People v. Stewart

2022 IL 126116

215 N.E.3d 752

465 Ill.Dec. 547

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,

v.Denzal STEWART, Appellee.

Docket No. 126116

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion Filed October 20, 2022

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick, Katherine M. Doersch, and Michael L. Cebula, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Douglas R. Hoff, Deputy Defender, and Ginger Leigh Odom, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender (Lorellee Kampschnieder, law student), of Chicago, for appellee.

Shobha L. Mahadev and Lydette S. Assefa, of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, of Chicago, for amici curiae Children and Family Justice Center et al.

CHIEF JUSTICE ANNE M. BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In 2017, defendant Denzal Stewart was convicted in the circuit court of Cook County of possession of a stolen motor vehicle ( 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2016)) and sentenced as a Class X offender to six years in prison. On appeal, the appellate court held that defendant's first felony offense, committed in 2013 when he was 17 years old, was not a qualifying offense for Class X sentencing under section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) ( 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2016)). 2020 IL App (1st) 180014-U, 2020 WL 1891226. Therefore, that conviction could not serve as a basis for Class X sentencing eligibility. Id. Accordingly, the appellate court vacated defendant's Class X sentence and remanded the cause to the circuit court for resentencing as a Class 2 offender. Id. ¶ 48. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the appellate court's judgment.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The appellate court's order contains a detailed description of the trial court proceedings, including a recitation of the evidence presented at trial. For present purposes, a brief summary will suffice. Additional facts will be set forth in the analysis section as necessary for resolution of the issue raised in the instant appeal.

¶ 4 In 2016, defendant, then 20 years old, was charged with one count of possession of a stolen motor vehicle, a Class 2 felony. 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1), (b) (West 2016). The offense was committed on August 13, 2016. During the pendency of the case, defendant turned 21. In 2017, a jury found defendant guilty of the charged offense, and the trial court entered a judgment of conviction.

¶ 5 The trial court found that defendant was subject to mandatory Class X sentencing pursuant to section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Code. At the time of defendant's conviction, this provision stated, in relevant part:

"(b) When a defendant, over the age of 21 years, is convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, after having twice been convicted in any state or federal court of an offense that contains the same elements as an offense now (the date the Class 1 or Class 2 felony was committed) classified in Illinois as a Class 2 or greater Class felony and those charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of different series of acts, that defendant shall be sentenced as a Class X offender. This subsection does not apply unless:

(1) the first felony was committed after February 1, 1978 (the effective date of Public Act 80-1099);

(2) the second felony was committed after conviction on the first; and

(3) the third felony was committed after conviction on the second." 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2016).

¶ 6 At sentencing, the State introduced into evidence defendant's two predicate felony convictions—a 2013 conviction for residential burglary, a Class 1 felony ( 720 ILCS 5/19-3 (West 2012) ), and a 2014 conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle, a Class 2 felony ( 625 ILCS 5/4-103 (West 2014) ). Accordingly, the trial court found defendant was eligible for Class X sentencing and sentenced him to the statutory minimum term of six years’ imprisonment and three years of mandatory supervised release (MSR). See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a), (l ) (West 2016).¹

¶ 7 On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in finding him eligible for Class X sentencing. Defendant was 17 years old when he was convicted of his first felony offense in 2013. One year later, in 2014, the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 ( 705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2014)) was amended to raise the age for exclusive juvenile court jurisdiction from 16 years to 17 years. See Pub. Act 98-61 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-120, 5-130). Defendant argued that if he had committed the residential burglary on August 13, 2016 (the date that the current offense was committed), it would have resulted in a juvenile adjudication, not a felony conviction. He argued, therefore, that it was not a qualifying felony offense for Class X sentencing.

