People v. Wells

234 N.E.3d 680

2023 IL 127169

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,

v.Angela J. WELLS, Appellee.

(Docket No. 127169)

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed November 30, 2023

Rehearing Denied March 25, 2024

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County, the Hon. Paul P. Gilfillan, Judge, presiding.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Katherine M. Doersch and Gopi Kashyap, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Douglas R. Hoff, Deputy Defender, and Jonathan Krieger, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee.

Ameri R. Klafeta, Emily Werth, and Rachel D.G. Johnson, of Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc., and Kristen R. Seeger, Elizabeth Y. Austin, and Martha C. Clarke, of Sidley Austin LLP, both of Chicago, for amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois et al.

OPINION

JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The petitioner, Angela Wells, pled guilty in 2001 to one count of first degree murder and was sentenced to 40 years in prison. More than 16 years later, she filed a petition for a reduced sentence pursuant to section 2-1401(b-5) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401(b-5) (West 2016)). The State filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that the petitioner was not entitled to seek relief under the statute because she was sentenced pursuant to a fully negotiated plea agreement and her petition was untimely filed. The circuit court of Peoria County found subsection (b-5) inapplicable on both grounds cited by the State and dismissed the petition without holding a hearing. On appeal, the appellate court held that the petitioner was not provided with an opportunity to respond to the State’s motion to dismiss. Therefore, the appellate court vacated the circuit court’s dismissal order and remanded the case for further proceedings without addressing the merits. 2021 IL App (3d) 180344-U, ¶ 32, 2021 WL 1031635.

¶ 2 For the reasons that follow, we now hold that any error in depriving the petitioner of an opportunity to respond to the dismissal motion was harmless as a matter of law because subsection (b-5) does not apply to a person who is sentenced pursuant to a fully negotiated plea agreement. We thus reverse the appellate court’s judgment and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On May 1, 2001, the petitioner and her husband, Ronald Wells, were charged by a bill of indictment with three counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2), (3) (West 2000)) and one count of concealment of a homicidal death (id. § 9-3.1(a)) for allegedly murdering Jamie Weyrick on March 15, 2001, and burying his body in their backyard. The petitioner entered into a fully negotiated plea agreement with the State, whereby the petitioner agreed to plead guilty to one count of first degree murder and testify truthfully at her husband’s trial in exchange for a sentence of 40 years’ imprisonment and the dismissal of the remaining charges.

¶ 5 At the October 29, 2001, plea hearing, the assistant public defender informed the trial court of the terms of the plea agreement. The petitioner would plead guilty to first degree murder as charged in count III of the bill of indictment, receive a sentence of 40 years’ incarceration in the Department of Corrections, and if called to testify, would testify truthfully in the trial of her husband, Ronald Wells. The trial court read the charge in count III, which stated that, on or about March 15, 2001, Ronald Wells and the petitioner committed the offense of first degree murder in that "they, without lawful justification stabbed Jamie Weyrick with a knife, struck him on the head with a hammer and confined him in a freezer, knowing such acts created a strong probability of death to Jamie Weyrick[,] thereby causing the death of Jamie Weyrick." See id. § 94(a)(2). The trial court admonished the petitioner in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 1997), and she indicated she understood and agreed to the admonishments.

¶ 6 The assistant state’s attorney recited the following factual basis for the plea agreement. On March 18, 2001, Brenda Weyrick reported to the police that her 20-year-old son, Jamie, had been missing since March 14, 2001. She reported that Jamie had received a tax refund check in the amount of approximately $2000 and had cashed the check shortly before his disappearance. The investigating police officers learned that Jamie was seen in the company of Ronald Wells on March 15, 2001. The police interviewed both Ronald Wells and the petitioner and searched their home. During the search, they discovered Jamie Weyrick’s body buried in the backyard. An autopsy revealed that the cause of death was multiple blunt force injuries, sharp force injuries, and asphyxia.

