People v. Williams

55 N.E.3d 1237

404 Ill.Dec. 383

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Antonio WILLIAMS, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–13–3812.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division.

June 17, 2016.

Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Christopher Kopacz, all of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and Sheilah O'Grady–Krajniak, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 After a bench trial, defendant Antonio Williams was found guilty and sentenced to concurrent 14–year terms each for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking, and to an additional concurrent 5–year term for aggravated unlawful restraint.

¶ 2 On this direct appeal, both defendant and the State ask this court to reinstate defendant's negotiated plea agreement. Prior to defendant's bench trial, the trial court had already accepted defendant's guilty plea and sentenced defendant pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement between defendant and the State. Without first vacating the guilty plea, the trial court directed the parties to proceed to trial. After the bench trial, defendant was convicted of more offenses and received a higher sentence. For the following reasons, we reinstate the plea agreement and correct the mittimus to reflect the negotiated sentence.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 An indictment charged defendant with two counts of armed robbery, two counts of vehicular hijacking, possession of a stolen motor vehicle, burglary, and two counts of aggravated unlawful restraint. The indictment alleged that, on January 11, 2012, defendant forcibly took money and a vehicle from James Cooper. Separate counts alleged that the offenses were committed with a firearm and with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm. Defendant who was born on March 13, 1993, was 18 years old at the time of these offenses.

¶ 5 On March 5, 2013, defendant requested a Rule 402 conference which was held and then continued to March 20, 2013. Ill. S.Ct. R. 402 (eff. July 1, 1997) (governing plea negotiations and guilty pleas). On March 20, 2013, defendant pled guilty to counts II and IV, which were for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking.

¶ 6 Count II of the indictment charged defendant with armed robbery with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm, “to wit: a bludgeon,” in violation of section 18–2(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/18–2(a)(1) (West 2010)).¹ Concerning the sentence for this offense, the statute states: “Armed robbery in violation of subsection (a)(1) is a Class X felony.” 720 ILCS 5/18–2(b) (West 2010).² For a Class X felony, “[t]he sentence of imprisonment shall be a determinate sentence of not less than 6 years and not more than 30 years.” 730 ILCS 5/5–4.5–25(a) (West 2010).³

¶ 7 For count IV, defendant was charged with aggravated vehicular hijacking with a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm, “to wit: a bludgeon,” in violation of section 5/18–4(a)(3) of the Criminal Code of 1961. 720 ILCS 5/18–4(a)(3) (West 2010).⁴ Concerning the sentence, the statute provides: “Aggravated vehicular hijacking in violation of subsection (a)(3) is a Class X felony for which a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years shall be imposed.” 720 ILCS 5/18–4(b) (West 2010).

¶ 8 During the plea hearing, the State presented a factual basis for the two offenses, and the trial court found defendant guilty on those two counts, stating: “I find there's a factual basis for the plea. I find him guilty on Counts 2 and 4. Judgment's [sic ] entered on the findings.” The State then nol-prossed the remaining counts. When discussing factors in mitigation and aggravation, the assistant State's Attorney (ASA) observed that defendant had no adult criminal history but that he had three juvenile delinquency adjudications for battery.⁵

¶ 9 After listening to factors in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court stated:

“THE COURT: The government has agreed to dismiss the charges involving the firearms—there was an understanding that the defense—based on a plea of guilty, Counts 2 and 4 will be 12 years in the penitentiary.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: That's correct, [Y]our Honor.

THE COURT: I will follow that agreement between the parties. I find it within the realm of reason. Credit for 425 days served. Statutory DNA ordered. Over the defense objection, costs will be satisfied by the time served.”

¶ 10 After stating to the defendant that “you've plead guilty and been sentenced,” the trial court then admonished defendant concerning his appeal rights, including the requirement to file a written motion if he wanted to withdraw his plea. The trial court then asked defendant if he had “any questions at all,” and defendant responded:

“DEFENDANT: I'd like to say something.

THE COURT: Sure.

DEFENDANT: People who rape little girls get lesser time than I'm getting. I'm getting sentenced for time that people get for trying to kill people. A man can shoot a man in the leg, and his case will be a 4 to 15.

THE COURT: This is very simple. If you don't want to do this, I'll withdraw—let you withdraw the plea right now. And I'll set you down for trial.

