People v. Vincent

1

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CEDRIC VINCENT, Defendant and Appellant.

C099435

California Court of Appeals, Third District, San Joaquin

November 12, 2024

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

(Super. Ct. No. LODCRFE20230002795)

RENNER, J.

Defendant Cedric Vincent drove through an intersection without stopping at a stop sign in Lodi late one night. A police officer pulled defendant over and discovered his registration was long expired. The officer decided to impound defendant's pickup truck. Defendant got out of the truck and tried to flee. He was apprehended and searched, resulting in the discovery of a partially loaded handgun.

Defendant moved to suppress the handgun and ammunition. The motion was denied. A jury later found him guilty of possession of a firearm with a prior felony conviction and possession of ammunition by a prohibited person and found true allegations that he suffered two prior felony convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law. (Pen. Code, §§ 1170.12, subd. (b), 667, subd (d), 29900, subd. (a)(1), 30305, subd. (a)(1).)^[1] The trial court struck one of defendant's prior strikes and sentenced him to six years on the felon-in-possession of a firearm count.

Defendant appeals, arguing the magistrate erred in denying the motion to suppress. We agree and reverse.^[2]

I. BACKGROUND^[3]

A. Traffic Stop and Search

Lodi Police Officer Gerardo Ramirez was on duty in a marked patrol car on the night of March 4, 2023. Around 11:20 p.m., Ramirez saw a Dodge Ram pickup truck drive through an intersection without stopping at the stop sign. Ramirez activated his overhead lights and followed the pickup truck a short distance. As he drove, Ramirez radioed dispatch and learned the truck's registration had expired in August 2019.

Officer Ramirez followed the pickup truck to the parking lot of a small strip mall. The truck parked properly, and Ramirez approached the driver's side. As Ramirez drew near, he saw defendant's face in the driver's side mirror. Ramirez recognized defendant from a prior arrest for armed robbery.

Officer Ramirez requested defendant's license and registration. Defendant turned them over. Lodi Police Officer John DeLeon arrived shortly thereafter. Ramirez instructed DeLeon to stand near the driver's side door. Defendant remained in the truck, with the engine on. Defendant wore a puffy jacket. He smoked a cigarette and spoke on the phone with his wife.

Officer Ramirez returned to his patrol car to prepare a traffic citation. He ran the truck's license plate number through Department of Motor Vehicle records and confirmed the registration had been expired since 2019. He also noted that defendant was associated with an address some 2.2 miles away.

Officer Ramirez then returned to the pickup truck and asked defendant to step outside. Defendant, who has mobility issues, gave Officer DeLeon permission to remove a walker from his backseat. DeLeon retrieved the walker, and defendant seated himself upon it.

Officer Ramirez said he wanted to pat search defendant. Defendant refused the pat search and started leaning forward on the walker, as though to prevent a search. A struggle ensued. Defendant stood and started to run.

Officers Ramirez and DeLeon tackled defendant around 15 feet away. Other officers arrived and helped subdue defendant. They eventually gained control over defendant and searched him. They found a Glock 26 nine-millimeter handgun with six rounds in defendant's jacket pocket. Defendant was arrested and taken into custody. B. Charges and Motion to Suppress

Defendant was charged by complaint with possession of a firearm with a prior felony conviction (§ 29900, subd. (a)(1)-count 1) and possession of ammunition by a person prohibited from possessing a firearm (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)-count 2).^[4] The complaint further alleged, as to both counts, that defendant had suffered two prior serious felony convictions. (§§ 1170.12, subd. (b), 667, subd. (d).)

Defendant filed a motion to suppress the gun and ammunition. The motion was heard concurrently with the preliminary hearing. We have already summarized much of the testimony offered at the hearing. We now direct our attention to the testimony at issue on appeal.

During the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Ramirez explained that he decided to tow defendant's truck upon returning to his patrol car and confirming that the truck's registration had expired. Ramirez elaborated on cross-examination that he relied on Vehicle Code section 22651, subdivision (o), which gave him authority to tow, and discretion whether to exercise that authority.

