People v. Walker

553 P.3d 150

324 Cal.Rptr.3d 127

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Maurice WALKER, Defendant and Appellant.

S278309

Supreme Court of California.

August 15, 2024

Second Appellate District, Division Two, B319961, Los Angeles County Superior Court, BA398731, David R. Fields, Judge

Jason Szydlik, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Eric J. Kohm, Chung L. Mar and Christopher G. Sanchez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Jonathan Soglin, William M. Robinson; and Stephen K. Dunkle for First District Appellate Project and California Attorneys for Criminal Justice as Amici Curiae.

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

Penal Code¹ section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), as added by Senate Bill No. 81 (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1), provides that a sentencing court "[i]n exercising its discretion" to dismiss a sentencing enhancement "shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove" certain enumerated mitigating circumstances, and "[p]roof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety." The Second District Court of Appeal below "conclude[d] that section 1385’s mandate to ‘afford great weight’ to mitigating circumstances erects a rebuttable presumption that obligates a court to dismiss the enhancement unless the court finds that dismissal of that enhancement … would endanger public safety." (People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, 391, 302 Cal.Rptr.3d 468, italics added (Walker).) The Sixth District subsequently disagreed, concluding instead that section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) does not preclude a trial court from relying on countervailing aggravating factors, apart from a danger to public safety, to uphold an enhancement, despite the presence of one or more mitigating circumstances. (See People n Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1098, 304 Cal.Rptr.3d 251 (Ortiz).)²

More specifically, it found that absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court is required to engage "in a holistic balancing with special emphasis on the [nine] enumerated mitigating factors," in which those mitigating factors weigh "strongly in favor of … dismissal." (Id. at p. 1096, 304 Cal.Rptr.3d 251, italics added.) We granted review to resolve this conflict.

[1] Both parties now agree that the Court of Appeal below misinterpreted section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)’s "great weight" language as imposing a rebuttable presumption, but they diverge on the proper construction of that phrasing and its impact on a trial court’s authority under section 1385, subdivision (c). We conclude that the plain language of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) contemplates that a trial court will exercise its sentencing discretion in a manner consistent with the Ortiz court’s understanding. Specifically, absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present. (See Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1098, 304 Cal. Rptr.3d 251.) In other words, if the court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that "may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice." (Ibid.) Nevertheless, since the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s refusal to dismiss defendant’s enhancement under a presumption in favor of dismissal that could only be overcome by a finding that dismissal endangered public safety, defendant fails to persuade us that he is entitled to any relief under our less restrictive interpretation of a trial court's authority pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I. Facts and Procedural History

In June 2012, defendant Maurice Walker blocked a woman’s path as she left her Los Angeles apartment. The pair began to argue and defendant struck the woman in the mouth with his elbow. When a 78-year-old man tried to intervene, defendant stabbed him in the arm with a knife. (Walker, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 392, 302 Cal.Rptr.3d 468.)

Defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), elder abuse (§ 368, subd. (b)(1)), and misdemeanor battery (§ 242). The jury also found true enhancement allegations that defendant personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury on a person 70 years of age or older (§ 12022.7, subd. (c)). Defendant admitted that he had suffered two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i) & 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), as well as a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and he had served two prior prison terms (§ 667,5, subd. (b)).

In November 2012, after dismissing one of defendant’s two strikes, the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate determinate term of 20 years in prison. The sentence consisted of the upper term of four years (doubled to eight years under the Three Strikes law) for assault with a deadly weapon, consecutive to five years for the great bodily injury enhancement, five years for the prior serious felony enhancement, and one year each for the two prior prison term enhancements. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment and sentence. (People v. Walker (Feb. 24, 2014, B245405), 2014 WL 700693 [nonpub. opn.].)

In a 2017 habeas proceeding, the trial court struck one of defendant’s prior prison term enhancements, reducing his sentence to 19 years.

In a separate 2018 habeas proceeding, defendant successfully sought relief from his only remaining prior prison term enhancement, and the matter was remanded for the trial court to consider "whether to conduct a full resentencing." (People v. Walker (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 198, 208, 281 Cal.Rptr.3d 892; see id. at p. 204, 281 Cal.Rptr.3d 892 [citing our opinion in People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893, 236 Cal.Rptr.3d 84, 422 P.3d 531 for its statements regarding the "full resentencing" rule].) While that matter was still pending, Senate Bill No. 81 (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1) added subdivision (c) to section 1385, effective January 1, 2022, allowing the trial court to dismiss any enhancement "in the furtherance of justice" (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1)) unless otherwise prohibited, and providing that nine enumerated mitigating circumstances (two of which apply to defendant — section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), subparagraphs (B) [multiple enhancements alleged] and (H) [prior conviction over five years old]) "weigh[ ] greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety." (Id., subd. (c)(2).)³ Defendant filed a motion for resentencing in the trial court, seeking, inter alia, that "[a]t least one five-year enhancement … be dismissed because there are two mitigating factors justifying dismissal." The People opposed defendant’s motion.

In April 2022, the trial court conducted a full resentencing hearing, agreeing with defendant that the Court of Appeal intended for the court to "consider … the law as it is now[.]" The trial court declined to exercise its discretion under section 1385, as amended by Senate Bill No. 81, to dismiss defendant’s enhancements. The trial court stated in part, "I don’t find it’s in the interest of justice to — despite the new law under 1385 to dismiss these enhancements, even though there are multiple enhancements in this case."⁴

Defendant appealed, asserting that the trial court’s decision not to strike his five-year prior serious felony enhancement "cannot be reconciled with section 1385," as amended by Statutes 2021, chapter 721, section 1. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal below rejected defendant’s claim. We granted review limited to the following question: "Does the amendment to Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c) that requires trial courts to ‘afford great weight’ to enumerated mitigating circumstances (Stats. 2021, ch. 721) create a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissing an enhancement unless the trial court finds dismissal would endanger public safety?" The answer to this question has divided the Courts of Appeal. (Compare Walker, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 391, 302 Cal.Rptr.3d 468 with Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1095, 304 Cal.Rptr.3d 251; see also People v. Ponder (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1050-1052, 314 Cal.Rptr.3d 855 [agreeing with Ortiz].)

II. Discussion

A. Amended, Section 1385 Does Not Create a Rebuttable Presumption

[2–8] We begin our analysis of the question before us by consulting well-known precepts of statutory interpretation. "The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo. [Citations.] ‘ " ‘ "As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning." ’ " ’ [Citation.] ‘ "[W]e look to ‘the entire substance of the statute … in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision …. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question ‘"in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute …." [Citation.]’" (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961, 281 Cal.Rptr.3d 521, 491 P.3d 309.) " " " "if the statutory language...