People v. Williams

63 Cal.App.5th 990

278 Cal.Rptr.3d 332

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Christopher Eric WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.

A160530

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

Filed April 30, 2021

Jeffrey S. Kross, Oakland, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Amit Kurlekar and Victoria Ratnikova, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

STEWART, J.

Appellant Christopher Williams pled no contest to one count of felony stalking ( Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a)¹ ), was then denied mental health diversion under newly enacted section 1001.36 which took effect shortly after his plea, and was subsequently placed on probation for three years subject to various terms and conditions.

We conclude the trial court erred in finding Williams posed an unreasonable risk to public safety and thus abused its discretion in denying his request for mental health diversion. Accordingly, the judgment will be reversed.

BACKGROUND

One day in 2015, Williams went to a local autobody shop for an estimate and became upset because he felt he had been treated in a racist manner. In response, he retaliated anonymously against the business's owners, a married couple (whom we refer to here as "husband," "wife," or "family," as appropriate), with an unrelenting campaign of extremely vicious and threatening harassment carried out by email and other means that continued daily for two years, until his identity was discovered and he was arrested.² While this was going on, he also began sending anonymous, angry and threatening letters every few months to one of his neighbors after an altercation with her (by-then deceased) husband.

The record contains abundant evidence of the extremely disturbing content of Williams's communications, and the parties have summarized it accurately in their briefing. He sent the family thousands of vile and threatening emails.³ The tenor of his anonymous letters to his neighbor was similar.⁴ He also posted disparaging flyers near the family's shop, signed them up for swinger clubs, prostitution and massage solicitation online forums, and wrote threatening emails to elected officials (a United States Senator and the President) using their email address.

Williams was arrested on December 20, 2017, and released on bond the same day.

Subsequently, on February 1, 2018, Williams was charged with one felony count of stalking the family for a period of about four months the prior year (between August 1 and December 13, 2017) ( § 646.9, subd. (a)⁵ ), and one misdemeanor count of making a criminal threat to his neighbor, on or about December 13, 2017 ( § 422, subd. (a) ).⁶ Before any preliminary hearing, he pled no contest to the felony stalking charge, and the misdemeanor threat charge was dismissed with a Harvey waiver.⁷

Then on June 27, 2018, less than three weeks after Williams's plea, the Legislature passed an omnibus budget bill that took immediate effect (Assem. Bill No. 1810). Among other measures, the bill enacted Penal Code section 1001.36, which authorizes trial courts to grant pretrial diversion for certain defendants suffering from mental health disorders. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 34, § 24 and Legislative Counsel's Digest ¶15; People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626, 264 Cal.Rptr.3d 292, 466 P.3d 844.) It applies retroactively to all cases in which the judgment is not yet final. ( Id . at p. 624, 264 Cal.Rptr.3d 292, 466 P.3d 844.)

Diversion under section 1001.36 entails "the postponement of prosecution, either temporarily or permanently, at any point in the judicial process from the point at which the accused is charged until adjudication, to allow the defendant to undergo mental health treatment," for a period not to exceed two years. ( § 1001.36, subd. (c).)

If diversion is granted and the defendant completes the process satisfactorily, the defendant's criminal charges shall be dismissed and the defendant's arrest "shall be deemed never to have occurred." ( § 1001.36, subd. (e).) Criminal proceedings may be reinstated if the defendant performs unsatisfactorily in diversion or commits other crimes. (Id ., subd. (d).)

To be eligible for diversion, the defendant must meet six statutory criteria. (See § 1001.36, subds. (a), (b)(1).) First, the defendant must "suffer[ ] from a mental disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ...." (Id ., subd. (b)(1)(A).) Second, the defendant's mental disorder must be "a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense." (Id ., subd. (b)(1)(B).) Third, "[i]n the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant's symptoms of the mental disorder motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment." (Id ., subd. (b)(1)(C).) Fourth, the defendant must consent to diversion and waive the right to a speedy trial. (Id ., subd. (b)(1)(D).) Fifth, the defendant must agree to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion. (Id ., subd. (b)(1)(E).) And, finally, as relevant here, the court must be satisfied that "the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community." (Id ., subd. (b)(1)(F).) In evaluating these criteria, "[t]he court may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant's violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate." (Ibid .)

Shortly after the new statute took effect, Williams asked (in a "Statement in Mitigation" prepared for the upcoming sentencing hearing) that criminal proceedings be suspended so that he could be considered for pretrial mental health diversion, asserting that the harassment he had engaged in was attributable to "a sustained period of impaired judgment due to a major mood disorder." In support, his filing referenced written evaluations from two doctors (Drs. McGlynn and Patterson).⁸

The following day (August 8, 2018), the probation department filed its report in which it acknowledged Williams's mental health issues and recommended he be placed on supervised probation so he could receive continued mental health treatment.⁹ According to the probation report, Williams "presented as cooperative, honest and very emotional. He admitted to his crimes and stated several times that he had no intention of following through with his threats, but that he wanted to embarrass or upset the recipients.... He wept openly and expressed what appeared to be genuine remorse and said, ‘They did nothing to deserve this treatment. I felt horrible when I found out I scared a family.’ " The report noted that Williams's neighbor "stated that she never really thought the defendant was a threat to her, but contacted police because she wanted his actions documented." The neighbor told the probation officer that "while she believes the defendant has possible mental health issues and needs to suffer some consequences for his behavior, ‘I don't believe he's a threat, I never have.’ "

The probation department recommended against a prison sentence, even though it acknowledged Williams's actions were "threatening and racist in nature" and his crime was "serious." The probation report attached and discussed reports from three mental health professionals: Williams's therapist, Lina Rappoport, who had been treating him since December 27, 2017; his psychiatrist, Dr. Lawrence McGlynn; and defense-retained expert, C. Mark Patterson, Ph.D., a forensic psychologist who had evaluated Williams. The probation department recommended Williams be placed on three years of supervised probation (plus serve a sentence of 6 months in county jail as punishment), in order to "afford him the opportunity to take advantage of probation services and receive the support he may need to continue counseling and treatment for his anger and other diagnosed mental health issues." The report also noted Williams had no history of prior arrests or convictions, "expressed great remorse and took full responsibility" for his actions and was participating in counseling.

A few weeks later, on August 24, 2018, citing principally the existing psychological evaluations conducted by Drs. McGlynn and Patterson, Williams filed a motion to withdraw his no contest plea or, alternatively, to suspend sentencing proceedings and formally requested pretrial mental health diversion.¹⁰ He subsequently supplemented the motion with declarations by both doctors.

Dr. Patterson, who had reviewed abundant materials from the criminal case (including the probation report, and some of the emails and other materials recovered from Williams's home during the warrant search) and met with Williams three times, opined in his declaration that during the period of his criminal behavior, Williams was suffering from depression, chronic anxiety and trauma-related symptoms, as well as "sensitivity (or hypersensitivity) and, at times, paranoid ideation in relation to real and/or misperceived racism," and that all of these symptoms had impaired Williams's judgment and his ability to manage anger and frustration. Dr. Patterson stated that Williams "does not deny or greatly minimize his threatening behavior ... nor does he deny or greatly minimize the consequences of his behavior to others," was remorseful and "[t]here are no indications that [he] has been beset by violent ideation or intent prior to or since the incidents." Dr. Patterson "found no evidence that Mr. Williams poses an imminent risk of danger to himself or others," because using three different risk assessment methodologies, Williams's "long-term risk of violence falls within the lowest category." Dr. Patterson concluded Williams "may benefit from psychiatric intervention and psychotherapy, and the available...