People v. Taylor

1

2024 IL App (3d) 200031-U

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KAMRON T. TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 3-20-0031

Court of Appeals of Illinois, Third District

May 29, 2024

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 21st Judicial Circuit, Kankakee County, Illinois. Appeal No. 3-20-0031 Circuit No. 13-CF-272 Honorable Kathy Bradshaw-Elliott, Judge, Presiding.

PETERSON JUSTICE ^[1] delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Holdridge specially concurred. Presiding Justice McDade dissented.

ORDER

PETERSON JUSTICE.

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court did not err in summarily dismissing defendant's postconviction petition at the first stage.

¶ 2 Defendant, Kamron T. Taylor, appeals from the first-stage dismissal of his postconviction petition. Defendant argues he presented the gist of a claim of ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. We affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On July 12, 2013, defendant was charged by indictment with first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2) (West 2012)) attempted armed robbery (id. § 8-4(a)) residential burglary (id. § 19-3(a)), escape (id. § 31-6(c)), aggravated unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (id. § 24-1.6(a)(2)(3)(A)), and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (id. § 24-1.1(a)). The charges alleged that on June 24, 2013, the defendant shot and killed Nelson Williams, after which he entered a house and attempted to rob Williams's fiance, Rebecca Hoover. After his arrest, the defendant escaped from the Kankakee Police Department. Defendant pled guilty to aggravated unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. Following a February 2015 trial, the jury found defendant guilty of all remaining charges, and that he discharged the firearm that proximately caused Williams's death. The trial court sentenced defendant to over 100 years in prison. Defendant timely appealed.

¶ 5 On direct appeal, defendant raised one issue, arguing he was deprived of the right to a fair trial before an impartial jury due to the trial court's failure to remove juror PA for cause. Defendant argued juror PA's ability to remain fair and impartial had been compromised, where she claimed that during a lunch break her car had been followed by an African American person wearing a hoodie. Defendant argued the trial court erred in accepting juror PA's claim that she could remain impartial. People v. Taylor, 2019 IL App (3d) 150345-U, ¶ 13. We recognized there was support for defendant's contention that juror PA may have subconsciously linked the incident to defendant, as the person allegedly following her matched the physical description the eyewitnesses had attributed to defendant. But we concluded the trial court applied an appropriate level of scrutiny to juror PA's assertions, and the court did not abuse its discretion when deciding not to dismiss her from the jury. Id. ¶¶ 18-19.

¶ 6 On November 15, 2019, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel (counsel). Defendant raised multiple claims regarding this allegation: (1) counsel did not investigate certain evidence that could have proven defendant's innocence; (2) counsel failed to subpoena witnesses who would have shown why defendant had been in the area of the crime; (3) counsel failed to file a motion to suppress the identification of defendant by four eyewitnesses via suggestive show-up procedures; (4) counsel was ineffective for not offering in its entirety Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction No. 3.11 (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.11 (approved October 17, 2014)) (hereinafter IPI Criminal No. 3.11); and (5) counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a challenge to juror Fraser, who had attended the same church as the prosecutor. The petition raised two claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel: (1) appellate counsel did not raise on direct appeal a meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) appellate counsel failed to argue defendant had not been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also claimed the trial court should have removed juror PA for alleged bias-the same claim we specifically rejected on direct appeal.

¶ 7 On January 9, 2020, the trial court issued its memorandum of decision. The court found defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could have been brought on direct appeal and were waived. It also found defendant's claim regarding juror PA was res judicata. The court noted it had questioned juror Fraser and determined Fraser would not feel the need to explain a not-guilty verdict because she and the prosecutor no longer attended the same church. The court quoted case law stating that appellate counsel is not required to raise every conceivable issue or to raise issues on appeal that appellate counsel determines are without merit. The trial court dismissed defendant's petition as being frivolous and patently without merit.

¶ 8 Defendant timely appealed the summary dismissal of his postconviction petition.

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Defendant first argues his postconviction petition sufficiently alleged the gist of a constitutional claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not moving to suppress the eyewitnesses' identifications of defendant via a show-up procedure, appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to make this argument on direct appeal, and the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his petition. The State argues the trial court correctly determined defendant's allegations of ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel were frivolous and patently without merit. We affirm the first-stage dismissal of defendant's petition.

¶ 11 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) establishes a three-stage procedure whereby an incarcerated defendant may collaterally attack his or her conviction or sentence based on a substantial violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018). In the first stage, the trial court has 90 days to independently review the petition and determine whether it is frivolous or patently without merit. Id. § 122-2.1(a)(2). "A petition may be dismissed as frivolous or patently without merit only 'if the petition has no arguable basis either in law or in fact'-relying on 'an indisputably meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation.'" People v. Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶ 25 (quoting People v. Hodges, 234 Ill.2d 1, 16 (2009)). "Meritless legal theories include ones completely contradicted by the record, while fanciful factual allegations may be 'fantastic or delusional.'" Id. (quoting Hodges 234 Ill.2d. at 17).

¶ 12 "At the first stage, the court must accept as true and liberally construe all of the allegations in the petition unless contradicted by the record." People v. Walker, 2019 IL App (3d) 170374, ¶ 13 (citing People v. Edwards, 197 Ill.2d 239, 244 (2001)). "To survive dismissal at this stage, a petition need only present the gist of a constitutional claim." People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill.2d 410, 418 (1996) (citing People v. Porter, 122 Ill.2d 64, 74 (1988)). This is a low threshold, requiring the defendant to present only a limited amount of detail in the petition. Id. The defendant is not required to make legal arguments or to cite to legal authority. Id. "We review de novo the trial court's first-stage summary dismissal of a postconviction petition." People v. Costic, 2021 IL App (3d) 180618, ¶ 18 (citing People v. Hodges, 234 Ill.2d 1, 9 (2009)).

¶ 13" '[I]ssues that were raised and decided on direct appeal are barred from consideration by the doctrine of res judicata; issues that could have been raised, but were not, are considered waived.'" Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶ 20 (quoting People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill.2d 444, 456 (2002)). Thus, the trial court correctly determined that all of defendant's claims relating to ineffective assistance of counsel were res judicata due to having been considered on direct appeal, or they were waived as they had not been raised on direct appeal. "However, defendant's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is not subject to waiver because he could not raise the issue in his direct appeal." People v. Todd, 2019 IL App (3d) 170153, ¶ 11 (citing People v. Flores, 153 Ill.2d 264, 281-82 (1992)).

¶ 14 In Todd, we explained:

"At the first stage of postconviction proceedings, an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim must make an arguable assertion that (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) defendant was prejudiced. [Citation.] Defendant's contention that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise [an ineffective assistance of trial counsel] issue required defendant to allege facts and law to show that counsel's failure was objectively unreasonable and counsel's decision prejudiced defendant. [Citation.] Appellate counsel is not required to brief every conceivable issue and is not incompetent for refraining from raising an issue that is without merit, unless counsel's appraisal of the merits is patently wrong. [Citation.]" Todd, 2019 IL App (3d) 170153, ¶ 12.

Here defendant argues counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the four eyewitnesses' identifications of defendant as the person who shot and killed Mr. Williams, as such a motion arguably would have been granted. Defendant argues the identifications were the product of unnecessarily suggestive show-up procedures, and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to claim trial counsel was...