People v. Thomas

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDWARD EUGENE THOMAS et al., Defendants and Appellants.

D074600

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

May 26, 2020

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super. Ct. No. SCD 184845)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Frank Brown, Peter Deddeh, Jeffrey Fraser, Joan Weber, Judges. Reversed with directions.

Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Edward Eugene Thomas.

Gregory L. Cannon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Dejon Tyree Satterwhite.

Laura P. Gordon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Robert Lamar Myers.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Kristen Ramirez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

Defendants Edward Eugene Thomas, Dijon Tyree Satterwhite, and Robert Lamar Myers committed two murders and three attempted murders in drive-by shootings in 2004. Thomas and Myers were 17 years old at the time of the crimes and received sentences of life without parole (LWOP). Satterwhite, who was 15 years old, received a sentence of 196 years to life. All had postappeal orders for the court to resentence them, taking into account their youthful characteristics at the time of the crime and their capacity to change. The law has since been changed to provide eligibility for parole for these defendants and others who committed offenses when they were juveniles and were sentenced to LWOP or to lengthy indeterminate terms. In accordance with legal rulings discussed post, the trial court determined that defendants were no longer serving LWOP or lengthy sentences because all were eligible for parole in the 25th year of their incarceration. The court reinstated the sentences originally imposed because it could provide no further relief to defendants.

Defendants Thomas and Satterwhite contend that the "Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016" (Proposition 57 or Act), requiring that all cases with juvenile offenders be initiated in the juvenile court, is applicable to them because their sentences were not final when Proposition 57 was enacted. Myers joins in that contention, and alsorequests a remand for resentencing on his initial LWOP sentence and reversal of the fees and fines imposed on him.

We conclude that Proposition 57 is applicable to defendants. We reverse and remand the case to the juvenile court with directions regarding each defendant.

BACKGROUND

Facts

We provide a very brief summary of the facts here, based on our prior opinions, People v. Thomas (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 987 (Thomas I), and People v. Myers (July 21, 2010, D054179) [nonpub. opn.] (Myers I).)¹

Defendants Thomas, Satterwhite, and Myers were gang members who jointly went on a drive-by shooting spree against rival gang members in August 2004. Their spree included three separate shootings in San Diego in less than 24 hours, killing two and injuring three. Defendants were in Thomas's SUV when they shot at the victims.

On August 13, 2004, at about 11:30 p.m., defendants drove along Gribble Street and shot at a group of rival gang members, injuring Charles Foster.² (Thomas I, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 994; Myers I, supra, D054179, at pp. 4-5.) About an hour later, just after midnight on August 14, while driving south on Highway 163, defendants shot from the SUV at three other cars also driving on the freeway. Richard Wilson was killedand Michael Canty and Christopher Scott were injured. (Thomas, at p. 995; Myers I, at pp. 6-7.) At 9:00 p.m. later that day, defendants shot at some men standing at the bus stop at Meadowbrook Drive and Skyline Drive, killing Lee Smith. (Thomas, at p. 996; Myers I, at pp. 7-8.)

Procedural Background

Trial and Sentence

Thomas and Satterwhite were tried together before two separate juries. Myers was tried separately. Each defendant was convicted of two counts of murder (Pen. Code,³ § 187, subd. (a)); three counts of attempted premeditated and deliberate murder (§§ 664 & 187, subd. (a)); and two counts of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246). The juries found each defendant committed the murders with two special circumstances: (1) the murders were intentional and perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21)); and (2) defendants were each convicted in this proceeding of more than one murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). The jury found true as to all defendants several allegations of firearm use (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d), (e)(1)), including the most serious allegation that the defendants were principals in the offense and a principal personally discharged a gun, causing great bodily injury or death to another (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1))⁴; and that the crimes were committed for thebenefit of a gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). Sentences for shooting at an occupied motor vehicle and for the lesser firearm enhancements were stayed. (Thomas I, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 990-992; Myers I, supra, D054179, at pp. 1-2.)

