People v. Warren

505 Mich. 196

949 N.W.2d 125

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Kelly Christopher WARREN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 158065

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued on application for leave to appeal November 6, 2019

Decided April 29, 2020

Markman, J.

At issue is whether, prior to accepting a guilty or no-contest plea, the trial court, in cases in which such advice is relevant, is required to advise a defendant that the court possesses discretionary consecutive-sentencing authority and to apprise the defendant as to the potential consequences of that authority for his or her sentence. We conclude that the trial court is required to do so under MCR 6.302(B)(2). As a result, the trial court here erred when it denied defendant's motion to withdraw his plea because the court failed to apprise him of both this authority and its potential consequences. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court to allow defendant to either withdraw his guilty plea or to reaffirm this plea. See People v. Brown , 492 Mich. 684, 702, 822 N.W.2d 208 (2012).

I. FACTS & HISTORY

In November 2014, defendant drove while intoxicated and then did so again the following summer while on bond for the first crime. In each case, he was charged, among other crimes, with operating a vehicle while intoxicated, third offense (OWI-3rd), MCL 257.625, and the prosecutor provided notice that defendant was subject to a sentence enhancement as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12(1)(b). Defendant agreed to plead guilty to one count of OWI-3rd in each case in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges and the habitual-offender enhancement. At the plea hearing, after the prosecutor informed the trial court of the agreement, the court asked the following:

The Court : All right. And each of the charges carries with it, absent the habitual, a five year maximum charge; is that correct, folks?

[Prosecutor ]: Yes.

[Defense Counsel ]: Yes.

Thereafter, the court questioned defendant to ensure that his plea was understanding, voluntary, and accurate under MCR 6.302. Yet at no point did the court inform defendant that it possessed the discretionary authority to sentence him to consecutive sentences because he had committed a felony (the second OWI-3rd charge) while disposition of another felony (the first OWI-3rd charge) had been pending. MCL 768.7b(2)(a).

The trial court ultimately sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms of 2 to 5 years. Because these sentences were to be served consecutively, defendant was subject to a maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment, twice the maximum of 5 years’ imprisonment had the sentences been imposed concurrently. Defendant filed a timely motion to withdraw his plea based upon the court's failure to have advised him of the possibility of consecutive sentencing. The trial court denied this motion and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. This Court then remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted with directions to compare People v. Johnson , 413 Mich. 487, 490, 320 N.W.2d 876 (1982) (holding that the former court rule governing pleas, GCR 1963, 785.7, did not "require advice as to other potential sentence consequences such as consecutive sentencing") with People v. Blanton , 317 Mich. App. 107, 119-120, 894 N.W.2d 613 (2016) (holding that the court was required to inform the defendant that he was subject to a two-year mandatory consecutive sentence for possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, or "felony-firearm"). People v. Warren , 500 Mich. 1056, 898 N.W.2d 597 (2017).

In a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's convictions and sentences. People v. Warren , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, 2018 WL 2269651, issued May 17, 2018 (Docket No. 333997). The majority concluded that Michigan caselaw, including Johnson and Blanton , was not dispositive of the issue and that neither the Michigan Court Rules nor due process required the court to inform defendant that it possessed the discretion to impose consecutive sentences. Id. at 2-5. The dissent would have held that "a possible consecutive sentence is a fact as important as the maximum penalty for each charge, and therefore an integral component of a voluntary and understanding plea." Id. at 1 ( GLEICHER , J., dissenting). Defendant sought leave to appeal in this Court and we heard oral argument on the application.¹

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a plea." Brown , 492 Mich. at 688, 822 N.W.2d 208. An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes. Woodard v. Custer , 476 Mich. 545, 557, 719 N.W.2d 842 (2006). The interpretation of court rules is reviewed de novo. People v. Lee , 489 Mich. 289, 295, 803 N.W.2d 165 (2011).

