office has the ability and the power to decide who gets assigned to which cases."

¶ 9 Defendant volunteered that his desire to represent himself was based on a disagreement with his appointed lawyer. The trial court explained that disagreements take place between lawyers and criminal defendants on a regular basis and asked again if the defendant wished to represent himself. Defendant answered in the affirmative, and the trial court said, "Defendant may represent himself."

¶ 10 At no point during the proceedings that day did the trial court inform defendant of (1) the nature of the charges against him, (2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, and (3) his right to counsel.

¶ 11 Trial commenced on January 24, 2020. Before proceeding to jury selection, the State announced that it was proceeding on counts V and VI of the indictment, dismissing counts I, II, III, and IV. In the very next sentence, the trial court said, "just so you're aware, the state charged you with six different counts of murder, but they're proceeding on three specific counts." The trial court told defendant the State was proceeding on the counts that alleged that, during the commission of the offense, defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused death.

¶ 12 Following jury selection, defendant moved the trial court to dismiss his case for a violation of Illinois's speedy trial statute. However, before argument on that motion commenced, an attorney apparently inserted himself into the proceedings. Though the record is somewhat unclear, it appears this attorney entered the courtroom after voir dire and gave defendant a written motion to dismiss. The following exchange took place:

"THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Stewart, anything you want to add outside of—no, Mr. Jackson. This is not going to be allowed.

MR. JACKSON: It's important—I'm not going to—

THE COURT: No, Mr. Jackson, completely inappropriate that you are sitting behind the defendant who is representing himself, completely inappropriate, completely inappropriate.

MR. JACKSON: Judge, if he likes me as a standby. Would you like me as your standby counsel[?]

DEFENDANT: That's fine.

THE COURT: No, Mr. Jackson.

MR. JACKSON: I just want to make the record here. I'm prepared to file my appearance—limited appearance for purposes of this motion in particular. Now, you're denying him the right to have—

THE COURT: I already denied it.

MR. JACKSON: I understand that, Judge. I understand.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JACKSON: But I'm just making my record.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JACKSON: And I prepared—I drafted the motion.

THE COURT: Okay."

¶ 13 Following additional discussion about the speedy trial issue, counsel said, "With that I'll leave." The trial court replied:

"Thank you. Mr. Jackson, thank you. As a friend of the Court I will accept that you walked into this courtroom after jury was selected and handed what you now acknowledge to be a document and motion you prepared when you are not the attorney of record when Mr. Stewart has decided to represent himself."

¶ 14 Defendant's motion was denied, and the trial proceeded.

¶ 15 B. Trial Evidence

¶ 16 Responding to a 911 call on the evening of January 1, 2018, Chicago police officers discovered Reed's lifeless, frozen body face down in the snow in an alleyway at 81st Street and Stony Island Avenue. A single .45-caliber bullet had penetrated Reed's left temporal bone and left temporal lobe before coming to rest in the right temporal lobe, precipitating his death. Scorch marks on Reed's left temple indicated that the gun responsible for his death was fired mere inches away. There were tire tracks and footprints around Reed's body, but no shell casings were recovered.

¶ 17 Three days later, defendant phoned Reed's grandmother, Dorothy Reed, insistent that he wished to tell her what happened with her grandson and that no one else wanted to listen. He informed her that he attended a New Year's Eve Party with Reed and that afterward he dropped Reed off around 79th Street and Stony Island Avenue.

¶ 18 Chicago police detectives recovered security footage from both ends of the alley from which Reed's body was recovered. Footage from one end showed a dark, four-door sedan with a broken driver's side taillight pull into the alley. Approximately two minutes later, the vehicle exited the alley and pulled onto the street. Detectives learned that defendant drove a black 2008 BMW sedan with four doors that was registered in his name.

¶ 19 Detectives located defendant's BMW at 77th Street and Coles Avenue on January 10, 2018, at 10 p.m. A visual inspection with a flashlight from outside the vehicle revealed what appeared to be numerous bloodstains throughout the interior of the vehicle. The vehicle was towed and impounded.

¶ 20 Additional investigation led detectives to an apartment located half a block from where defendant's car was seized. The unit's lease contract belonged to Yasmeen Zuri, defendant's ex-girlfriend. The two moved into the apartment in October 2017, but she moved out the following month. As of December 2017, defendant was still living in the apartment.

¶ 21 A search of that apartment yielded a blue jacket, a V-neck T-shirt, jeans, and black boots, as well as a container of "bubble scrub" and an air freshener, all of which appeared to be stained with blood. Additionally, a fired bullet and a spent shell casing were recovered from a drawer. On February 2, 2018, after defendant's car was released back into his possession, defendant was stopped by Chicago police because one of his taillights was not functioning.

¶ 22 Forensic analysis eventually confirmed that the stains inside defendant's car were blood and that Reed's DNA was present throughout those stains. Defendant's DNA, however, was excluded from every sample taken from the car save for a bloodstain swab taken from the passenger seat. Defendant was included in that sample as a minor donor, but the frequency of that minor DNA profile in the general population was as high as one in three people.

¶ 23 Likewise, the articles of clothing recovered from Zuri's apartment were confirmed to be stained with blood, and the coat, shirt, and jeans contained Reed's DNA. Defendant's DNA profile, however, was excluded from those articles of clothing.

¶ 24 Forensic analysis of the bullet that killed Reed and the bullet found in Zuri's...