People v. Talley

1

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARITA GLYNISE TALLEY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 350178

Court of Appeals of Michigan

August 22, 2024

UNPUBLISHED

Oakland Circuit Court LC No. 2018-267313-FC

Before: O'BRIEN, P.J., and CAVANAGH and SHAPIRO ^[*], JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right her jury-trial convictions of first-degree murder (premeditation), MCL 750.316(1)(a), felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. Defendant's initial appellate brief raised a variety of ineffective-assistance claims, and this Court, while retaining jurisdiction, granted defendant's motion to remand for a Ginther^[1]hearing to develop those claims.^[2] Following the hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial, and the case now returns to this Court for plenary review. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant's convictions arise from the shooting death of the decedent William Spencer Bell, Jr. in the late-night hours of May 11, 2018. Defendant and the decedent were in a relationship for a little over a year before the shooting, and had been living together even longer. According to the decedent's family, shortly before the shooting, the decedent said that he was no longer happy in his relationship with defendant, and that he wanted to break up with defendant and have her move out.

There was is no dispute that, on May 11, 2018, defendant killed the decedent by shooting him with his own gun. The dispute at trial centered around the circumstances of the shooting. Defendant claimed that she shot the decedent in self-defense following a struggle, while the prosecution's theory was that defendant's killing of the decedent was premeditated, shooting the decedent while he was "dozing off" on the couch.

Defendant called 911 shortly before midnight to report the shooting, but her call got disconnected. When the 911 operator called back, defendant answered, and during the ensuing conversation, there was a loud bang. Defendant explained to the operator that she just shot the decedent again because he was trying to grab the gun. Officers arrived shortly thereafter and detained defendant.

The police then processed the scene. One live, unspent cartridge was found on the floor of defendant's and the decedent's shared bedroom in front of a dresser. A drawer of the dresser was open, and inside was an empty holster and other gun-related items.

The decedent's body was in the living room, which was right next to the home's entrance. The decedent was found in a seated position. Officers could see blood on the decedent's shirt and multiple gunshot wounds to his chest. A gun was found on the couch next to the decedent. Officers saw no signs of a struggle. Eleven spent cartridges were found throughout the living room, including two pinned between the decedent's body and the couch. Officers also found an uncapped, partially-filled water bottle between the decedent's legs. Multiple officers checked the areas surrounding the water bottle to see if they were wet, but they were all dry.

Deputy Robert Charlton, the prosecution's ballistics expert, testified that, when a gun is fired, it ejects the spent cartridge, and "most" spent cartridges get ejected "right and to the back." But Deputy Charlton said that there was no set path that spent cartridges travel and that spent cartridges could hit something or bounce once ejected, so where they were found was just where they happened to land. That said, based on where the spent cartridges were found in this case combined with the trajectory of the gunshot wounds to the decedent, Deputy Charlton could approximate where the shots were fired from. He told the jury where he believed the shots were roughly fired from using a visual aid.

Dr. Bernardino Pacris testified that he performed an autopsy of the decedent's body and identified 11 gunshot wounds,^[3] a number of which could have been fatal. Dr. Pacris described one "through-and-through gunshot wound" that traveled through the decedent's "left upper arm, exited on the medial aspect of the left upper arm, reenters into the armpit or left axilla, and then exited on the back of the left armpit, so it's basically downward." Dr. Pacris testified that he did not notice any soot or stippling around any of the gunshot wounds, which suggested to him that the gun was fired from more than two feet away. Dr. Pacris also testified that he tested the decedent for drugs, but the tests revealed only that the decedent's blood alcohol level at the time of his death was .02-the decedent tested negative for all other drugs that Dr. Pacris tested for.

The prosecution also presented the testimony of Edwin Duhart as an other-acts witness. Duhart testified that, in 2011, he met defendant at Grace Centers of Hope and, within a week, the two of them agreed to get a motel room to have sex. Duhart said that the two had sex, went out around the motel for 25 minutes, then returned to the motel room and had sex again. Afterwards, while Duhart was dozing off in the bed, he heard defendant get up, and shortly afterward he felt a "sharp pain in [his] head." When Duhart opened his eyes, he saw defendant standing "over [him] with a brick" in her hand. Duhart ran out of the room screaming and asking defendant why she hit him in the head with a brick, and defendant accused Duhart of raping her. Duhart had to get eight stiches and four staples as a result of the assault.

Defendant, testifying in her own defense, confirmed that she assaulted Duhart because he raped her. Defendant then disputed the decedent's family's characterization of her relationship with the decedent. According to defendant, the decedent was verbally, emotionally, and physically abusive throughout their relationship. She agreed that she and the decedent had told the decedent's parents that they planned to separate but claimed that, afterwards, the decedent was "very aggressive." She also claimed that, in the weeks leading up to the shooting, the decedent "became an alcoholic" and was "drinking consistent[ly]."

She said that, on the day of the shooting, after she got home, she went out to the store and bought "half a gallon of vodka." After she got home, the decedent wanted to run out to get juice to go with the vodka, and he asked defendant to get his gun and make sure it was loaded. Defendant said that she "immediately did as instructed," getting the decedent's gun from the drawer in their shared bedroom and racking it to ensure it was loaded. She then gave the gun and holster to the decedent, who went to the store. When the decedent got back, he gave only the holster to defendant and told her to put it back in the drawer.

Defendant testified that she then made drinks for her and the decedent and began working in the dining room while the decedent began listening to music and watching television in the living room. Defendant claimed that the decedent kept getting up to make himself more drinks, and his demeanor eventually became aggressive and abusive. This was when, according to defendant, she tried to leave, at which point the decedent took out his gun, pointed it at her, and told her that he was going to kill her. Defendant, believing she "was facing imminent death," grabbed the gun and wrestled it away from the decedent. Defendant testified that, as she was starting to walk away with the gun, the decedent "jump[ed] up to attack" her and she "knew right then [she] was facing imminent danger," so she "immediately just aimed the gun and [she] shot, and [she] continued to shoot."

The jury convicted defendant as previously stated. This appeal followed.

II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

Defendant argues that her trial counsel, Richard Taylor, provided ineffective assistance in a variety of ways. Defendant asked for and was granted a Ginther hearing to address these claims.

Based on the record developed at that hearing, we agree with the trial court that defendant is not entitled to a new trial based on her claims of ineffective assistance.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a defendant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and law-the trial court's factual findings supporting its decision are reviewed for clear error, while the court's determination of whether those facts violated the defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel is reviewed de novo. People v Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich.App. 490, 515; 909 N.W.2d 458 (2017).

B. LAW

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance, "a defendant must show that (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for counsel's deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different." People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich. 38, 51; 826 N.W.2d 136 (2012). Effective assistance is "strongly presumed," People v Vaughn, 491 Mich. 642, 670; 821 N.W.2d 288 (2012), and the defendant bears the heavy burden of proving otherwise, People v Dixon, 263 Mich.App. 393, 396; 688 N.W.2d 308 (2004). "If this Court can conceive of a legitimate strategic reason for trial counsel's act or omission, this Court cannot conclude that the act or omission fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." People v Haynes, 338 Mich.App. 392, 429-430; 980 N.W.2d 66 (2021). But any strategy so conceived must be in fact sound, and courts must avoid insulating ineffective assistance "by calling it trial strategy." People v Douglas, 496 Mich. 557, 585; 852 N.W.2d 587 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

C. BALLISTICS EXPERT

Defendant first challenges Taylor's failure to hire and present the testimony of a ballistics expert at...