Defense counsel then asked: "So why did you decide to not let him drive his car 2.2 miles home with instructions not to drive it again until it was registered?" The prosecutor objected on relevance grounds and the magistrate sustained the objection.

Defense counsel then asked whether Officer Ramirez was familiar with those sections of the Lodi Police Department Manual (the Manual) dealing with the storage of vehicles at arrest scenes.^[5] Ramirez responded he was. Defense counsel then asked whether the Manual authorized him to leave a vehicle at the scene, so long as it was lawfully parked. Ramirez responded in the affirmative. Turning to the decision to impound defendant's truck, defense counsel asked, "Okay. So why did you feel the need to tow the vehicle?" The prosecutor objected, again on relevance grounds. The magistrate asked defense counsel why Ramirez's thought process was relevant, given that he had discretion to impound the truck. Defense counsel responded, "They're creating an unnecessary situation where they're trying to bootstrap a pat search onto something that they don't even need to do." The magistrate responded, "But, again, they have discretion to do it." The magistrate then sustained the objection.

Following further witness testimony and argument, the magistrate denied the motion to suppress and held defendant to answer. Shortly thereafter, the prosecution filed an information charging defendant with the same counts and prior strikes, and further alleging, as to count 1, that defendant was armed with a firearm during the commission of the crime. (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii).) The information also alleged various aggravating factors, including that defendant's prior convictions were numerous (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)) and he had served a prior prison term (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(3)).^[6] Defendant pled not guilty and denied the allegations. He later filed a combined motion to set aside the information and renewed motion to suppress pursuant to sections 995 and 1538.5, subdivision (i). That motion, too, was denied.

The matter was tried to a jury in August 2023. The jury found defendant guilty on all remaining counts (counts 1 and 2) and found true the allegation that defendant was personally armed with a firearm during the commission of count 1. In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found true the two prior serious felony allegations and aggravating prior prison terms. The trial court struck one of defendant's two prior strikes and sentenced him on count 1 to the upper term of three years, doubled, for a total term of six years in prison. The trial court imposed and stayed defendant's sentence on count 2.

This appeal timely followed.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant advances two interrelated arguments. First, he argues the magistrate erred in limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of Officer Ramirez regarding his reasons for impounding the truck. Second, he argues the evidence was not sufficient to allow the magistrate to determine the reasonableness of the decision to impound the truck. Both arguments are well taken. We will explain why in a moment, after we set forth our standard of review and the governing law.

A. Standard of Review

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against warrantless searches and seizures. (People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 829.) Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable, and the prosecution bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the search or seizure was constitutionally permissible. (United States v. Matlock (1974) 415 U.S. 164, 177, fn. 14; People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 120.)

Section 1538.5 establishes procedures by which criminal defendants may seek to suppress illegally seized evidence. (People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 940 (Romeo).) Ordinary rules of evidence generally apply to suppression hearings, with exceptions not relevant here. (See Hewitt v. Superior Court (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 923, 927 ["Evidence Code section 300 makes it clear that, except as provided by statute, the Evidence Code applies to every evidentiary hearing in the state courts"]; and see Levenson, Cal. Criminal Procedure (The Rutter Group 2023) § 6:19 [discussing hearsay exceptions to the Evidence Code applicable to suppression hearings].)

"When a suppression motion is made before a magistrate in conjunction with a preliminary hearing, as in this case, the magistrate tries the facts, resolving credibility issues and conflicts in the evidence, weighing the evidence, and drawing appropriate inferences. [Citations.] If the magistrate denies the motion and holds the defendant to answer, the defendant must, as a prerequisite to appellate review, renew his challenge before the trial court by motion to dismiss under section 995 or in a special hearing. [Citations.] At that stage, the evidence is generally limited to the transcript of the preliminary hearing, testimony by witnesses who testified at the preliminary hearing (who may be recalled by the prosecution), and evidence that could not reasonably have been presented...