People v. Teen

229 N.E.3d 969

2023 IL App (5th) 190456

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Antrell TEEN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 5-19-0456

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

Filed November 15, 2023

Rehearing denied December 28, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County. No. 14-CF-914, Honorable Zina R. Cruse, Judge, presiding.

James E. Chadd, Ellen J. Curry, and Richard J. Whitney, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.

Brendan F. Kelly, State’s Attorney, of Belleville (Patrick Delfino, Patrick D. Daly, and Sharon Shanahan, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Antrell Teen, files a direct appeal from the trial court’s judgment of conviction. On appeal, he argues that his speedy trial rights were violated, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue his speedy trial rights, and the court committed reversible error when it prevented Krankel counsel from performing his duties by barring him from presenting additional claims and evidence at the Krankel hearing (see People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 80 Ill.Dec. 62, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984)). For the following reasons, we disagree.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On June 29, 2014, defendant was charged by complaint with one count of aggravated battery for knowingly discharging a firearm, injuring Shanter Bonner, in violation of section 12-3.05(e)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2014)) and one count of first degree murder of Cassandra Holman in violation of section 9-1 (a)(1) of the Code (id. § 9-1 (a)(1)). On September 5, 2014, a superseding indictment was issued for the same charges.

¶ 4 Defendant was apprehended in Missouri on December 11, 2015. He was processed into the St. Clair County jail on December 15, 2015, and his arraignment was held on December 28, 2015. At that time, Gregory Nester, from the public defender’s officer, was appointed as counsel.

¶ 5 On December 28, 2015, Mark Peebles, from the public defender’s officer, was assigned to defendant’s case. Defense counsel filed a motion to reduce bond and a motion for discovery. A status conference was held on February 8, 2016. Defense counsel appeared at the hearing; defendant did not. At that time, the court ordered the proceedings to be continued. The written order stated the continuance was "by agreement."

¶ 6 At two subsequent status hearings—held on March 1, 2016, and March 30, 2016—the court again ordered the proceedings continued "by agreement/without objection." Defense counsel appeared at both hearings; defendant did not attend either hearing.

¶ 7 On April 20, 2016, defendant filed correspondence stating he "originally asked to exercise [his] right to a speedy trial December 16, 2015." He asserted that it had been over 120 days since his incarceration, and he was still in the county jail with no explanation. Defendant had not heard from his attorney, despite calling him several times and leaving a message. He also called his attorney’s direct supervisor, Defendant stated, "This letter is to inform the courts and all parties involved that I have not agreed to a delay of any kind and object." The correspondence indicated this was the second letter written on that issue and stated it included a copy of the initial correspondence; however, the initial correspondence was not included. Defendant also filed a pro se motion to dismiss based on the noncompliance with his statutory speedy trial request (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a), (d) (West 2016)).

¶ 8 A status hearing was held on April 28, 2016. Defense counsel and defendant appeared. The court acknowledged the demand for speedy trial and motion to dismiss. The court stated defendant was taken into custody around December 11, 2015, and the speedy trial period totaled 60 days on February 8, 2016. Its calculations revealed they were "at 60 days today," and the case needed to be set and completed "within 60 days." The State and defense counsel stated this was also their understanding. The court inquired, "And your understanding, Mr. Teen?" Defendant responded, "I do understand now." The court clarified the issue stating, "Mr. Teen indicates ‘now,’ because off the record we discussed how those numbers are tolled, or not."

¶ 9 Thereafter, the court and counsel discussed possible trial dates. The State and defendant indicated their acceptance of a May 23, 2016, trial date, but defense counsel stated he did not believe he would be ready. The trial court informed defense counsel, "You have no choice. This is his demand. He has that right. You’re going to have to get ready."

