People v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara Cty.

319 Cal.Rptr.3d 488

The PEOPLE, Petitioner,

v.The SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY; Respondent;

John Kevin Woodward, Real Party in Interest.

H051311

Court of Appeal, Sixth District.

Filed March 14, 2024

Trial Court: County of Santa Clara, Trial Judge: Hon. Shella Deen (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. C2200594)

Jeffrey F. Rosen, District Attorney, Kaci R. Lopez, Supervising District Attorney, and David R. Boyd, Deputy District Attorney for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Nolan Barton Olmos & Luciano, LLP, Daniel L. Barton and Evan C. Greenberg for Real Party in Interest.

Danner, Acting P. J.

In this petition for extraordinary writ relief, we consider whether constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy bar the refiling of a murder charge after its dismissal by court order in 1996 following two mistrials.

In 1992, John Kevin Woodward was charged with the murder of Laurie Houts. The case proceeded to trial and twice resulted in deadlocked juries and declarations of mistrial. After the second mistrial in 1996, the trial court dismissed the case pursuant to Penal Code former section 1385.¹ In a written order, the trial court explained the dismissal was "in the furtherance of justice for insufficiency of the evidence."

Advancements in DNA technology led to new evidence against Woodward. In 2022, the Santa Clara County District Attorney (district attorney) refiled the murder charge against him. Woodward moved to dismiss the complaint on double jeopardy grounds. The trial court agreed that the 1996 dismissal of the case for insufficiency of the evidence operated as an acquittal and dismissed the refiled complaint.

Petitioner district attorney brings this petition for writ of mandate. He asks this court to order the trial court to vacate its dismissal order and enter a new order denying real party in interest Woodward’s motion to dismiss. The district attorney disputes that the murder charge against Woodward was dismissed due to legal insufficiency of the evidence and contends the trial court erred in construing the 1996 dismissal order as an acquittal.

We agree. Applying the standard articulated in People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 80, 991 P.2d 165 (Hatch), we decide the trial court’s section 1385 dismissal order does not clearly indicate an intent to dismiss for legally insufficient evidence and preclude retrial. As double jeopardy principles do not bar the refiling of the case against Woodward, we will issue a peremptory writ directing the trial court to vacate its order dismissing the refiled murder charge.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. 1992-1996 Murder Prosecution

On September 5, 1992, Laurie Houts was found dead in her car, parked about one mile from her place of work in Mountain View. She had been strangled with a rope while seated in the driver’s seat. The rope had been pulled through her mouth like a gag, knotted behind the neck, and left in place. The cause of death was strangulation.

Woodward was identified as a suspect. At the time, he lived with Houts’s boyfriend Brent Fulmer. Woodward had reportedly displayed possessive behavior toward Fulmer and became jealous when Houts began spending time with Fulmer. Two latent fingerprints belonging to Woodward were recovered on the outside of Houts’s car, and fibers collected from masking tape on the free end of the rope used to strangle Houts showed characteristics similar to the outside of Woodward’s sweatpants. Woodward had no alibi for the window of time in which Houts was killed. During a pretext phone call between Woodward and Fulmer, Woodward never denied killing Houts. Based on these and other circumstances and evidence, the district attorney charged Woodward with Houts’s murder.

The first jury trial resulted in a hung jury, with the majority (8 to 4) voting for acquittal. The prosecution elected to retry the case, resulting in a second jury deadlock with the majority (7 to 5) again voting for acquittal. The same judicial officer presided over both trials.

B. 1996 Dismissal of Case

At a posttrial hearing on August 7, 1996, the trial court ordered the murder case dismissed pursuant to former section 1385.² The court’s dismissal order is reflected in two documents issued on August 7, 1996, a minute order³ and a written order signed by the judge ("written decision") (collectively the "1996 dismissal order").

The minute order states as follows: "In open court at 9:49 [a.m.] with above-named counsel and defendant present. [¶] The [c]ourt reads the written decision into the record dismissing this case pursuant to Penal Code [s]ection 1385 based on insufficient evidence. The written decision is ordered filed and defendant’s bail is ordered exonerated."

