People v. Valle

34 N.E.3d 231

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Jaime L. VALLE, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 2–13–1319.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

June 11, 2015.

Nischal Raval, of Morelli & Raval, of Aurora, for appellant.

Joseph H. McMahon, State's Attorney, of St. Charles (Lawrence M. Bauer and Diane L. Campbell, both of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 After a bench trial, defendant, Jaime L. Valle, was convicted of unlawful possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 2010)) and sentenced to six years' imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. Defendant argues that the police exceeded the scope of the warrant that authorized the search leading to the evidence of his offense. We affirm.

¶ 2 Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and unlawful possession of cocaine (720 ILCS 570/402(a)(2)(A) (West 2010)). His motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence alleged that, on March 23, 2010, while executing a search warrant, police seized evidence from a detached garage at 216 South East Avenue in Aurora. Defendant and his mother, Celia Valle, lived in the house at that address. The motion contended that the search of the garage exceeded the scope of the warrant, which was limited to the house.

¶ 3 The warrant, issued by Judge Leonard Wojtecki, read:

“On this day, March [23], 2010, Complainant [Officer Steven Stemmet] has signed and sworn to a complaint for search warrant before me. Upon examination of the complaint, I find that it states facts sufficient to show probable cause and I therefore command that the following person(s), place(s), or thing(s):

* The person of Jaime Luis Valle Male Hispanic Date of Birth 06/08/75, approximately 6'04? 315 lbs. black hair brown eyes.

* 216 S. East Av. Aurora, Kane County, IL 60505 described as a two story split level single family residence that is light blue in color with white trim. The front door to the residence is white in color with windows and faces west. There is white screen door [sic ] with windows. There are several concrete steps, with white wrought iron railings, leading to the front door. The numerals ‘216’ appear in black to the right of the front door. The residence has two driveways. One is in the northwest section of the yard, and the other runs along the east (rear) of the residence. The east drive leads to a large detached garage that is light blue in color with a white garage door. There is tall white fence [sic ] in the yard. The structure is located on the northeast corner of S. East Av. and North Av. in Aurora, Kane County, Illinois; be searched and the following instruments, articles, or things which have been used in the commission of, or which constitute evidence of the offense of Unlawful Delivery of Controlled Substance in violation of 720ILCS570/401 [sic ] be seized therefrom.

(1) any and all substances containing cocaine;

(2) any and all documents and United States Currency relating to the purchase, sale, or distribution of cocaine, or in the proximity of any material possibly containing cocaine;

(3) any and all paraphernalia including scales, relating to the usage, sale, or distribution of cocaine;

(4) any and all electronic devices, computers, and computer equipment, related to the usage, sale, or distribution of cocaine;

(5) any and all evidence of drug co-conspirators, including photographs, ledgers, [and] records[;]

(6) indicia of residency, ownership, or possession of the above address.”

¶ 4 The complaint, signed by Stemmet, stated that he had probable cause to believe, based upon the facts provided in his affidavit, that the evidence to be seized was “now located in the residence, or on the person set forth above.” In his affidavit, Stemmet stated in pertinent part as follows. Several controlled buys of cocaine, using a confidential informant, had taken place at 216 South East Avenue in Aurora, from a man who matched defendant's photograph. Police records revealed that defendant resided at 216 South East. On or about March 16, 2010, Stemmet observed a man who resembled defendant's description backing his SUV out of the east driveway; Stemmet traced the vehicle's registration to Celia Valle, who also resided at 216 South East. Stemmet believed that “a search of 216 S. East Av., Aurora * * * and/or on the person of [defendant] [would] result in the seizure of cocaine.”

¶ 5 At a hearing on the motion, the parties stipulated that, on March 23, 2010, defendant resided at 216 South East; that the property at 216 South East included a detached garage used by defendant; and that officers discovered incriminating evidence in the garage.

