People v. Vanderpool

505 Mich. 391

952 N.W.2d 414

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.John David VANDERPOOL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 158486

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued on application for leave to appeal November 6, 2019

Decided July 13, 2020

Cavanagh, J.

While conducting a probation compliance check on defendant John D. Vanderpool's house, a probation agent found heroin. Defendant admitted that the heroin belonged to him. A few weeks later, defendant was arrested and was again found in possession of heroin. He was charged with two counts of possession with intent to deliver heroin and with violating probation. Defendant moved to suppress evidence from the compliance check, arguing that the search was illegal because he was not on probation at the time of the search, but the circuit court denied the motion. Defendant pleaded no contest to having violated probation and to having possessed less than 25 grams of a controlled substance, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v ), second offense. Defendant has appealed, arguing that because he was not on probation when his home was searched, the search was unlawful. We agree. While the circuit court attempted to extend defendant's probation before the compliance check, because the term of probation had already expired, the court did not have the authority to extend it. Consequently, the warrantless search of defendant's home was not justified. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand to the Tuscola Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant was sentenced to a two-year term of probation on June 25, 2013, after pleading no contest to assaulting a police officer. The terms of probation included a prohibition on the use or possession of controlled substances and authorization of compliance checks permitting probation officers to search his property. The two years passed; June 25, 2015, came and went; and defendant's term of probation expired without the circuit court either discharging defendant from probation or extending his probation. On September 23, 2015, defendant's probation officer filed a Petition for Amendment of Order of Probation, which requested that defendant's term of probation be "extended" until June 25, 2016, "to allow for the time he was on warrant status as well [as] time to pay his Court ordered fines and fees." The circuit court—without notice or a hearing—granted the petition and "extended" defendant's probation, setting a new expiration date of June 25, 2016.

The record is unclear whether defendant continued to comply with the terms of his probation, or whether he was asked to comply with the terms of his probation, following its expiration on June 25, 2015, until its "extension" on September 23, 2015. On November 12, 2015, however, defendant's probation officer sought to have him arrested for failing a drug screen. On December 3, 2015, another arrest warrant indicated defendant had "stopped" reporting to the probation office on a weekly basis, though the order did not indicate when he stopped. On December 4, 2015, probation officers conducted a compliance check of defendant's home and found heroin, which defendant admitted belonged to him. Defendant was not arrested that day, but was arrested on December 30, 2015, when a deputy responded to a tip regarding his location and warrant status. At the time of his arrest, defendant was again found in possession of heroin, and he was charged with two heroin offenses as well as violating probation.

Defendant moved to suppress the evidence produced in the search, arguing that the December 4, 2015 compliance check was not authorized because the circuit court lacked the authority to extend his probation after it had expired. The circuit court denied the motion, and defendant pleaded no contest to one charge of possession of less than 25 grams of heroin, second offense, and to the probation-violation charge. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 18 months to 8 years for the heroin conviction and 459 days for the probation-violation conviction.

The Court of Appeals granted defendant's application for leave to appeal but affirmed his convictions in a split decision. People v. Vanderpool , 325 Mich. App. 493, 925 N.W.2d 914 (2018). Defendant sought leave to appeal here, and this Court scheduled oral argument on the application, directing the parties to address whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to extend defendant's probationary term on September 23, 2015, and whether the extension of the probationary term without notice and a hearing violated defendant's due-process rights. People v. Vanderpool , 504 Mich. 872, 872, 928 N.W.2d 198 (2019).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo questions of both statutory interpretation, People v. Carter , 503 Mich. 221, 226, 931 N.W.2d 566 (2019), and constitutional law, People v. Hammerlund , 504 Mich. 442, 451, 939 N.W.2d 129 (2019).

III. ANALYSIS

Several statutory provisions are relevant to our analysis in this case. MCL 771.2(1) limits the probationary period for a felony to five years.¹ MCL 771.2(5) requires the sentencing court to set the period and conditions of probation and allows the court to amend the order of probation "at any time":

The court shall, by order to be entered in the case as the court directs by general rule or in each case, fix and determine the period and conditions of probation. The order is part of the record in the case. The court may amend the order in form or substance at any time. If the court reduces a defendant's probationary term under subsection (2), the period by which that term was reduced must be reported to the department of corrections.

The court can revoke probation "during the probation period." MCL 771.4. The end of the probationary period and the probation officer's duties at that time are directed by MCL 771.5(1) :

When the probation period terminates, the probation officer shall report that fact and the probationer's conduct during the probation period to the court. Upon receiving the report, the court may discharge the probationer from further supervision and enter a judgment of suspended sentence or extend the probation period as the circumstances require, so long as the maximum probation period is not exceeded.

Finally, MCL 771.6 requires a record of discharge.

When interpreting a statute, a court's duty is to "discern the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute by according those words their plain and ordinary meaning." Sotelo v. Grant Twp. , 470 Mich. 95, 100, 680 N.W.2d 381 (2004). Statutory words and phrases are to be "understood according to the common and approved usage of the language," except when a "peculiar" legal meaning has attached. MCL 8.3a. The common meaning of statutory words and phrases takes into account the context in which the words are used. Krohn v. Home-Owners Ins. Co. , 490 Mich. 145, 156, 802 N.W.2d 281 (2011). In giving meaning to the statute, "we examine the provision[s] within the overall context of the statute ‘so as to produce, if possible, a harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole.’ " People v. Cunningham , 496 Mich. 145, 153-154, 852 N.W.2d 118 (2014), quoting Grand Rapids v. Crocker , 219 Mich. 178, 182-183, 189 N.W. 221 (1922). Statutory provisions "cannot be read in isolation, but instead must be read reasonably and in context." Cunningham , 496 Mich. at 154, 852 N.W.2d 118. Reading various probation statutes together, we conclude that after June 25, 2015, when defendant's probationary period expired, the circuit court had neither the authority to "extend" defendant's probationary period under MCL 771.5(1) nor to "amend" the probationary period under MCL 771.2(5).

The circuit court fixed defendant's probationary period, as required by MCL 771.2(1), at two years on June 25, 2013. That two-year period ended on June 25, 2015. On or before that date, the probation officer was required to report the termination of the probationary period to the circuit court and report on defendant's conduct during the probationary period. MCL 771.5(1). Upon receiving that report, the circuit court would have had the choice of discharging defendant or extending the probationary period. Id. However, defendant's probation officer did not notify the circuit court or report on defendant's conduct on or before June 25, 2015. Defendant's period of probation therefore terminated on that date.

When defendant's probation officer sought to "extend" defendant's probationary period on September 23, 2015, there was no statutory authority to do so because the period had already "terminate[d]," MCL 771.5(1), or "expir[ed]," MCL 771.6. "Terminate" means "to form an ending" and "to come to an end in time." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.). "Expire" means "to come to an end." Id. The most relevant definition of "extend" is "to cause to be longer[;] prolong." Id. The order of probation was signed on June 25, 2013, and set a two-year term of probation. By its own terms, the order of probation ended the period of probation on June 25, 2015. A probationary period that has terminated is over. And therefore, logically, once a period has terminated, it cannot be made longer (extended).

Additionally, the circuit court's authority to "extend" the probationary period is conditioned "[u]pon receiving the report" of the probation officer, which must be provided to the court "[w]hen the probation period terminates." MCL 771.5(1). The phrase "[w]hen the probation period terminates" is unambiguous. "When" means "at or during the time that." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.). The circuit court's attempt to extend the probationary period several months after the probation period terminated does not align with the statutory phrase "when the probation period terminates."

Neither could the circuit court "amend" the order of probation to extend the...