People v. Warner

2022 IL App (1st) 210260

215 N.E.3d 156

465 Ill.Dec. 360

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Thomas WARNER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-21-0260

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, FOURTH DIVISION.

Filed: July 21, 2022

Rehearing denied September 19, 2022

Thomas Warner, of Menard, appellant pro se.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique Abraham, Douglas P. Harvath, and Paul E. Wojcicki, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Petitioner-appellant, Thomas Warner, pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) stemming from a multi-count information and was sentenced to one year imprisonment. Petitioner's AUUW conviction was based on a statute later found unconstitutional in People v. Aguilar , 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 22, 377 Ill.Dec. 405, 2 N.E.3d 321. After this conviction was vacated, petitioner sought a certificate of innocence (COI) pursuant to section 2-702 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-702 (West 2018) ), which was denied. Petitioner appeals the circuit court's denial of his request for a COI. We affirm.

¶ 2 In 2012, petitioner was charged by information with one count of unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) within 1000 feet of a school ( 720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(10) (West 2012)); one count of unlawful possession of a firearm (UPF) within 1000 feet of a school (id. § 24-3.1); and six counts of AUUW, including possessing a firearm without a valid firearm owner's identification card (id. §§ 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C); (a)(2), (a)(3)(C)), and possessing a handgun while under 21 years of age (id. §§ 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(I); (a)(2), (a)(3)(I)). The arrest report stated that at the time of the incident, petitioner was 17 years old and was within 1000 feet of a park and a school, during school hours.

¶ 3 Petitioner, represented by counsel, as part of a negotiated plea agreement, pleaded guilty to one count of AUUW (id. § 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)) in exchange for the State's agreement to nol-pros the seven remaining counts.

¶ 4 The parties stipulated to the following facts in support of petitioner's guilty plea. On December 5, 2012, Chicago police officer Jeffery Zwit and his partner were patrolling near Dunbar Career Vocational Academy and Dunbar Park (collectively, Dunbar) in response to recent robberies and gang violence in the area. At 1:14 p.m., the officers approached petitioner, who was "loitering" on the 2700 block of South Prairie Avenue in Chicago, about a block away from Dunbar. Petitioner backed away from the officers, keeping a hand in his jacket pocket. In the course of being arrested, petitioner stated, "I ain't going to lie, officer, I got a gun." The officers recovered a loaded .380-caliber handgun from petitioner's right coat pocket.

¶ 5 The circuit court accepted the guilty plea and sentenced petitioner to one year imprisonment on one count of AUUW. After the sentence was imposed and pursuant to the agreement, the State nol-prossed the remaining counts.

¶ 6 On October 30, 2018, during a sentencing hearing on petitioner's subsequent convictions on two aggravated battery charges with findings of severe bodily injuries and an aggravated discharge of a firearm charge (subsequent convictions), petitioner successfully petitioned the court to vacate his 2012 AUUW conviction pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code ( 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018) ). The AUUW was vacated based on petitioner's argument that the conviction was rendered void by Aguilar , 2013 IL 112116, 377 Ill.Dec. 405, 2 N.E.3d 321, in which the supreme court held that section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) was facially unconstitutional. Two of the six AUUW counts charged in the information were based on the provision found unconstitutional in Aguilar ; the other four AUUW counts, the UUW count, and the UPF count were constitutionally valid. After the sentencing hearing on the subsequent convictions, petitioner was sentenced to 24 years’ imprisonment. The State, in this case, did not move to reinstate and did not refile the nol-prossed charges.

¶ 7 On October 27, 2020, petitioner filed a pro se petition for a COI under section 2-702 of the Code ( 735 ILCS 5/2-702 (West 2018) ) (petition). Petitioner alleged that he had been convicted and incarcerated under a statute that was later declared unconstitutional. The petition contained no allegations to establish petitioner's innocence as to the other valid offenses charged in the information. The court set a hearing on the petition for December 4, 2020.

¶ 8 At the December 4 hearing, the State argued that, under section 2-702, petitioner was not entitled to a COI unless he established his innocence as to all of the offenses charged in the information. The court took the matter under advisement and set a status date for January 7, 2021.

¶ 9 On January 7, the State brought to the circuit court's attention the recent decision in People v. Moore , 2020 IL App (1st) 190435, 453 Ill.Dec. 847, 188 N.E.3d 816, where this court interpreted section 2-702 to provide that a petitioner must prove their innocence as to all of the offenses charged in an indictment or information in order to obtain a COI. The circuit court orally found that the petition failed to meet the requirements of section 2-702 and entered a written order denying the petition.