DEFENDANT: Just give me the time though. It's already been done.

THE COURT: You can undo this. Just relax. It's not personal. I don't know you. They tell me—you're pleading guilty to jacking cars from people.

DEFENDANT: I'm just saying—at 85 percent off my adult case though. It's plenty of kids running around here right now my age caught on attempt murder and comped (sic) ^[6] out and got 13 at 85, 12 at 85. I'm getting the same amount of the time I can get for shooting somebody, Joe.^[7]

I didn't kill nobody and shoot nobody. I didn't hit this man.

THE COURT: Did you do the car jacking? You don't have to resolve this. If you think this is too much and unfair, we'll have a trial. It doesn't matter to me.

DEFENDANT: They got they [sic ] time without a trial though. Why should I have to go through a trial to get something lowered.

THE COURT: If you don't think—

DEFENDANT: Why.

THE COURT: —they can prove you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—

DEFENDANT: Maybe if I would have touched a little girl and got lesser time than this.

THE COURT: Do you want to withdraw your plea? It's okay with me. I see you're upset. You're not happy with the agreement. You don't have to agree.

DEFENDANT: I'm not, definitely not man.

THE COURT: Well, you can have a trial—would you rather—you want to think about it? * * * This is what we're going to do. I'm going to bring you back here in a couple days. Let you think this through. If you want to withdraw your plea, I will let you withdraw your plea. I will absolutely do that. * * * So I'm going to accept the plea. I'm going to vacate the sentence now. And we'll go to sentencing in a couple days or we're going to withdraw this plea and start fresh.”

¶ 11 As the lawyers started discussing a date for the continuance, defendant interjected and the following exchange occurred:

“DEFENDANT: I'll take the time. Judge, if I want to see the day of light again, I want to be out before my great grandmother pass because she real old right now. Just because of that. I'll take that time.

THE COURT: Okay. Put this over till Friday.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Thank you.

THE COURT: I'm going to bring you back Friday. And I want you to think about this because you're emotional and you're [a] young guy. And I want you to have a chance to think about this and think about exactly what you are doing.”

¶ 12 Defendant never filed a motion to withdraw his plea. However, on March 22, 2013, which was the next court date, defense counsel requested a fitness examination and the trial court entered the following two orders.

¶ 13 The first order was entitled a “Consolidated Referral Order,” and it directed the “Forensic Clinical Services of the Circuit Court” to evaluate defendant for his fitness to stand trial, his sanity and his ability to understand his Miranda rights.

¶ 14 The second order stated:

“This cause before the Court, the Court fully advised it is hereby ordered:

(1) Defendant is incarcerated in Juvenile IDOC custody. Defendant has previously been diagnosed with Bi-polar disorder, ADHD and anger issues since the age of seven (7) and hospitalized for the same.

(2) Juvenile IDOC shall evaluate and prescribe medications, if medically entered.

It is so ordered.”

¶ 15 On June 10, 2013, a psychologist filed a letter with the trial court stating that he had examined defendant and concluded that defendant was fit to stand trial. In a subsequent letter, dated July 24, 2013, the same psychologist concluded that defendant was “legally sane at the time of the alleged offense” and “was able to understand the Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest.”

¶ 16 After the resolution of the fitness issue, the parties appeared in court on July 24, 2013, and the following exchange occurred:

“THE COURT: Bench or jury?

DEFENDANT: I am taking my time.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I don't understand. Do you want to plead guilty?

DEFENDANT: Yeah, I will plead guilty.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: As the Court is aware, we previously attempted—

THE COURT: We conferenced this?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, we did. We were in the middle of a plea.

THE COURT: Does this require a reducer or an amendment from the Government?

ASA: Give me one moment.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Why don't we pass on it?

THE COURT: We can do it.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, I believe it was on Count—

THE COURT: Was it Count 2?

ASA: Judge, I show it was for Count 2 and Count 4.

THE COURT: Are you still willing to conference and—

ASA: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: —move forward on those two counts?

ASA: Yes, Judge.”

¶ 17 The case was then passed and recalled. Although the ASA had indicated before the break that the State was willing to “move forward” on the two counts of the plea agreement, when the parties returned the ASA stated that the State no longer wished to adjust the charges:

“THE COURT: There had previously

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