People v. Turner

45 Cal.App.5th 428

258 Cal.Rptr.3d 706

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.James Edward TURNER, Defendant and Appellant.

D075788

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Filed February 19, 2020

Gregory L. Cannon, San Diego, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

DATO, J.

James Edward Turner pleaded guilty in 2007 to voluntary manslaughter ( Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a) ) and admitted a gang allegation.¹ While he was serving his 21-year prison term, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) to make certain changes to murder liability under felony-murder and natural-and-probable-consequences theories and provide a procedure for eligible defendants to petition for recall and resentencing. Turner filed a petition pursuant to newly enacted section 1170.95, subdivision (a), but the trial court summarily denied relief on the ground that he was ineligible as someone who "was not convicted of murder." He claims on appeal that section 1170.95 applies to defendants who were charged with murder under a felony-murder or natural-and-probable-consequences theory but pleaded guilty to manslaughter to avoid trial.²

As we explain, other courts including ours have concluded there is no ambiguity in the plain language of Senate Bill 1437 as to whether a defendant convicted of manslaughter is entitled to relief. Turner relies on language in section 1170.95, subdivision (a)(2) to suggest ambiguity exists. But even if he were correct, the legislative history demonstrates that Turner is not entitled to relief. Because the trial court did not err in summarily denying Turner's petition, we affirm its order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND³

One evening in June 2005, 16-year-old Rusty S. was walking down a street in Oceanside. As he approached a residence, he was confronted by Turner, Turner's cousin Joseph, and Tony L. A physical altercation ensued. As Tony would confess, he pulled out a handgun during the fight and fired shots at Rusty, killing him.

The San Diego County District Attorney charged Tony, Joseph, and Turner with first degree murder. (§ 187, subd. (a).) (See People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 922, 928, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 202, 209 P.3d 105 [fatal shooting by fellow gang member was a natural and probable consequence of engaging in a gang fistfight] ( Medina ).)⁴ The information also alleged firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), & (e)(1)) and a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). Before the case reached trial, the prosecution offered for Turner to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter and admit the gang allegation in exchange for dismissal of the firearm enhancement allegations.

As Turner would later declare, he accepted the plea deal believing he faced a life sentence if convicted of murder at trial. He pleaded guilty in 2007 to voluntary manslaughter ( § 192, subd. (a) ), stipulating that the preliminary hearing transcript provided a factual basis for his plea.⁵ Turner further admitted the crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). Consistent with the parties' stipulation, the court dismissed the firearm allegations and sentenced Turner to a prison term of 21 years, consisting of the 11-year upper term for voluntary manslaughter and the 10-year gang enhancement.

While Turner was serving his sentence, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 1437. In January 2019, Turner filed a petition pursuant to newly enacted section 1170.95 seeking to vacate his voluntary manslaughter conviction. The People opposed the motion, arguing Senate Bill 1437 did not apply to defendants convicted of manslaughter. In February 2019, the court agreed with the People and summarily denied Turner's petition on the ground that he did not establish a prima facie case for relief.

Turner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in April 2019 challenging the denial of his recall petition. We denied relief because the order was appealable. Thereafter, we granted Turner's motion to reinstate his appeal, deeming his habeas corpus petition a constructive filing of a notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Turner challenges the trial court's summary denial of his petition. As we explain, a person convicted of manslaughter is not eligible for recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95, and the court did not err in summarily denying relief. This case, perhaps like others in the wake of Senate Bill 1437, underscores the importance of a court's statutory obligation during the plea colloquy to inquire into the factual basis for a conditional plea (§ 1192.5). But the adequacy of the factual basis for Turner's conviction is not before us, and Senate Bill 1437 does not provide an avenue for relief.

1. Overview of Senate Bill 1437

Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill 1437 amended murder liability under the felony-murder and natural-and-probable-consequences theories. The bill redefined malice under section 188 to require that the principal acted with malice aforethought. Now, "[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime." (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Senate Bill 1437 also amended section 189, which defines the degrees of murder, by limiting the scope of first-degree murder liability under a felony-murder theory. (§ 189, subd. (e).)

By adding section 1170.95, the Legislature created a new petitioning procedure for eligible defendants to have their murder convictions vacated and seek resentencing on the remaining counts. "A person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory" may file a petition if all three conditions apply:

"(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

"(2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder.

"(3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to [Penal Code] Section[s] 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019." (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).)

A petitioning defendant must file a declaration stating that he or she meets the above criteria and requesting appointed counsel. (§ 1170.95, subd. (b)(1)(A).) If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of eligibility, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and recall the sentence. (§ 1170.95, subds. (c), (d)(1).) At that hearing, the prosecutor bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).) "The prosecutor and the petitioner may rely on the record of conviction or offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens." (Ibid. )

2. Applicability of Senate Bill 1437 to Persons Convicted of Manslaughter

Turner was charged with Rusty's murder, presumably based on the theory that it was the natural, probable, and foreseeable consequence of the gang assault he joined. (See Medina, supra , 46 Cal.4th at pp. 922, 928, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 202, 209 P.3d 105.) In lieu of trial, he agreed to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter. He could not be charged with murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine following enactment of Senate Bill 1437 because malice can no longer be imputed based solely on Turner's participation in a crime. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)⁶ His petition recited these facts.

Appealing the trial court's summary denial, Turner argues Senate Bill 1437 extends to individuals who risked a murder conviction under a theory of felony murder or natural and probable consequences murder but agreed to plead guilty to manslaughter instead. The People disagree, maintaining that Senate Bill 1437 applies exclusively to defendants convicted of murder under one of those theories, and not to defendants like Turner who were convicted of other crimes pursuant to a plea agreement.

Turner's statutory eligibility presents a question of law. We independently consider the scope of Senate Bill 1437 to assess whether it provides relief to a defendant like Turner who was convicted of manslaughter by plea. (See People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 309, 355 P.3d 480 [de novo review].) As with any question of statutory interpretation, "our primary task is to give effect to the Legislature's intended purpose in enacting the law." ( People v. Hubbard (2016) 63 Cal.4th 378, 386, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 114, 371 P.3d 578 ( Hubbard ).) "We begin with the statute's text, assigning the relevant terms their ordinary meaning, while also taking account of any related provisions and the overall structure of the statutory scheme. [Citation.] Essential is whether our interpretation, as well as the consequences flowing therefrom, advances the Legislature's intended purpose. [Citation.] Where the statutory text admits of more than one reasonable interpretation, we may consider various extrinsic aids—including the legislative history—to the extent they are helpful in illuminating that purpose." ( Ibid. )

a. Defendants Who Pled Guilty to Voluntary Manslaughter Are Not Entitled to Relief.

Subdivision (a) of section 1170.95 allows "[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory" to file a petition "to have [his or her] murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts." (Italics added.) Likewise, section 1170.95, subdivision (d) defines the available relief as the vacating of a "murder conviction." (...