¶ 6 In argument, defendant contended that the search of the detached garage exceeded the scope of the warrant. Citing People v. Freeman, 121 Ill.App.3d 1023, 77 Ill.Dec. 266, 460 N.E.2d 125 (1984), he argued that the warrant had specified that the search was limited to the “single[-]family residence” specifically identified in the first line of the applicable paragraph. In response, the State, citing United States v. Bennett, 170 F.3d 632 (6th Cir.1999), noted that the warrant explicitly mentioned the detached garage, which had the same address as the house. Further, the garage was within the curtilage of the house, validating the search. Defendant replied that Bennett, in which the court construed a warrant authorizing the search of the defendant's “premises” as permitting the search of a shop building located on the same property as his house (id. at 638 ), was distinguishable because “premises” has a broader meaning than the terminology used in the warrant here.

¶ 7 The trial court found Bennett persuasive and ruled that the search of the garage had been proper. After defendant was convicted and sentenced as noted, he timely appealed.¹

¶ 8 On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in holding that the search warrant authorized the search of the detached garage. He argues that the warrant's plain language limited any search to his person and the “two[-]story split[-]level single[-]family residence.” The State responds that, because the detached garage was within the house's curtilage, the police could have searched it even had the warrant not mentioned the garage at all. Further, the warrant's mention of the “large detached garage” brought that building within the warrant's scope.

¶ 9 Because the trial court's ruling turned solely on the construction of the search warrant, our review is de novo. See People v. Close, 238 Ill.2d 497, 504, 345 Ill.Dec. 620, 939 N.E.2d 463 (2010) ; People v. McCarty, 223 Ill.2d 109, 148, 306 Ill.Dec. 570, 858 N.E.2d 15 (2006). A warrant should receive a commonsense and realistic interpretation. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965) ; People v. Bryant, 389 Ill.App.3d 500, 514–15, 329 Ill.Dec. 284, 906 N.E.2d 129 (2009).

¶ 10 In the trial court—though, strangely, not on appeal—defendant relied on Freeman, a 1984 opinion of this court. Although Freeman does appear to support his position, the opinion is legally unsound.

¶ 11 In Freeman, the police obtained a warrant to search a house at a given address. The requesting officer's affidavit stated that he knew that the defendant resided “ ‘at the premises described as a two-story wood frame single family dwelling’ ” located at the address and that the officer had been present personally “ ‘at the premises described * * * above’ ” when cannabis had been present. Freeman, 121 Ill.App.3d at 1026, 77 Ill.Dec. 266, 460 N.E.2d 125. The affidavit did not mention any other buildings. The opinion does not quote any part of the search warrant but describes it only as “a warrant to search a house” at the given address. Id. at 1024, 77 Ill.Dec. 266, 460 N.E.2d 125. The police searched the house. One officer then exited, approached a garage 30 or 40 feet from the house, looked in through the window, and obtained the keys to the garage from the defendant's wife, under a threat of breaking down the garage door if needed. Inside, the officers seized cannabis. Id. at 1025–26, 77 Ill.Dec. 266, 460 N.E.2d 125.

¶ 12 The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress. As pertinent here, the defendant argued on appeal that the garage was outside the scope of the warrant. Id. at 1031, 77 Ill.Dec. 266, 460 N.E.2d 125. This court agreed, reasoning, “[t]he warrant clearly did not include the garage, and the cannabis was not within the plain view of the officer from a place where he had a right to be.” Id. We noted that the garage had been 30 to 40 feet away from the house and that the evidence showed that the defendant had reasonably expected that its contents would remain private. Id.

¶ 13 However, the problem with Freeman is that, even though the warrant expressly included only the defendant's residence, the garage was within the curtilage of the defendant's residence. Thus, per the settled law that we discuss below, the warrant authorized the search of the defendant's garage. For the same reason, the warrant here authorized the search of defendant's garage.²

¶ 14 Under Illinois law, “[t]he curtilage, that is, the land immediately surrounding and associated with the home, has been considered part of the home itself for fourth amendment purposes.” People v. McNeal, 175 Ill.2d 335, 344, 222 Ill.Dec. 307, 677 N.E.2d 841 (1997). Thus, “[t]he government cannot search a home and its curtilage absent a warrant or some exception to the warrant requirement.” People v. Pitman, 211 Ill.2d 502, 518, 286 Ill.Dec. 36, 813 N.E.2d 93 (2004) ; see also People v. Accardi, 284 Ill.App.3d 31, 34, 219 Ill.Dec. 459, 671 N.E.2d 373 (1996). Necessarily, if the curtilage is considered part of the home for purposes of the ...