People v. Wells

2023 IL App (3d) 210292

219 N.E.3d 1263

467 Ill.Dec. 864

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Deon Davelle WELLS, Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal No. 3-21-0292

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Filed May 11, 2023

James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Karalis, and Bryon Kohut, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.

Jodi Hoos, State's Attorney, of Peoria (Patrick Delfino, Thomas D. Arado, Gary F. Gnidovec, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In 2014, when defendant Deon D. Wells was 19 years old, he was charged with first degree murder ( 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2014)). Defendant pled guilty, and in 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to 40 years in prison. In 2017, defendant filed a postconviction petition, arguing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and that his sentence violated the Illinois and United States Constitutions. The State filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. On appeal, defendant argues that section 5-4.5-115 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115 (West 2020)) violates the equal protection clauses of the Illinois Constitution and the United States Constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2 ; U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1 ) because it grants parole review only to young offenders sentenced after June 1, 2019, not those sentenced prior thereto, like defendant. We hold that section 5-4.5-115 of the Unified Code does not violate equal protection principles and, therefore, affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 A. Defendant's Case

¶ 4 On December 26, 2014, defendant Deon D. Wells, a 19-year-old, was charged with first degree murder in connection with the death of a 19-month-old child. On October 8, 2015, defendant pled guilty in exchange for a 40-year cap on his prison sentence. On January 15, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to 40 years in prison.

¶ 5 On October 12, 2017, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court appointed postconviction counsel to represent defendant. Defendant's counsel filed a supplemental postconviction petition, alleging that defendant's sentence violates the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clauses of the Illinois and United States Constitutions. The State filed a motion to dismiss defendant's original and supplemental postconviction petitions. On July 2, 2021, the trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss defendant's postconviction petitions.

¶ 6 On appeal, defendant raises a new argument. He contends that section 5-4.5-115 of the Unified Code violates the equal protection clauses of the Illinois Constitution and the United States Constitution.

¶ 7 B. Section 5-4.5-115 of the Unified Code

¶ 8 In January 2017, House Bill 531 was introduced in the Illinois General Assembly and was enacted two years later as Public Act 100-1182, adding section 5-4.5-115 to the Unified Code. Pub. Act 100-1182 (eff. June 1, 2019) (adding 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115). Section 5-4.5-115 of the Unified Code creates parole review for offenders under the age of 21 at the time of their offense. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b) (West 2020). Under the statute, a person convicted of first degree murder is eligible for parole after serving 20 years if he was under 21 years old at the time of the offense and was sentenced after June 1, 2019. Id. In determining if a defendant should be granted parole, the Prisoner Review Board must "consider the diminished culpability of youthful offenders, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and maturity of the youthful offender during incarceration." Id. § 5-4.5-115(j).

¶ 9 According to one of its sponsors, Senator Don Harmon, the legislation was introduced as a "response to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miller against Alabama that laid out the fundamental notion that juvenile offenders are simply wired differently and have a propensity, much more so than older offenders, to be rehabilitated." 100th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 31, 2017, at 31 (statement of Senator Harmon). It creates "a parole system that would permit long sentences to be revisited at ten years or fifteen or twenty years depending *** on the crime." Id. Senator Harmon explained:

"The Supreme Court—the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence on youthful offenders is moving forward and is relying upon the—the brain science of development. And the science of brain development suggests that young people don't reach the age of fully formed brains at eighteen or at twenty-one. It's not till the mid-twenties, so we're still a few years away from the—the brain science here. *** [T]here is no judge on the planet who can look at a nineteen-year-old and say, I know for a fact that you're the kind of young person who is going to mature and rehabilitate in prison or you're the kind who is never going to get out of prison. That's why we create this parole process, so that ten years or fifteen years down the road, we can have a second look at the offender and say whether or not it is appropriate for them to be released. *** To the concern over victims, a concern that I shared, victims were at the table. This is prospective only. It will not disturb any victims who are—whose offenders have already been imprisoned." Id. at 36.

¶ 10 One of the bill's House sponsors, Representative Barbara Flynn Currie, explained the proposed legislation as follows:

"All this measure does is just say that people who committed crimes, while they were under the age of 21, will after 10 years, in some cases 20 years, in some cases never, have the opportunity to go to the Prisoner Review Board, to say I am a different person, and I do think that it would be appropriate for me to be released. In no way is this a get out of jail free card. I have no reason to think that the Prisoner Review Board would apply any but the most stringent standards, to a decision whether to release somebody after 10 years or after 20. But I do think that our correctional system should be premised on the idea of rehabilitation, not just retribution. Rehabilitation so that when somebody has shown that they really are different they're really a changed person, we ought to take that seriously. We ought to take it into account. We ought to give them a second chance. *** Think about what we know *** about brain research that says that young people, and the subject of this Bill is young people, do not always have good judgment. They haven't always understood the consequences of their actions. *** This is a critical change in our criminal justice system. To recognize that young people should be given, if they deserve it, a second chance." 100th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Nov. 28, 2018, at 47-48 (statement of Representative Currie).

According to one of the bill's cosponsors: "This Bill provides an opportunity for youthful offenders to rehabilitate, remediate, and reenter society." Id. at 50 (statement of Representative Parkhurst).

¶ 11 During the House debates, the following exchange took place between Representative C.D. Davidsmeyer and Representative Currie:

"DAVIDSMEYER: Is this only going forward? So if somebody who has committed a crime prior to this becoming law *** is not affected by this?

CURRIE: Absolutely, I'm glad you mentioned that. I meant to say so in my opening remarks. This Bill will not affect anybody who is currently serving time in the Illinois Correctional system. It is prospective only.

DAVIDSMEYER: So, you know *** one of the concerns of my local State's Attorneys was you know, making a promise to the victim's family that this person will never come back. Now they'll know going in *** that they may have an opportunity for parole in 10 years, or 20 years or whatever that date may be, correct?

CURRIE: And that was the reason we made the change because of the concern for victim families." Id. at 52-53 (statements of Representatives Davidsmeyer and Currie).

¶ 12 Representative Rita Mayfield stated:

"I do want to just reiterate that this Bill is prospective, meaning those individuals who are not currently incarcerated. This gives the State's Attorneys opportunities, when they are doing their sentencing, to take in consideration, you know the length of the sentence when they are giving them. Knowing that after 10 or 20 years that individual may be getting out." Id. at 55 (statement of Representative Mayfield).

In addressing the scope of the bill, Representative Currie stated: "[T]he Sentencing Policy Advisory Committee did give us help in figuring out how many people might be coming before the Prisoner Review Board were this Bill to become Law, affecting as it does, only future criminals, and the number is probably under 100 a year." Id. at 61-62 (statement of Representative Currie).

¶ 13 In Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), the United States Supreme Court ruled that a defendant under 18 years of age cannot be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole unless the sentencing court considers youth and various factors attendant to it because of "children's diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change." "[T]he evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development" suggests that the principles of Miller may also apply to young adults. People v. House , 2021 IL 125124, ¶¶ 29, 32, 452 Ill.Dec. 498, 185 N.E.3d 1234 ; see also People v. Hilliard , 2021 IL App (1st) 200112, ¶ 25, 457 Ill.Dec. 439, 195 N.E.3d 353 ("young adults (those between 18 and 21 years old) may rely on the evolving neuroscience regarding brain development in juveniles and its correlation to maturity underpinning the Miller decision" to support a constitutional challenge to a life sentence); People v. Daniels , 2020 IL...