People v. Stoot

1

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CELESTINE JOHN STOOT, Defendant and Appellant.

D082995

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division

August 19, 2024

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County No SWF2101003 Jeffrey M. Zimel, Judge. Affirmed.

Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Namita Patel, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

RUBIN J.

I. INTRODUCTION

A jury convicted Celestine John Stoot of first degree murder with personal use of a firearm, felony child endangerment, and possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon. Stoot seeks reversal of the murder and child endangerment counts, claiming the trial court failed to instruct the jury properly on lesser included offenses. Finding no error on the murder count and harmless error on the child endangerment count, we affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

In the summer of 2021, Stoot and Natasha Barlow were in a relationship. They had a child together, then two-year-old John Doe. During their relationship, Stoot would threaten Barlow with violence, like maiming her with a chainsaw, burning down her house while she was inside, and shooting her. Primarily due to these repeated threats, Barlow wanted to end the relationship with Stoot.

On July 4, 2021, Stoot shot Barlow to death in his small two-bedroom house. A single round fatally pierced Barlow's neck and came to rest in the adjoining bedroom, very close to a child's bed. That neighboring room is where Stoot's young children stayed when visiting.^[1]

As a result of their investigation, the police concluded that a struggle occurred throughout the house preceding the shooting. A fan and two chairs were knocked over in the living room, Barlow's purse was on the kitchen floor, one of Barlow's artificial fingernails was found in the hallway outside of Stoot's bedroom, and a wig Barlow normally glued to her head was found on Stoot's bed.

Testifying at trial, Stoot disputed that a struggle occurred; he attributed the state of Barlow's purse and the living room chairs to John Doe and claimed the shooting was an accident. He explained that after returning to his house from a party, Barlow went inside while he stayed outside with John Doe to play for a few minutes. He then brought John Doe inside, locked the doors, and went into his bedroom where Barlow pointed a gun at him and said, "I'm tired of your shit." According to Stoot, he tried to grab the gun from Barlow, causing it to accidentally fire and kill Barlow. He claimed he had no intention of shooting or killing Barlow, and he was unable to say whether he or Barlow pulled the trigger.

Stoot also testified that he was unaware of John Doe's exact location at the time of the shooting. He assumed John Doe was in the living room, but when he exited his bedroom after shooting Barlow, he saw John Doe halfway down the short hallway outside the bedroom.

Leaving the scene of the murder on foot, Stoot walked approximately one mile with John Doe before accepting a ride from J.L., a person unknown to Stoot. With Stoot and John Doe sitting in the front seat, J.L. drove to a gas station approximately 30 minutes away. Stoot's second cousin retrieved Stoot and John Doe from the gas station and drove them back to Stoot's house. While there, Stoot moved Barlow's body onto a rug and gathered some belongings. He then fled to Las Vegas with John Doe, discarding Barlow's car, his cell phone, and the murder weapon along the way. On July 6, 2021, law enforcement apprehended Stoot.

The Office of the Riverside County District Attorney filed charges against Stoot. A jury found Stoot guilty of (1) first degree murder (Pen. Code,^[2] § 187, subd. (a)), during which he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); (2) felony child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (a)); (3) possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)); and (4) possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced Stoot to prison for 100 years to life plus 13 years and four months. Stoot's timely appeal followed.

III. DISCUSSION

Stoot argues the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on lesser included offenses for murder and felony child endangerment. For murder, he claims the trial court should have instructed on imperfect self-defense. For felony child endangerment, he contends the court failed to provide the jury with instructions for its misdemeanor counterpart. We conclude insufficient evidence supported giving an imperfect self-defense instruction. And while the People concede the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on misdemeanor child endangerment, we find the error harmless. We therefore affirm the judgment.

A. Standard of Review

We independently review whether an instruction on a lesser included offense is appropriate. (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 584.) A lesser included offense instruction is required when supported by substantial evidence, meaning a reasonable jury could conclude" 'that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.'" (Ibid.)

B. Imperfect Self-defense

Stoot claims his own testimony provided sufficient evidence to support an imperfect self-defense instruction. Stoot points to his description of attempting to take the gun from Barlow after she both pointed the weapon at him and made a threatening statement. He further contends that the trial court's decision to instruct on perfect self-defense shows there was substantial evidence of imperfect self-defense.

"A homicide is considered justified as self-defense where the defendant actually and reasonably believed the use of deadly force was necessary to defend himself from imminent threat of death or great bodily injury. Under such circumstances, the killing is not a crime. [Citations.] Where the defendant kills while actually but unreasonably believing the use of deadly force was necessary, defendant is considered to have acted in imperfect self-defense. Imperfect self-defense is not a complete defense to a killing, but negates the malice element and reduces the offense to voluntary manslaughter." (People v. Sotelo-Urena (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 732, 744, italics omitted.)

Stoot points only to his testimony as a basis for self-defense, whether perfect or imperfect. According to Stoot's version of events that night, the gun inadvertently discharged when Stoot attempted to take it from Barlow. As Stoot explained to the jury, he did not intend to shoot or kill Barlow, rather the shooting happened by accident, and he was unsure who pulled the trigger. If believed, this testimony does not show that Stoot actually but unreasonably believed he needed to use deadly force to defend himself, or that he shot Barlow to defend himself. Consequently, the court lacked any evidence on which to base a jury instruction that voluntary manslaughter resulted from imperfect self-defense.

We also find unpersuasive Stoot's argument that because the trial court instructed the jury on perfect self-defense it erred by failing to give the jury an instruction on imperfect self-defense." '[J]ust because a trial court instructs a jury on perfect self-defense, this does not necessarily mean it has a sua sponte duty to also instruct on imperfect self-defense.'" (People v. Valenzuela (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1231, italics omitted.) Accordingly, the fact that the trial court instructed on perfect self-defense does not change our analysis.^[3]

In sum, Stoot fails to show that substantial evidence supported an imperfect self-defense jury instruction.

C. Child Endangerment

Stoot argues no evidence showed John Doe was near the shooting when it occurred. Nor did the evidence demonstrate that Stoot put his son in circumstances likely to produce great bodily harm or death. Stoot further contends a rational juror could have found that accepting a car ride from a stranger placed John Doe in some type of theoretical danger, but not circumstances likely to cause great bodily harm or death. He therefore claims the trial court should have instructed the jury on misdemeanor child endangerment, and the court's failure to do so was prejudicial error.

The People concede the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on misdemeanor child endangerment, but argue the error was harmless. We accept the concession and limit our analysis to the issue of harmlessness.

Child endangerment occurs when a person "willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of that child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits that child to be placed in a situation where his or her person or health is endangered." (§ 273a, subd. (a).) The offense is a felony when it occurs "under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death." (§ 273a, subd. (a).) Otherwise, the offense is a misdemeanor. (§ 273a, subd. (b).)

"[T]he definition of 'likely' in the context of section 273a is not that death or serious injury is probable or more likely than not." (People v. Wilson (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1204.) Instead, it "means a substantial danger, i.e., a serious and well-founded risk, of great bodily harm or death." (Ibid.)^[4]" 'Great bodily harm refers to significant or substantial injury,'" but actual injury is not required. (People v. Cortes (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 80.)

Error...