People v. Stock

961 N.W.2d 214 (Mem)

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Kellie Nichole STOCK, Defendant-Appellant.

SC: 160968

COA: 340541

Supreme Court of Michigan.

July 9, 2021

Order

On May 5, 2021, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the December 26, 2019 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered. MCR 7.305(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that the defendant's convictions for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing death and operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing a serious impairment of a body function were supported by sufficient evidence on the record. The prosecution failed to present evidence that the presence of cocaine metabolites in the defendant's urine supports a reasonable inference that the defendant had cocaine in her body. MCL 257.625(8) states, in relevant part:

A person, whether licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle on a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles ... if the person has in [their] body any amount of a controlled substance listed in schedule 1 under section 7212 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.7212, or a rule promulgated under that section, or of a controlled substance described in section 7214(a)(iv ) of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.7214.

As noted by dissenting Judge SHAPIRO, the prosecution bears the burden of proof with regard to each element of an offense, including whether a controlled substance was in a defendant's body. In People v. Feezel , 486 Mich. 184, 783 N.W.2d 67 (2010), this Court held that 11-carboxy-THC, a metabolite of the main psychoactive chemical in marijuana, is not a Schedule 1 controlled substance for purposes of MCL 257.625(8). Therefore a person cannot be prosecuted under the statute for operating a motor vehicle with "any amount" of the metabolite in their system. In this case, the prosecution presented evidence—the results of a toxicology screen—indicating the presence of an unidentified metabolite of cocaine in the defendant's urine. While the prosecution contends that Feezel can be distinguished, the prosecution argues for an interpretation of "controlled substance" that would include any metabolite of cocaine—the same argument this Court rejected in Feezel when we explained that 11-carboxy-THC is not a Schedule 1 controlled substance. Id. at 210-211, 783 N.W.2d 67 (opinion by M. F. CAVANAGH , J.); id. at 217, 783 N.W.2d 67 (opinion by WEAVER , J.). Here, the prosecution failed to identify the metabolite or demonstrate that the metabolite itself was a "controlled substance" for purposes of MCL 257.625(8). Further, the prosecution's evidence showing the mere presence of an unidentified metabolite, but nothing more, was not sufficient to prove that the defendant had any amount of cocaine in her body at the time of the motor vehicle collision. We therefore REVERSE the defendant's sentences for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing death and operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing a serious impairment of a body function, and we REMAND this case to the Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order. On remand, the circuit court shall determine whether resentencing on the defendant's remaining convictions is required where the Court of Appeals has reversed the defendant's convictions of operating a motor vehicle while license suspended causing death and operating a motor vehicle while license suspended causing serious impairment of a body function and where this Court has reversed the defendant's sentences for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing death and operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing a serious impairment of a body function. In all other respects, the application for leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

We do not retain jurisdiction.

Zahra, J. (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent from this Court's order reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) causing death¹ and OWI causing a serious impairment of a body function² based on defendant's positive test for cocaine metabolites after her motor vehicle accident, as well as her behavior leading up to the accident.

"Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are reviewed de novo."³ "In evaluating defendant's claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor to determine whether any trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt."⁴ All conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the prosecution,⁵ and circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom can constitute satisfactory proof of the crime.⁶ "Circumstantial evidence is evidence of a fact, or a chain of facts or circumstances, that, by indirection or inference, carries conviction to the mind and logically or reasonably establishes the fact to be proved."⁷

MCL 257.625(8)⁸ prohibits the operation of a vehicle on a highway if a "person has in his or her body any amount of a controlled substance listed in schedule 1 under [ MCL 333.7212 ] ... or of a controlled substance described in [ MCL 333.7214(a)(iv ) ]."⁹ MCL 333.7214(a)(iv ) includes, as a Schedule 2 controlled substance:

Coca leaves and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation thereof which is chemically equivalent to or identical with any of these substances, except that the substances do not include decocainized coca leaves or extraction of coca leaves which extractions do not contain cocaine or ecgonine. The substances include cocaine, its salts, stereoisomers, and salts of stereoisomers when the existence of the salts, stereoisomers, and salts of stereoisomers is possible within the specific chemical designation.

Whether the presence of a cocaine metabolite in one's body is sufficient to sustain a conviction under MCL 257.625(8) first turns on whether a cocaine metabolite is a Schedule 2 drug under MCL 333.7214(a)(iv ). Although this Court has not yet delved into the science of cocaine metabolites, it has done so with respect to the specific marijuana metabolite 11-carboxy-tetrahydrocannabinol (11-carboxy-THC), which is produced by the body naturally when it metabolizes THC—the psychoactive ingredient of marijuana. In People v. Feezel , this Court held that 11-carboxy-THC is not a Schedule 1 controlled substance under MCL 333.7212 of the Public Health Code, MCL 333.1101 et seq. , and thus "a person cannot be prosecuted under MCL 257.625(8) for operating a motor vehicle with any amount of 11-carboxy-THC in his or her system."¹⁰ In rendering its decision, the Feezel Court overruled its prior decision in People v. Derror , which came to the opposite conclusion just four years earlier.¹¹

Although I would not extend Feezel ’s narrow holding here,¹² even applying Feezel to cocaine metabolites in general does not automatically resolve this case. This Court's conclusion that "the prosecution's evidence showing the mere presence of an unidentified metabolite ... was not sufficient to prove that the defendant had any amount of cocaine in her body at the time of the motor vehicle collision" ignores the rather elementary rule that "circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime."¹³ As the Court of Appeals explained below, the presence of cocaine metabolites in defendant's urine is "probative of the presence of cocaine" and may still be used as circumstantial and inferential evidence that defendant had cocaine in her body at the time of the accident.¹⁴ Indeed, even the dissenters in Derror , who later formed the majority in Feezel , recognized that the presence of "11-carboxy-THC may be used as circumstantial evidence of a statutory violation[.]"¹⁵ The presence of cocaine metabolites in a person's body is even stronger circumstantial evidence of a statutory violation given the closer biological link between its presence and impairment. Because a cocaine metabolite only ever appears in a person's body if the person has ingested cocaine, the presence of cocaine metabolites necessarily establishes that defendant ingested cocaine at some prior point in time. And given that defendant was taken to the hospital immediately after her accident, it is unlikely that she ingested cocaine in the roughly four and a half hours between the accident and her urine test. It was therefore reasonable for the jury to infer that defendant had ingested cocaine prior to her motor vehicle accident.

Further, defendant's behavior leading up to the accident is compelling circumstantial evidence that she operated her vehicle with cocaine in her body. An undercover police officer had observed defendant drive the wrong way down a one-way street and attempted to have nearby officers stop defendant's vehicle on that basis. Despite the police activating their vehicle's emergency lights and sirens, defendant refused to pull her vehicle over. Instead, defendant initiated a high-speed police chase, in which she sped down Woodward Avenue in rush-hour traffic, ran a red light, and crashed into another vehicle. The accident resulted in the death of the driver of the other vehicle and left the passenger of defendant's vehicle, Classie Butler, seriously injured. At trial, Butler testified that when defendant observed what she believed to be an undercover police car behind her, she started speeding. Butler insisted that she be let out of the vehicle because she was scared by how fast defendant was driving. Defendant ignored Butler's complaints and...