¶ 10 On May 2, 2016, the trial court issued a written order canceling the May 23, 2016, setting. The order noted that the State argued it was ready for trial on May 9, 2016, but defense counsel needed additional time and requested the May 23, 2016, trial date. The State requested a continuance from May 23, 2016, due to witness unavailability and requested the trial be set for June 6, 2016, but defense counsel was unavailable at that time and requested a trial date of June 20, 2016. The court ordered the delay from April 28, 2016, to May 9, 2016, attributable to the State; the delay from May 9, 2016, to May 23, 2016, attributable to the defense; the delay from May 23, 2016, to June 6, 2016, attributable to the State; and the delay from June 6, 2016, to June 20, 2016, attributable to the defense.

¶ 11 Following completion of a four-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty of both aggravated battery and first degree murder. The jury also found, regarding the commission of first degree murder, defendant was armed with a firearm and personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused the death of another.

¶ 12 On July 21, 2016, defense counsel filed a posttrial motion, raising various errors. Five days later, defendant moved, pro se, for a new trial. The pleading alleged defendant was deprived of a fair trial by an impartial jury. Defendant’s affidavit stated he was taken into custody on December 11, 2015, arraigned December 16, 2015, and was only brought back to court on April 28, 2016, after writing several letters to the court, his court appointed counsel, and his counsel’s supervisors at the public defender’s office. The affidavit stated that the letters objected to any delay and addressed a violation of speedy trial, a motion to dismiss, undue delay, unprofessional conduct by defense counsel, and counsel’s blatant attempt to circumvent the running of the 120-day speedy trial clock. Defendant’s affidavit further stated his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a discharge on speedy trial grounds and the trial court erred by not acknowledging his motion and denying the dismissal on speedy trial grounds. Also attached to the pleading was defendant’s motion to dismiss based on a speedy trial violation.

¶ 13 On September 19, 2016, the trial court noted that the parties were set for a sentencing hearing on August 23, 2016; however, defendant filed pro se motions that included a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court inquired if defendant’s only claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was based on the failure to pursue the motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. Defendant stated he also had other claims, which included counsel withholding information from him. He stated he did not see discovery until the day before the trial and the discovery he saw included only 4 of the 60 DVDs.

¶ 14 Defendant further stated that he wrote a letter to the court on March 31, 2016, that discussed issues regarding a failure to communicate with defense counsel. Defendant confirmed a copy was also sent to defense counsel and the public defender’s office. The court admonished defendant, stating that letters do not go in the court file and the court ignores them to avoid an ex parte communication issue. Defendant averred that the letter addressed the inability to speak with his attorney, and the attorney’s failure to bring him to the status conferences after defendant told counsel he wanted to go. Defendant stated that his trial should have been held in April and they had not prepared for trial. He had not seen any discovery or the grand jury transcript, and counsel only came to see him once in jail. The court inquired as to whether defendant had the information, and defendant clarified that he kept detailed records about almost everything.

¶ 15 The trial court explained to defendant that it was continuing the matter to hold a hearing on September 29, 2016, pursuant to Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 80 Ill.Dec. 62, 464 N.E.2d 1045. The court explained the preliminary-Krankel inquiry and explained it would then determine whether defendant presented a prima facie case of ineffectiveness. On September 29, 2016, the trial court issued an order continuing the Krankel hearing until October 18, 2016.

¶ 16 At the October 18, 2016, hearing, defendant made several claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based—inter alia—on the failure to call witnesses, inadequate closing arguments, lack of communication, insufficient cross-examination of eyewitness Keveon Frison, withholding discovery, and misleading defendant. The court was also again advised of defendant’s March 31, 2016, correspondence, as it related to his ineffective assistance of trial claim. Defendant claimed the correspondence was sent to the circuit clerk. The court found no copy of the correspondence in the file. The court stated that defendant’s July pleadings indicated defendant’s belief that defense counsel should have sought a discharge on speedy trial grounds. When queried, neither the State nor defense counsel had anything to add at that time. The court stated it would take the matter under advisement and write up an order giving it another setting so they could "see where we are."

¶ 17 On ...