The written decision cites the relevant factors for dismissing a case "in furtherance of justice" under former section 1385, subdivision (a) (hereafter former section 1385(a)) and describes the prosecution theories and evidence presented in both jury trials.

Regarding the evidence, it states that "[a] comparison of the first trial and the second trial shows that the prosecution has presented no new evidence pointing to the defendant’s guilt and there is no probability that new evidence will become available. Absent new evidence there is no likelihood that a jury would be able to convict the defendant of murder." The decision cri- tiques the quality of the evidence, noting that while over 300 items of evidence and 30 witnesses were presented during each trial, "the prosecution was not able to utilize the evidence to prove" guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because "[t]he substantive quality of the evidence did not lend itself to proving the prosecution’s contentions." It explains, "This lack of quality meant that the prosecution was limited to very little evidence with which to try its case. With the possible exception of the fingerprints and the defendant’s apparent inconsistent statements, the vast majority of the evidence does not point to the defendant’s guilt."

The written decision also addresses the prosecution’s theory that Woodward killed Houts out of jealousy, stating there was "insufficient proof that such a jealousy existed." Citing Tibbs v. Florida (1982) 457 U.S. 31, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (Tibbs), it explains that a dismissal would further the interests of justice "by preventing the prosecution from honing its trial strategies and perfecting its presentation of the evidence through successive attempts at conviction." It further cautions, citing Tibbs, that "[r]epeated prosecutions would create a risk of conviction through sheer governmental perseverance."

The final two paragraphs of the written decision reiterate the trial court’s reasoning for the dismissal order. It states, "The prosecution has not met its burden of proof in two trials and absent new evidence it will be unable to do so in subsequent trials. Another trial would only serve to harass the defendant, It is reasonable to believe that society will not be endangered by this decision and the interest of justice will best be served by a dismissal. [¶] A dismissal of this case is not meant to criticize the work done by the prosecution or deprive the victim’s family of an opportunity to see their daughter’s killer brought to justice. There is simply a lack of evidence on which to convict [Woodward]. Without new evidence, the result of this case will be the same at each successive trial. Due to the lack of evidence in this case, a jury will never be able to reach a unanimous verdict of guilty. It appears that justice would best be served if the charges were dismissed." The decision orders "that the case be dismissed in the furtherance of justice for insufficiency of the evidence."

C. 2022 Refiling of Murder Charge

In 2021, the district attorney, Mountain View police detectives, and the Santa Clara County crime lab collaborated in follow up on the investigation into Houts’s murder. According to the declaration of Mountain View Police Department Detective Sergeant David Fisher, whose statement of facts accompanied the refiling of charges against Woodward, new technology applied to evidence in the case supports a finding of Woodward’s guilt. This evidence includes a DNA sample collected from the rope that had been found on Houts and fibers collected from Woodward’s sweatpants, as well as the discovery of additional latent fingerprints on the outside of Houts’s vehicle.⁴

In 2022, the district attorney refiled a felony complaint in the Santa Clara County Superior Court charging Woodward with one count of murder, in violation of section 187, subdivision (a). The complaint alleged, pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b), and California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(8), (a)(11), and (b)(1), respectively, that the crime involved great violence, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness; that the victim was particularly vulnerable; that the crime involved planning, sophistication, or professionalism; that Woodward took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the offense; and that Woodward had engaged in violent conduct that indicated a serious danger to society.

D. Motion to Dismiss

Woodward moved in the trial court to dismiss the charges, arguing that the prosecution violated his state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy. Woodward’s motion invoked the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution.

Woodward contended that under settled law as articulated by the California Supreme Court in Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th 260, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 80, 991 P.2d 165, the 1996 dismissal order for insufficiency of the evidence "serves the same function as an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes" and bars retrial. In support of the motion to dismiss, Woodward asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the 1996...