¶ 7 In a subsequent interview with police detectives, the petitioner gave a videotaped statement after being read her Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). According to her statement, on the evening of March 15, 2001, she was at home with her four children when her husband, Ronald, came home with Weyrick. Ronald told Weyrick to go upstairs. Ronald then told the petitioner that he intended to kill Weyrick because Weyrick had a large sum of money. The petitioner said that she pleaded with her husband not to kill Weyrick but that he ignored her pleadings and went upstairs. The petitioner heard a struggle; then she saw Weyrick run down the stairs with Ronald in pursuit. She saw Ronald stab Weyrick with a knife. Believing that Weyrick was deceased, the petitioner and Ronald carried him to the basement and placed him in a large freezer. Ronald then took some money and left the house.

¶ 8 During Ronald’s absence, the petitioner heard noises coming from the freezer and discovered that Weyrick was still alive. She hit him with a hammer and stabbed him. She then summoned her 13-year-old stepson, Destin, to the basement and ordered him to sit on top of the freezer. She and Destin sat and waited a long time until Weyrick was deceased. Ronald returned home the following day. On that day, Weyrick’s body was removed from the freezer and buried in the backyard.

¶ 9 The assistant state’s attorney apprised the court that the testimony of Destin, the petitioner’s stepson, would corroborate certain aspects of her account, including that Ronald came home with Weyrick, the two men went upstairs, there was a straggle, they came back down the stairs, Ronald and the petitioner placed Weyrick in the freezer, and the petitioner summoned Destin to come down to the basement.

¶ 10 Following the State’s recitation of the factual basis for the plea agreement, the trial court further admonished the petitioner consistent with Rule 402. The trial court accepted the plea, entered judgment on count III of the bill of indictment, and dismissed the remaining counts. The trial court then sentenced the petitioner to 40 years in prison pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement. The court stayed the mittimus until such time as the petitioner fulfilled her promise to testify truthfully at her husband’s trial. The court also instructed the petitioner about her rights of appeal in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Nov. 1, 2000).

¶ 11 In November 2001, the petitioner testified at the trial of her husband, Ronald Wells, and her testimony was consistent with the factual basis for her plea agreement. Accordingly, the trial court vacated the order staying the mittimus. During the period from 2006 to 2015, the petitioner filed three section 2-1401 petitions seeking relief from judgment, all of which were dismissed.

¶ 12 On January 3, 2018, more than 16 years after her judgment of conviction and sentence, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for relief from judgment under section 2-1401(b-5) of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(b-5) (West 2016). Subsection (b-5), which was added to section 2-1401 on January 1, 2016 (see Pub. Act 99-384, § 10 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016)), allows a person who has been convicted of a forcible felony to petition the trial court for sentencing relief if his or her participation in the offense was related to him or her having been a victim of domestic violence. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(b-5) (West 2016).

¶ 13 In her petition and accompanying documents, the petitioner alleged that her husband, Ronald Wells, had physically abused her from 1990 through 2001. She alleged that she had been "punched, kicked, slapped, [and] drag[ged] on the floor on a regular basis for years." On one occasion, Ronald allegedly held a gun to the petitioner’s head and pulled the trigger, but the gun jammed. In an affidavit, the petitioner averred that she was afraid to speak out about being a victim of domestic violence. The petition listed several injuries that the petitioner alleged were caused by Ronald’s abuse—a shotgun wound to her arm; a black eye; trauma to her left foot; and pain in her neck, knee, and finger. Medical records attached to the petition indicated that the petitioner had gone to the hospital to be treated for these injuries. She alleged, however, that she had lied to medical personnel about the origins of her injuries because Ronald was with her at the hospital. The petition also alleged verbal abuse by Ronald, including threats that he would hurt the petitioner or their children if she did not do what he wanted. Another exhibit, a Department of Children and Family Services form from April 2001, included a statement from the petitioner’s father, who stated that Ronald had physically abused the petitioner for years but that she would not leave him.

¶ 14 The petition averred that the crime for which the petitioner was convicted was...