III. ANALYSIS

A defendant has the "right to withdraw any plea until the court accepts it on the record." MCR 6.310(A). Once the trial court has accepted the plea, there is no longer any absolute right to withdraw the plea. People v. Gomer , 206 Mich. App. 55, 56, 520 N.W.2d 360 (1994). Following sentencing, a trial court may withdraw a guilty plea if "there was an error in the plea proceeding that would entitle the defendant to have the plea set aside ...." MCR 6.310(C)(4). In other words, "[a] defendant seeking to withdraw his or her plea after sentencing must demonstrate a defect in the plea-taking process." Brown , 492 Mich. at 693, 822 N.W.2d 208. Thus, the issue here is whether the trial court's failure to inform defendant of the possibility of consecutive sentences constitutes a sufficient defect in the plea-taking process to require judicial relief. To determine whether there is such a defect, we must first give meaning to the relevant court rule, MCR 6.302.

"The court may not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere unless it is convinced that the plea is understanding, voluntary, and accurate." MCR 6.302(A). "[T]his requires a defendant to be informed of the consequences of his or her plea and, necessarily, the resultant sentence." Brown , 492 Mich. at 693, 822 N.W.2d 208 (quotation marks and citation omitted). To ensure that a defendant's plea satisfies these requirements, the trial court, before accepting such a plea, "must place the defendant or defendants under oath and personally carry out subrules (B)–(E)." MCR 6.302(A). Specifically relevant to the instant case are the requirements under Subrule (B), which addresses understanding pleas:

(B) An Understanding Plea. Speaking directly to the defendant or defendants, the court must advise the defendant or defendants of the following and determine that each defendant understands:

* * *

(2) the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense and any mandatory minimum sentence required by law, including a requirement for mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring under MCL 750.520b or 750.520c[.] [ MCR 6.302(B)(2).]

Defendant argues that a trial court must advise persons in his circumstances when the court possesses the discretion to impose consecutive sentences because such sentences affect the "maximum possible prison sentence." MCR 6.302(B)(2). That is, if the trial court only advised the defendant that he or she faced a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment, when, in fact, he or she was facing a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment as a consequence of a consecutive sentence, the trial court would have failed to inform the defendant of the "maximum possible prison sentence" and thus the defendant would not have fully understood the consequences of the plea.² Conversely, the prosecutor argues that the court rule does not explicitly require the trial court to inform defendants of discretionary consecutive-sentencing authority. Rather, trial courts are only required to advise a defendant of the "maximum possible prison sentence for the offense ," meaning that they are only required to inform defendants of the maximum sentence for each separate or discrete conviction. MCR 6.302(B)(2) (emphasis added). And in the instant case, this was done: the trial court properly advised defendant that the maximum possible prison sentence for each of his OWI-3rd convictions was five years’ imprisonment. To resolve this matter, we must undertake two related analyses: first, we must determine the extent to which prior caselaw governs the resolution of this issue and, second, if prior caselaw does not do so, we must determine in the first instance the proper understanding of MCR 6.302(B)(2).

A. CASELAW

We agree with the Court of Appeals majority that Michigan caselaw has not resolved the determinative question in this case: whether MCR 6.302(B)(2) requires courts to inform defendants of discretionary consecutive-sentencing authority before accepting a guilty or no-contest plea. We first address this Court's decision in Johnson and then the Court of Appeals’ decision in Blanton , because we specifically directed the Court of Appeals on remand to assess these specific decisions to determine what relevance, if any, these bear to the issue at hand.

In Johnson , the issue concerned whether the former court rule regarding pleas, GCR 1963, 785.7, required trial courts to inform defendants of the consequences of MCL 791.233b, then known as "Proposal B." Johnson , 413 Mich. at 488, 320 N.W.2d 876. Under this law, a defendant was "not eligible for parole until he or she has served the minimum sentence imposed by the court, undiminished by allowance for good time, special good time, or special parole." Id. at 488 n. 1, 320 N.W.2d 876. We held that trial courts were not required to inform defendants of the consequences of Proposal B because the court rule did not expressly require trial courts to inform defendants of those consequences. Id. at 490, 320 N.W.2d 876. In so holding, we also observed that the prior version of MCR 6.302 had not required trial...