¶ 10 Petitioner appealed.

¶ 11 On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in denying the petition where section 2-702 required only that he prove his innocence as to the charge upon which he was incarcerated and not as to the charges in the information that the State nol-prossed and did not move to reinstate and did not refile. In response, the State argues that, based on the plain language of section 2-702, petitioner must establish his innocence as to all of the offenses charged in the information.

¶ 12 The parties’ arguments regarding the denial of the COI present an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Id. ¶ 11.

¶ 13 Our primary goal in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. People v. Palmer , 2021 IL 125621, ¶ 53, 450 Ill.Dec. 860, 182 N.E.3d 672. The best indicator of the intent is the language of the statute. People v. Fields , 2011 IL App (1st) 100169, ¶ 18, 355 Ill.Dec. 429, 959 N.E.2d 1162 (citing People v. Smith , 236 Ill. 2d 162, 166-67, 337 Ill.Dec. 700, 923 N.E.2d 259 (2010) ). We consider the statute as a whole and give the words used by the legislature their plain and ordinary meaning. Palmer , 2021 IL 125621, ¶ 53, 450 Ill.Dec. 860, 182 N.E.3d 672. In interpreting a statute, no part should be rendered meaningless or superfluous. Hernandez v. Lifeline Ambulance, LLC , 2019 IL App (1st) 180696, ¶ 10, 429 Ill.Dec. 723, 125 N.E.3d 429. We cannot "depart from the plain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express." People v. Woodard , 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443, 222 Ill.Dec. 401, 677 N.E.2d 935 (1997).

¶ 14 If a statute is unambiguous, we will apply its terms as written and not consider extrinsic aids. Hernandez , 2019 IL App (1st) 180696, ¶ 11, 429 Ill.Dec. 723, 125 N.E.3d 429. If the statutory language is ambiguous, we may consider extrinsic aids to determine the legislature's intent. Id. "A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses ***." Advincula v. United Blood Services , 176 Ill. 2d 1, 18, 223 Ill.Dec. 1, 678 N.E.2d 1009 (1996). We must not presume that the legislature intended absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. Palmer , 2021 IL 125621, ¶ 53, 450 Ill.Dec. 860, 182 N.E.3d 672.

¶ 15 We now examine section 2-702 under these principles of interpretation.

¶ 16 Section 2-702 is titled "[p]etition for a certificate of innocence that the petitioner was innocent of all offenses for which he or she was incarcerated. " (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-702 (West 2018). However, a title cannot override the plain language of the statute. Moore , 2020 IL App (1st) 190435, ¶ 18, 453 Ill.Dec. 847, 188 N.E.3d 816 (citing Home Star Bank & Financial Services v. Emergency Care & Health Organization, Ltd. , 2014 IL 115526, ¶ 40, 379 Ill.Dec. 51, 6 N.E.3d 128 ). We must go on and look at the body of the statute.

¶ 17 Subsection (a) explains that section 2-702 provides "innocent persons who have been wrongly convicted of crimes in Illinois and subsequently imprisoned" with an "avenue to obtain a finding of innocence so that they may obtain relief through a petition in the Court of Claims." 735 ILCS 5/2-702(a) (West 2018).

¶ 18 Subsection (b) sets forth who may petition for a COI and what a petitioner may request ( Moore , 2020 IL App (1st) 190435, ¶ 19, 453 Ill.Dec. 847, 188 N.E.3d 816 ):

"Any person convicted and subsequently imprisoned for one or more felonies by the State of Illinois which he or she did not commit may, under the conditions hereinafter provided, file a petition for certificate of innocence in the circuit court of the county in which the person was convicted. The petition shall request a certificate of innocence finding that the petitioner was innocent of all offenses for which he or she was incarcerated. " (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-702(b) (West 2018).

¶ 19 Subsections (c) and (d) set forth the requirements as to the contents of the petition. Moore , 2020 IL App (1st) 190435, ¶ 19, 453 Ill.Dec. 847, 188 N.E.3d 816. Subsection (c) requires the petitioner to demonstrate that:

"(1) he or she has been convicted of one or more felonies by the State of Illinois and subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and has served all or any part of the sentence; and

(2) his or her judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated, and the indictment or information dismissed or, if a new trial was ordered, either he or she was found not guilty at the new trial or he or she

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