People v. Thomas

2024 NY Slip Op 03319

The People & c., Respondent, v. Kevin L. Thomas, Appellant.

No. 52

New York Court of Appeals

June 18, 2024

John B. Casey, for appellant.

Nathan M. Bloom, for respondent.

OPINION

CANNATARO, J.

The question presented by this appeal is whether the courts below erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress a large quantity of heroin recovered from the backseat of his car during a warrantless search by defendant's parole officer, who had been contacted by police in the course of a traffic stop. Because the lower courts applied an incorrect legal standard in analyzing whether the traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged, we reverse and remit to County Court for further proceedings.

The testimony presented at the suppression hearing established that defendant, who was on lifetime parole for prior narcotics offenses, was observed driving outside his county of residence by an off-duty police officer who recognized defendant's distinctive vehicle and license plate. The off-duty officer, who was familiar with defendant, suspected that defendant was in violation of a condition of his parole requiring him to stay within a certain geographic area and so contacted an on-duty officer in the vicinity of defendant's residence.

The on-duty officer knew defendant to be on parole, and suspected that he was in violation of his parole conditions because he was outside of the county and out after the standard parole curfew time. Based on these facts and defendant's history, he believed defendant was "possibly transporting drugs." The officer and his partner waited for defendant to return to the jurisdiction at a location where they could observe him exiting the highway. When defendant exited the highway, the officers followed defendant's vehicle, observed him commit a traffic infraction by failing to come to a complete stop at a stop sign and initiated a traffic stop at about 9:20 p.m Defendant had pulled into his driveway by the time he stopped his vehicle and the ensuing encounter was captured on one officer's body camera. Defendant readily admitted committing the traffic infraction, claiming he was distracted because he was talking on the phone, and provided his driver's license, which the officer confirmed was valid. The officer then questioned defendant about where he was coming from and whether he was in violation of his curfew. Defendant provided a series of inconsistent responses that the officer knew to be false. Defendant also appeared nervous and, when asked, withheld consent to search his vehicle. The officers repeatedly stated that if he did not give consent they would call his parole officer to search the car. The police attempted to have a canine unit come to the scene to conduct a sniff of the exterior of the vehicle, but none was available.

Then at about 9:40 p.m., the police contacted defendant's parole officer to advise him of what had transpired up to that point. The parole officer indicated that he would report to the scene to investigate. Defendant was frisked, his personal belongings were removed and he was placed, without handcuffs, in the back of the patrol car for officer safety purposes to await his parole officer's arrival. Upon arrival, defendant refused to answer his parole officer's questions, despite a parole condition requiring him to do so. The parole officer searched defendant's vehicle and discovered 2,000 glassines of heroin inside a shoebox.

In support of his motion to suppress, defendant argued that the People failed to prove that the officers had the requisite level of suspicion to extend the traffic stop after its initial basis-the traffic infraction-was exhausted, asserting that a traffic stop cannot be extended for the purpose of investigating an unrelated crime for which the officer lacked reasonable suspicion ^[1]. He also argued that the parole officer's warrantless search of his vehicle was not justified, as the parole officer was acting as an agent of the police.

County Court denied the motion, finding that the initial stop was justified by the police officer's observation of the traffic infraction. The court further found that, under the totality of the circumstances, including defendant's parole status and the false responses he gave to the police officers' questions, the police had a founded suspicion of criminality justifying the continued detention of defendant in order to contact his parole officer. The court went on to find that, based on the credible evidence of defendant's parole violations, the ensuing search of the vehicle by the parole officer was rationally and reasonably related to that officer's parole duties.

Defendant was convicted, upon his guilty plea, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that suppression was properly denied as the traffic stop, which was justified at its inception, was not unlawfully prolonged (211 A.D.3d 1326 [3d Dept 2022]). The Court opined that defendant's inconsistent and false responses, considered with the apparent violations of the conditions of his parole and his nervous demeanor, provided a founded suspicion of criminality, allowing the officers to extend the stop to request consent to search or await a canine sniff. The Court further concluded that, once the police officers learned that the canine unit was unavailable, it was reasonable for them to contact defendant's parole officer and detain defendant pending the parole officer's arrival. Finally, the Court determined that the subsequent warrantless search of the vehicle was substantially related to the performance of the parole officer's duty in the circumstances.

Two Justices dissented and would have granted suppression, concluding that defendant was detained beyond what was reasonable under the circumstances because the police officers lacked a founded suspicion that criminality was afoot after the justification for the traffic stop had been exhausted. An Appellate Division Justice granted defendant leave to appeal (39 N.Y.3d 1081 [2023]).

The proper standard for detaining an individual beyond "the time reasonably required" to complete a traffic stop is reasonable suspicion (Rodriguez v United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354-355 [2015] [quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Banks, 85 N.Y.2d 558, 562 [1995]). Given that a traffic stop is a "limited seizure" of the occupants of a vehicle, "[f]or a traffic stop to pass constitutional muster, the officer's action in stopping the vehicle must be justified at its inception and the seizure must be reasonably related in scope, including its length, to the circumstances which justified the detention in the first instance" (Banks, 85 N.Y.2d at 562). A "continued involuntary detention of [a] defendant... constitute[s] a seizure in violation of their constitutional rights, unless circumstances coming to [the officer's] attention following the initial stop furnishe[s]... reasonable suspicion that they were engaged in criminal activity" (id. [emphasis added]). Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has held that "[a] seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation... become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission of issuing a ticket for the violation" (Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350-351 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). In this vein, although that "mission" encompasses" 'ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop,'" it does not include additional measures designed to detect evidence of criminality (575 U.S. at 355, quoting Illinois v Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 [2005]). Thus, an otherwise lawful traffic stop may not be prolonged "absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual" (575 U.S. at 355).

Here, there is record support for the affirmed finding that the traffic stop was justified at its inception, based upon the police officer's observation that defendant committed a traffic infraction (see People v Hinshaw, 35 N.Y.3d 427, 430 [2020]). However, the courts below evaluated whether the traffic stop was prolonged beyond the time reasonably required for its completion under the founded suspicion standard applicable to the common law right to inquire (see People v De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223 [1976]), a lesser standard than the reasonable suspicion necessary to prolong a traffic stop. As a result, remittal is necessary to allow for consideration of this issue under the proper standard. ^[2]

We note that although "a parolee does 'not surrender [their] constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures' merely by virtue of being on parole,"" 'in any evaluation of the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure,' whether undertaken by parole or police officers, 'the fact of defendant's status as a parolee is always relevant and may be critical'" (People v McMillan, 29 N.Y.3d 145, 148-149 [2017], quoting People v Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175, 181 [1977]). The issue is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, including defendant's lifetime parole status and the officers' awareness that he was likely in violation of multiple conditions of his parole, "reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justified detaining [defendant] beyond completion of the traffic infraction investigation" (Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 358). As stated, "[a] seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation... become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission of issuing a ticket for the violation" (id. at 350-351 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

Accordingly the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the matter remitted to County Cou...