People v. Williams

2021 IL App (1st) 190239

194 N.E.3d 26

456 Ill.Dec. 907

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Preracio WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-19-0239

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, THIRD DIVISION.

Filed September 22, 2021

James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Lauren A. Bauser, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and Brian K. Hodes, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Preracio Williams, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for leave to file his pro se successive postconviction petition. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying leave to file his successive postconviction petition because he set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence supported by newly discovered evidence from three witnesses that establish a defense of compulsion.

¶ 2 In October 2010, defendant and his codefendant, Jason Foster, were charged with various offenses, including attempted armed robbery, attempted first degree murder, aggravated discharge of a firearm and burglary, related to the June 8, 2010, attempted armed robbery of a pawn shop located at 5900 West Fullerton Avenue in Chicago. Defendant and Foster were also charged with first degree felony murder, which alleged that during the commission of the above offenses, "they set in motion a chain of events that caused the death" of their co-offender Michael McMillion. Following the indictment, the State tendered discovery, which included a DVD surveillance recording showing Foster firing two gun shots during the offense, and the owner of the pawn shop returning fire in defense, striking, and killing McMillion.

¶ 3 In November 2011, Foster successfully moved for severance of his trial from defendant's due to antagonistic defenses. In May 2013, the parties told the court that defendant rejected a 23-year plea offer for first degree murder. Defendant confirmed that he was rejecting the offer. The case was set for trial.

¶ 4 On August 9, 2013, the day jury selection was to begin in defendant's trial, the parties informed the court that defendant had chosen to accept the State's plea offer of 23 years for first degree murder. Defendant signed written waivers of his right to a jury trial and to a presentence investigation report (PSI). The court read the first degree murder charge and informed defendant that the sentencing range for first degree murder was 20 to 60 years in prison. The court admonished defendant regarding the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, including his right to a jury trial or a bench trial as well as his right to present evidence in his defense, to cross-examine, and to confront witnesses. For each right, defendant replied that he understood and waived those rights. Defendant acknowledged that he wanted to plead guilty, he had not been subjected to force or threats to induce his plea, and he was pleading freely and voluntarily.

¶ 5 The court then heard the factual basis for the plea from the State. According to the prosecutor, if the case proceeded to trial, the evidence would show that on June 8, 2010, defendant, Foster, and McMillion entered the pawn shop located at 5900 West Fullerton Avenue. While in the pawn shop, defendant, Foster, and McMillion "committed the offense of attempt armed robbery with a dangerous weapon *** and during the commission of that offense, they did set in motion a chain of events that did eventually, or during the course of that felony, caused the death" of McMillion. Defendant stipulated to the factual basis for the plea.

¶ 6 The court then found that defendant understood the nature of his charge, the possible consequences of pleading guilty, and had agreed to the factual basis. The State informed the court that defendant had prior convictions for a Class 1 felony controlled substance offense in 2004 and for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon in 2007. The court explained defendant's right to a PSI, and defendant confirmed his waiver of that right. The State nol-prossed the remaining charges. The court explained defendant's appeal rights and gave him an opportunity to address the court, which he declined. The court then sentenced him, as agreed, to a term of 23 years in prison. Defendant did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or a direct appeal.

¶ 7 In February 2015, defendant filed his initial pro se postconviction petition. He alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to obtain readily available evidence of other suspect's involvement, to conduct a reasonable investigation by interviewing and subpoenaing witnesses, and to present a compulsion defense. Specifically, he alleged that he and his mother Dorothy Williams (Williams) told counsel that he had been "compelled to commit robbery which lead [sic ] to the death" of McMillion and his trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting a compulsion defense and failing to subpoena Williams as a witness to support that defense. Defendant also claimed that he asked counsel to interview Foster and counsel failed to do so. Defendant further alleged that counsel "coerce[d]" him on August 8, 2013, to plead guilty the next day "by telling him he would get 75 years in prison if he did not plea guilty [sic ], because compulsion was not a legal defense."

¶ 8 Defendant attached affidavits from Foster and Williams, as well as his own affidavit to the petition. Defendant stated in his affidavit that he told counsel on August 7, 2013, two days before trial, to interview Foster and reiterated that he was compelled to commit armed robbery. When counsel returned the next day, counsel informed defendant that "compulsion is not a legal defense for felony murder." Defendant further stated that counsel "coerced" him to plead guilty by telling him that "it was guaranteed" that he would be found guilty and "receive the maximum of 75 years in prison." Counsel also told defendant that the prosecutor agreed with counsel to give defendant "23 years at 100% if [he] pled guilty to first degree felony murder."

¶ 9 Williams stated in her affidavit that she met with counsel in May 2012 about defendant's case and "explained in vivid detail *** that [her] son was forced and compelled to commit the offense of felony murder." She further stated that defendant "begged" her for $15,000, but she refused. As he left, she thought about giving him the money because she had "never seen him look so worried before." She then saw Foster "force him into a car," and she called out to defendant, who replied that he would call her later. While defendant was in Cook County Jail, he wrote Williams a letter explaining why he needed the money, but she did not disclose what that need was. She told counsel of these circumstances, and he "promised that if [she] hired him he would get the charges dismissed because according to the law [defendant] was not accountable for his codefendant's murder." Instead, counsel "convinced" defendant to accept a plea offer "to even more time than the previous offer."

¶ 10 In his affidavit, Foster stated that he and McMillion had demanded $15,000 from defendant for bond for McMillion's cousin because they blamed defendant for the cousin's arrest. When defendant told them that he could not raise that sum, they told him that they would kill him if he did not join in their planned robbery. Foster "could tell by the fear in [defendant's] eyes he was afraid and did not want to die." Foster did not provide any additional details of any threats made to defendant. Foster stated that he was willing to disclose this information because he had "found God" and has "found peace." Foster stated that he took "full responsibility forcing [defendant] into the crime."

¶ 11 In May 2015, the trial court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that defendant entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea in exchange for a negotiated sentence close to the minimum 20-year sentence. The court also found that the affidavits of defendant, Foster, and Williams did not establish a legal defense of compulsion because the affidavits did not establish when Foster threatened defendant.

¶ 12 In August 2017, this court affirmed the trial court's first stage dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition. People v. Williams , 2017 IL App (1st) 151959-U. We held that defendant failed to state the gist of a meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We found "no arguable merit" to defendant's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview Foster because Foster's trial had been severed from defendant's due to antagonistic defenses and his trial date was scheduled after defendant's trial date. Id. ¶ 17. While we agreed with defendant that compulsion is a valid legal defense to felony murder, we concluded that defendant "failed to show in his petition with factual rather than conclusory allegations that counsel's advice, allegedly causing him to accept the plea offer, was erroneous." Id. ¶ 20. We specifically observed that defendant failed to provide any evidence to establish when the alleged threats were made to support the imminence required for a compulsion defense. Id. ¶ 24.

¶ 13 In October 2018, defendant filed a pro se motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition and asserted that he did not previously raise claims of actual innocence and compulsion because "the factual basis for those claims were not previously available due to threats and fear of gang retaliatory violence toward material witnesses needed to [corroborate] claims." In his attached pro se successive postconviction petition, defendant argued that he had newly discovered evidence of his actual innocence due to compulsion. He could not have presented these witnesses at trial due to their fear and would have shown that defendant "did not assist in...