¶ 8 The appellate court agreed that defendant was ineligible to be sentenced as a Class X offender. 2020 IL App (1st) 180014-U, ¶ 32. The court found the statutory language to be clear and unambiguous. Id. ¶ 30 (citing People v. Miles , 2020 IL App (1st) 180736, ¶ 10, 446 Ill.Dec. 458, 170 N.E.3d 984 ). It held that the relevant question for determining whether an offense qualifies as a predicate offense under the statute is "whether the prior offense would have been a Class 2 or greater felony if committed on the date of the present offense." Id. Applying this question to the instant case, the court held that defendant's residential burglary, "had it been committed under the laws in effect on August 13, 2016, would have been resolved through delinquency proceedings," rather than being tried in adult court. Id. ¶ 32. Therefore, the offense would have resulted in a juvenile adjudication rather than a felony conviction. Id. A juvenile adjudication does not constitute a "conviction," except where specifically provided by law. Id. ¶ 36 (citing People v. Taylor , 221 Ill. 2d 157, 176, 302 Ill.Dec. 697, 850 N.E.2d 134 (2006) ). Accordingly, the court held, defendant's 2013 residential burglary offense, committed when he was 17 years old, was not " ‘an offense now [(the date the Class 1 or Class 2 felony was committed)] classified in Illinois as a Class 2 or greater Class felony,’ " within the meaning of section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Code. (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 32 (quoting 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2016)). Having held that defendant's 2013 conviction was not a qualifying offense under the statute, the appellate court vacated defendant's Class X sentence and remanded the cause to the trial court with directions to resentence defendant as a Class 2 offender. Id. ¶ 48.

¶ 9 This court allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2019). Defendant filed a cross-appeal, arguing that applying section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Code to defendants who were under 21 years of age at the time of all relevant offenses violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11 ) and the ex post facto , due process, and equal protection clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., art. I, §§ 9, 10, amend. XIV ; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 16 ).

¶ 10 ANALYSIS

¶ 11 At issue in this appeal is whether defendant's 2013 conviction for a Class 1 felony offense at age 17 was a qualifying offense for purposes of Class X sentencing under section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Code. At the outset, defendant forfeited the sentencing issue by failing to object to it in the trial court and raise it in a postsentencing motion. See People v. Hillier , 237 Ill. 2d 539, 544-45, 342 Ill.Dec. 1, 931 N.E.2d 1184 (2010). Nevertheless, he argued before the appellate court and continues to argue in this court that the issue is reviewable as plain error.² A forfeited claim constitutes plain error in two circumstances:

"(1) where a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error and (2) where a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence." People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 48, 387 Ill.Dec. 633, 23 N.E.3d 325.

¶ 12 If defendant is correct that he was statutorily ineligible for a Class X sentence, this would amount to plain error under the second prong of our plain error analysis because it affects defendant's substantial rights. " ‘The imposition of an unauthorized sentence affects substantial rights’ and, thus, may be considered by a reviewing court even if not properly preserved in the trial court." People v. Fort , 2017 IL 118966, ¶ 19, 417 Ill.Dec. 566, 88 N.E.3d 718 (quoting People v. Hicks , 181 Ill. 2d 541, 545, 230 Ill.Dec. 244, 693 N.E.2d 373 (1998), citing People v. Brown , 197 Ill. App. 3d 907, 918, 145 Ill.Dec. 429, 557 N.E.2d 199 (1990) ). Thus, we first must determine whether the trial court's sentencing determination was, indeed, error. See People v. Hood , 2016 IL 118581, ¶ 18, 409 Ill.Dec. 1, 67 N.E.3d 213 (the first task in a plain error analysis is to ascertain whether error occurred at all).

¶ 13 In construing the statute at issue in this appeal, we are guided by the following well-established principles of statutory interpretation. The primary goal in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Roberts , 214 Ill. 2d 106, 116, 291 Ill.Dec. 674, 824 N.E.2d 250 (2005). The best indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Gaytan , 2015 IL 116223, ¶ 23, 392 Ill.Dec. 333, 32 N.E.3d 641. Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it should be applied without resort to additional aids of statutory construction. People v. Marshall , 242 Ill. 2d...