People v. Talley

1

2023 IL App (4th) 221013

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARQUIESE TALLEY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 4-22-1013

Court of Appeals of Illinois, Fourth District

November 28, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County No. 20CF426 Honorable John P. Vespa, Judge Presiding.

Attorneys for Appellant: James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Lilien and Drew A. Wallenstein, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Elgin, for appellant.

Attorneys for Appellee: Jodi M. Hoos, State's Attorney of Peoria (Patrick Delfino, Edward R. Psenicka, Ivan O. Taylor Jr., and Lawrence M. Bauer, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice DeArmond and Justice Zenoff concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

KNECHT JUSTICE

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant, Marquiese Talley, was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault and armed robbery and sentenced to consecutive terms of 45 years and 35 years in prison. Defendant appeals, arguing this court should remand for a new Batson hearing (Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986)) because the procedures used during the initial Batson hearing were inadequate and resulted in an insufficient record to review the merits of his Batson challenge. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 A. Indictment

¶ 4 In August 2020, a grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant with, inter alia, aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.30(a)(8) (West 2020)) (count I) armed robbery (id. § 18-2(a)(2)) (count II), and criminal sexual assault (id. § 11-1.20(a)(1)) (count III).

¶ 5 B. Jury Trial

¶ 6 In November 2021, the case proceeded to trial. During jury selection, James Hodges, an African American man who was a police officer with the Peoria Police Department, indicated he knew all of the police officers and technicians who were listed as potential witnesses. When asked whether this knowledge would impact his ability to be fair, Hodges stated, "I work with them, so I don't think so." Hodges, on further inquiry, confirmed he could be a fair and impartial juror. Hodges further indicated he was familiar with the "protocols" his fellow officers follow and had previous experience with cases involving victims of sexual assault. Hodges stated he would not necessarily believe his fellow officers over another witness, but rather, he would "go by the *** evidence and the facts of the case." Based upon this information, defense counsel challenged Hodges for cause, a challenge which the trial court rejected upon objection of the State.

¶ 7 Later, when a panel of potential jurors that included Hodges was tendered to the State, the State used a peremptory challenge to strike him. Defense counsel asked to be heard on the matter. After a sidebar conference off the record and the removal of the potential jurors from the courtroom, the following exchange occurred:

"THE COURT: But would you like to address your concern now?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Sure, Judge. Judge, Mr. Hodges is the only-I think one of two black individuals on the jury. He's the only black male on the jury, I believe. We had discussed the issue with respect to him being a police officer in the back. There was- [the State] actually objected to a challenge for cause. He has indicated no reason in the world why he couldn't be a fair and impartial juror, and yet [the State] has struck him. I would like to hear a race-neutral reason, under Batson, why.

[THE STATE]: Well, Your Honor, respectfully, just because counsel-I have no obligation to tell him anything. I have a right to do a prima facie peremptory. I don't owe him any explanation. If the Court, however, would want an explanation, that would be a different reason, which I can articulate, Judge.

THE COURT: First of all, there's one African American; is that what I'm supposed to say? The other one was Filipino, I think. So [the] State just removed the only African American in the jury pool. That African American raised his hand, wanted to come back there, and told us stuff. I mean, he's a police officer and he knows all the police officers. He knows a lot of the hospital workers.

And there's certainly not a pattern. I can't think of the phrase, but I know it's already been decided that one cannot form a pattern. One removal, by definition, cannot be a pattern of-now- the words are escaping me now. Pattern of what? But for Batson purposes.

In the interest of cleanliness, [the] State-and I agree with [the] State, they-that they're not required to give a reason. You get peremptories. You get to do it. You don't like-you don't like the way-I don't know what. I mean, it could be oddball reasons. None of my business. In [the] interest of cleanliness, would you like to volunteer whatever your reason was?

[THE STATE]: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.

[THE STATE]: Officer Hodges is a police officer with Peoria Police Department. He's indicated that he knows all of the officers. He knows, I believe, the analyst also from the Springfield laboratory. As I was thinking about the statements that he made in the Court's chamber in front of counsel and I, it-it appears to me that I-I did not want to put him in the position of being on a jury of this seriousness, knowing certainly that if the defendant's convicted this would be a ready-made reason for our Appellate Court to perhaps use it as a reason that the person should have been excused. So I didn't want to be in that position.

It has nothing to do with Officer Hodges' race. He is a fine officer. I know Officer Hodges. And I just felt, all things considered, that it would be best that I relieve him of being in that position while he's an active duty police officer.

THE COURT: All right. One person needs to be satisfied, and it's me, and I'm satisfied. So. I hope [defense counsel] is, too, but anyway, a satisfactory reason was given and none-none was required. But anyway, that is something an-an Appellate Court could, of course, look at if-if there will be one in this case. Before we stop, then-and that's the end of that issue. Or did you want anything else, Mr.-

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, that's the end of the issue.

THE COURT: All right. That's the end of that issue."

¶ 8 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found defendant guilty of the charges set forth in counts I through III of the indictment.

¶ 9 C. Sentencing

¶ 10 In March 2022, the trial court, after merging the findings of guilt on the sexual assault charges, sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of 45 years and 35 years in prison.

¶ 11 This appeal followed.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 On appeal, defendant argues this court should remand for a new Batson hearing because the procedures used during the initial Batson hearing were inadequate and resulted in an insufficient record to review the merits of his Batson challenge. The State disagrees.

¶ 14 A. Unpreserved Error

¶ 15 Defendant acknowledges he has failed to preserve the alleged error for review but asks it to be considered as second-prong plain error. See People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 66, 23 N.E.3d 325 ("To preserve an alleged error for review, a defendant must both make an objection at trial and include the issue in a posttrial motion."). Under the plain-error doctrine, a reviewing court may consider an unpreserved error

"when a clear or obvious error occurred and (1) the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant (first- prong plain error) or (2) the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process (second-prong plain error)." People v. Schoonover, 2021 IL 124832, ¶ 27, 190 N.E.3d 802.

Our first step under the plain-error doctrine is to determine whether a clear or obvious error occurred. People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 21, 211 N.E.3d 414.

¶ 16 B. Standard of Review

¶ 17 The parties disagree as to the appropriate standard of review to be applied to the issue presented in this case. Defendant asserts we should apply the de novo standard of review because the issue presented is one of law. The State disagrees, asserting we should apply the clearly erroneous standard of review based upon precedent from this court.

¶ 18 We initially reject the State's assertion that this court has previously applied the clearly erroneous standard of review to an issue similar to the one currently before this court. People v. Sanders, 2015 IL App (4th) 130881, 34 N.E.3d 219, upon which the State relies, does not support the State's assertion. In fact, absent from Sanders is any reference to the clearly erroneous standard of review.

¶ 19 Illinois case law is, as the State notes, replete with cases referencing the clearly erroneous standard of review when addressing Batson claims. However, the actual application of that standard of review has occurred when the issue concerned the trial court's ultimate determination on the Batson claim. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 206 Ill.2d 1, 25, 794 N.E.2d 314, 330 (2002); People v. Davis, 233 Ill.2d 244, 261-62, 909 N.E.2d 766, 775-76 (2009). In this case, the trial court's ultimate determination on the Batson claim is not at issue. Indeed, defendant makes clear in his reply brief he is not challenging the court's ultimate determination "[T]he State misconstrues [defendant's] procedural arguments as a substantive argument about the underlying merits of the Batson objection." (Emphases in original.).

¶ 20 To determine the appropriate standard of review to be applied to the issue presented in this case, we must consider the nature of the issue...