People v. Valencia

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MANUEL DE JESUS VALENCIA, Defendant and Appellant.

B283588

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION EIGHT

Review denied: December 11, 2019

August 5, 2019

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. YA091677)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, LaRonda J. McCoy, Judge. Affirmed in part and remanded with directions.

Stephen Michael Vasil, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of California, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, J. Michael Lehmann, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Gustavo Jaimes spoke disrespectfully to Manuel de Jesus Valencia, so Valencia shot him to death. In jail, Valencia described the murder to an undercover deputy. We affirm the admission of this confession and a gang sentencing enhancement. We remand for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which we abbreviate as SB 620, and direct the trial court to credit Valencia with an additional day of presentence custody. All code references are to the Penal Code.

I

We recount facts favorably to the side that won at trial.

Valencia is in a gang called Evil Klan. Evil Klan's territory is in Los Angeles County. Its southern border is Century Boulevard.

The morning of the murder, Valencia was on Century Boulevard with fellow Evil Klan member Little Looney. Jaimes was standing at a bus stop on Century Boulevard. Little Looney told Valencia to check out Jaimes. Valencia walked over to Jaimes, who began "talking shit" to Valencia. Valencia felt he had no choice but to shoot Jaimes. Valencia fired seven times, killing Jaimes.

Police arrested Valencia, read Valencia his Miranda rights, and interrogated him. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 444 (Miranda).) After answering some questions, Valencia requested a lawyer. The detectives left.

The next day, police put Valencia in a holding cell with an undercover sheriff's deputy dressed like an inmate and wearing a recording device. The deputy and Valencia spoke for nearly 40 minutes.

Police removed Valencia from the cell and put him in a lineup. Police planned to tell Valencia the witness identified him,whether or not the witness did. The witness did not identify Valencia.

After police returned Valencia to the cell with the undercover deputy, Valencia asked a uniformed deputy, "Are you gonna let me know if I got picked?" The uniformed deputy responded, "I'm running, running solo right now, so give me a couple seconds." A few minutes later, the following dialogue was recorded:

Uniformed deputy: Uh, you did get picked. And, uh, [the detectives] gonna talk to you. [unintelligible]

Undercover deputy: Who's gonna talk to me?

Uniformed deputy: Detectives.

Undercover deputy: Detectives?

Uniformed deputy: Yeah.

Undercover deputy: Alright.

Uniformed deputy: As a matter of fact, probably pretty quick. Not sure how long it's gonna take for you. You already have a house?

Valencia: Nah. [unintelligible]

Undercover deputy: Sit there and just no matter what they tell you, you don't have to open your mouth. Just sit there [unintelligible]

Valencia: What if they ask questions?

Undercover deputy: Just because they ask a question don't mean you gotta answer it right?

Valencia: Yeah. I have the right to remain silent.

Undercover deputy: You just sit there and you just let them talk. Let them feed you what they have, so you know. You're playing chess now homie. You need to know what their game [unintelligible] I'malmost positive they have [unintelligible] They probably have more, something else [unintelligible] So you really need to start playing back everything now. [unintelligible] It's gonna be a rough ride for you, you know.

Valencia: [unintelligible]

Undercover deputy: You gotta start [. . .] They got you? Straight up, they got you?

Valencia: They got me.

Then Valencia told the undercover deputy he murdered Jaimes and described the details. No one appears to dispute that the uniformed deputy left the cell before Valencia told the undercover deputy, "They got me," and described the details of the crimes.

At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence about Valencia's gang, Evil Klan. That evidence included Evil Klan member Elvin Mundo's conviction for grand theft from the person. Detective Albert Arevalo was the prosecution's gang expert. Arevalo said he was familiar with Mundo, Mundo's membership in Evil Klan, and Mundo's conviction.

Arevalo testified the "primary criminal activity of Evil Klan range from vandalism, felony vandalism, narcotic possession, narcotic possession for sale, illegal firearm possession, robbery, theft and assaults." Arevalo also testified the gang's primary activity include "assaults with firearms or deadly weapons."

The jury convicted Valencia of murder. It found true a firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) and a gang enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C).

The trial court sentenced Valencia to 50 years to life: 25 years to life for murder and 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement. The trial court did not impose any time under thegang enhancement. However, the enhancement made Valencia ineligible for parole for 15 years.

II

The trial court did not violate Valencia's Fifth Amendment rights by allowing the jury to hear his confession to the undercover deputy.

We defer to factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 642.) We independently review legal determinations. (Ibid.)

Valencia's confession was voluntary and was not the result of coercion. There was no Miranda problem. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 478 [statements given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences are admissible].)

Miranda forbids coercion, not strategic deception that tricks suspects into trusting someone they see as a fellow prisoner. (Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292, 297.) The atmosphere is not coercive when a suspect considers himself in the company of cellmates and not law enforcement. (Id. at pp. 296-297.) Because Valencia confessed to a man he believed was not with the government, there is no reason to assume coercion. (Id. at pp. 297-298.) Ploys to mislead suspects or to lull them into a false sense of security are not within Miranda's concerns. (Ibid.)

Miranda is inapplicable because Valencia did not know he was speaking to a sheriff's deputy. Police did not dominate the cell's atmosphere. The element of government coercion was missing. (See People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 554.)

Under these principles, the trial court was right to overrule Valencia's objection to admitting his confession. Voluntary confessions are a proper element in law enforcement and anunmitigated good. They are essential to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing criminals. (Maryland v. Shatzer (2010) 559 U.S. 98, 108 (Shatzer).)

Valencia objects a uniformed deputy subjected him to a custodial interrogation by lying to him that the lineup witness had picked him. We assume this lie was a custodial interrogation for purposes of argument. Valencia, however, said nothing to this deputy, who departed before Valencia spoke. The deputy was playing a role in a planned ruse to prompt Valencia to speak to someone Valencia did not believe was an officer. Valencia fell for the ploy. When the uniformed deputy left, Valencia thought he was alone with his trusted confidant, not in a police-dominated environment. Valencia spoke freely and voluntarily and not in response to his perception of official coercion. His confession was admissible.

Relying on Shatzer, Valencia incorrectly argues a coercive effect lingered after the uniformed deputy left Valencia. Shatzer does not help Valencia. Justice Scalia's opinion in Shatzer concerned statements to people the defendant knew were police. (Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. at pp. 101-102.) Valencia's statements were not to people Valencia thought were police.

Valencia also invokes Edwards v. Arizona, but it, like Shatzer, involved statements to people the defendant knew were from the government. (See Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 479 (Edwards) [after Edwards asked for a lawyer and officers left, other officers returned to cell and identified themselves].)

The same holds for Valencia's reliance on Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600, 604-605, which again concerned statements by a defendant to people she knew were police.

There was coercion in Shatzer, Edwards and Missouri v. Seibert because those defendants knew they were confronting the inquisitorial might of the government. The coercion in those cases triggered Miranda. Valencia was free of this intimidating power, so the opposite holds for him: no coercion, no Miranda. (Accord, People v. Orozco (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 802, 811-818.)

In sum, Valencia confessed to satisfy his own desire to tell the truth, not to satisfy the will of a person Valencia thought was from the government. Because Valencia spoke only to an undercover officer, Miranda and the Fifth Amendment do not apply. His voluntary confession was admissible.

III

The jury had enough evidence to find true the gang sentencing enhancement provided by section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C).

We review the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a reasonable jury could find the facts required for the enhancement. (People v. Garcia (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 519, 522-523...