Myers Sentence and Appeal

Myers was sentenced on October 30, 2008, to a total of two terms of LWOP, consecutive, for the murders; three terms of seven years to life with the possibility of parole, consecutive, for the attempted murders; plus five terms of 25 years to life, consecutive, for personal discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury or death, for an additional total of 125 years to life.

We affirmed Myers's judgment on July 21, 2010, with the exception of striking a parole revocation fine that had been imposed on him. (Myers I, supra, D054179, at p. 13.) The Supreme Court denied review on September 29, 2010. (Myers I, S185627, rev. den. Sep. 29, 2010.)

Thomas Sentence and Appeal

Thomas was sentenced on June 4, 2010. Thomas, like Myers, received a total of two terms of LWOP, consecutive, for the murders; three terms of seven years to life with possibility of parole, consecutive, for the attempted murders; three consecutive terms of 25 years to life for personal discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury or death,and two consecutive terms of 20 years for personal discharge of a firearm with respect to two of the attempted murders.

We affirmed Thomas's judgment on December 11, 2012, directing correction of some errors in the minute order and abstract of judgment. (Thomas I, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 987.) The Supreme Court denied review on March 27, 2013. (Thomas I, S208030, rev. den. Mar. 27, 2013.)

Satterwhite Sentence and Appeal

Satterwhite was also sentenced on June 4, 2010. Pursuant to section 190.5, subdivision (a), Satterwhite was not eligible for LWOP because he was 15 years old at the time of the murders. The court sentenced him to a total term of 196 years to life, comprised of consecutive terms of 25 years to life for each of the two murders, consecutive terms of seven years to life for each of the three attempted murders, and five consecutive terms of 25 years to life for use of a firearm causing great bodily injury or death.

On December 11, 2012, we affirmed Satterwhite's conviction, but we vacated his sentence and remanded his case to the trial court to exercise its discretion in resentencing him in accordance with Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller), which had been issued during the pendency of his appeal. (Thomas I, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1019.) The court in Miller found that a court had to consider the characteristics of youth, such as impetuosity and failure to appreciate risks and consequences, before sentencing a minor to a term that would prevent release from prison in his lifetime. (Miller, at p. 479.) Thecourt held that a lifetime sentence could be imposed only on a youthful offender who was irreparably corrupt. (Id. at pp. 479-480.)

The Supreme Court denied Satterwhite's petition for review on March 27, 2013.

Postappeal Procedural History

Satterwhite Postappeal

The trial court vacated Satterwhite's sentence upon receipt of the remittitur. The resentencing that was ordered was continued for years from 2013 until 2018, and was eventually heard on August 10, 2018. During that period, the Legislature changed the law so that most offenders who had committed crimes as juveniles, including Satterwhite, would be eligible for parole within 25 years of incarceration. The electorate also passed Proposition 57, providing that juvenile cases had to be initiated in juvenile court, not adult criminal court.

During that period between 2013 and 2018, Satterwhite filed briefs regarding his resentencing, including one that incorporated two reports from a psychologist who interviewed and tested Satterwhite in 2006 and 2015. The psychologist discussed Satterwhite's youthful characteristics, cognitive maturity, background environment and influences, circumstances of the crime and Satterwhite's role in it, and his capacity to change. Satterwhite also filed a motion to return his case to the juvenile court under Proposition 57.

At the hearing on August 10, 2018, the court permitted Satterwhite to present evidence on his youthful characteristics at the time of the crime and his capacity for change. Satterwhite relied on the briefing he had submitted to the court. The courtdetermined that, as a result of changes in the law, Satterwhite was eligible for parole in his 25th year of confinement and there was no further relief that the court could provide. It reinstated his original sentence. The court denied the motion to return the case to juvenile court under Proposition 57 because Satterwhite's conviction was final in 2013. Satterwhite filed...