People v. Williams

2017 IL App (1st) 152021

80 N.E.3d 771

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Respondent-Appellee,

v.Otis WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellant.

No. 1-15-2021

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division.

Opinion filed June 30, 2017

Rehearing denied July 24, 2017

Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Robert Hirschhorn, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and Joseph Alexander, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant Otis Williams, who was convicted of murder, presented alibi testimony at his third-stage postconviction evidentiary hearing in support of his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. At the close of defendant's evidence, the State moved for a directed finding, and the circuit court granted that motion. The circuit court found that the alibi witnesses were not credible and defendant thus failed to show trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not interviewing or calling those alibi witnesses.

¶ 2 Defendant argues that (1) the circuit court failed to apply the correct burden of proof and procedural rules when it granted the State's motion for a directed finding at the close of defendant's evidence and (2) the alibi testimony was unimpeached and sufficient to raise doubts about the reliability of the original verdict and the circuit court usurped the role of the jury by making ultimate determinations about witness credibility.

¶ 3 For the following reasons, we hold that the circuit court's findings about witness credibility and the weight and quality of the evidence were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court that granted the State a directed finding and denied defendant postconviction relief at the third-stage evidentiary hearing.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 Defendant Otis Williams was found guilty in 1999 of the first degree murder of Gregory Sharp and aggravated battery with a firearm of Felicia Robinson. The street-gang-related shooting occurred on November 28, 1994, while Sharp and Robinson sat in Sharp's car at a stoplight on an expressway ramp in Chicago.

¶ 6 At the 1999 jury trial, three members of the street gang testified against defendant, who had accompanied them, along with numerous other street gang members, to carry out their gang leader's order to kill Sharp, a fellow gang member. See People v. Williams , 332 Ill.App.3d 254, 257-59, 265 Ill.Dec. 781, 773 N.E.2d 143 (2002). Specifically, Delano Finch, Ramone Finch, and Kelly Quarles testified about their gang's hierarchy and rules, the order to kill Sharp, their preparation and meeting before driving to find Sharp, and observing defendant and other gang members approach Sharp's car and fire their guns multiple times into Sharp's car.

¶ 7 Delano and Ramone testified that they were incarcerated at the time of their testimony. Delano had been indicted on about 50 counts in a drug conspiracy and faced a minimum sentence of life in prison. In exchange for his testimony against defendant and many other gang members, Delano received a sentence of 15 years' imprisonment. Ramone received a reduced sentence of 8 years' imprisonment for armed robbery and home invasion in exchange for his testimony against defendant, for which the sentencing range was 30 to 60 years. Quarles denied that he was offered or promised a deal in exchange for his cooperation at the time that he gave a statement to law enforcement about various crimes, including the murder of Sharp. Rather, Quarles testified that the 60-month prison sentence he received for pleading guilty to racketeering was reduced to 17 months following a motion to reduce sentence, during which his counsel informed the court of Quarles's cooperation. Quarles denied knowledge of an offer for a reduced sentence in exchange for testimony against defendant.

¶ 8 Defendant was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 45 years for the first degree murder of Sharp and 10 years for the aggravated battery with a firearm of Robinson. On direct appeal, this court affirmed his conviction and sentence for the first degree murder of Sharp but reversed defendant's conviction and sentence for the aggravated battery with a firearm of Robinson because the evidence did not show that she had been injured.

People v. Williams , 332 Ill.App.3d 254, 265 Ill.Dec. 781, 773 N.E.2d 143 (2002).

¶ 9 Defendant's initial 2003 pro se postconviction petition was summarily dismissed, but this court reversed that dismissal and remanded the cause for second-stage postconviction proceedings because the summary dismissal occurred after the 90-day ruling period had expired for first-stage petitions. People v. Williams , No. 1-03-3233 (Mar. 3, 2005) (unpublished summary order under Supreme Court Rule 23(c) ). On remand, defendant's 2009 amended postconviction petition alleged he was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to interview and call alibi witnesses. Defendant also filed in 2010 a petition for relief from judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2010) ), contending newly discovered evidence established that the State's occurrence witnesses had perjured themselves. The State moved to dismiss both the postconviction and section 2-1401 petitions, and the circuit court granted those motions.

¶ 10 On appeal, this court affirmed the dismissal of defendant's section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment. People v. Williams , 2013 IL App (1st) 110304-U, 2013 WL 3935053. However, this court reversed the second-stage dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition and remanded that petition for an evidentiary hearing. This court, taking defendant's well-pleaded facts as true, held that defendant made a substantial showing that trial counsel's failure to call one alibi witness and investigate two other alibi witnesses was objectively unreasonable. This court also held that defendant made a substantial showing of prejudice because the only evidence linking him to the crime scene was the testimony of the State's three occurrence witnesses, Delano, Ramone, and Quarles, who had received significantly reduced sentences in exchange for their testimony, and defendant's proposed alibi witnesses could have tested their credibility.

¶ 11 At the evidentiary hearing on remand in November 2014, defendant's sister Gabrielle Williams testified that, on the date of the offense, her nephew had a birthday party at her mother's house on South Wallace Street in Chicago. The party began around noon and ended about 7 or 8 p.m. The party was held throughout the house, and defendant was responsible for "managing the kids" in the television room. Gabrielle admitted that she was not in defendant's presence during the entire party; however, she asserted that he was supervising children between 3 and 5 p.m., when the offense occurred, and Gabrielle never lost sight of him during those two hours because her mother's house was "not that big." Gabrielle never saw defendant leave the party. She did not testify at defendant's trial and did not speak with his trial counsel. She made several attempts to contact trial counsel each week over the two- to three-month period prior to the trial. Also, she was in the courtroom once during the trial but never spoke to counsel. She was unable to recall the names of everyone who attended the party and similar details or the specific dates or times she attempted to contact trial counsel. Her sister Glynda contacted her in 2006 about submitting a postconviction petition affidavit in defendant's case. Gabrielle's affidavit did not list her sisters Gail, Glynda, or Ginger as being at the birthday party.

¶ 12 Defendant's sister Gail Alexander testified consistently with Gabrielle about defendant's supervision of several children in the television room at the birthday party. Gail never saw him leave the party, but she did not watch him constantly and spent time with other people at the party. Gail spoke with defendant's trial counsel about her alibi testimony about one month before the trial in counsel's office, and he told her that she would testify at the trial. On the first day of the trial, she followed counsel's instructions to wait outside the courtroom but was never called to testify. Gail thought she asked counsel why she was not called as a witness but did not remember his answer. Gail did not remember specifically when she began leaving messages for counsel or when she received the postconviction petition affidavit to sign, who gave it to her, or how she obtained it.

¶ 13 Defendant's sister Glynda Williams testified that she had contact with defendant throughout the family party, never lost sight of him, and would have noticed if he had left before the party ended at about 7 or 8 p.m. Glynda tried to contact defendant's trial counsel by telephone for several months before the trial and left messages, but counsel never returned her calls until a week before the trial. After a conversation with trial counsel, Glynda went to the courthouse and spoke with him again; her mother and sisters were present for this conversation, which occurred outside the courtroom. Counsel told them they would testify and should wait outside the courtroom; however, they were never called as witnesses. When Glynda questioned counsel about this, he did not give her a reason for not calling them as witnesses and said they could win the case on appeal. Glynda acknowledged that her postconviction petition affidavit did not specify when or how many times she tried to contact counsel, the content of the messages she left him, any reference to her meeting with counsel a week before the trial, or any details about that conversation.

¶ 14 Defendant testified that on the date the shooting occurred he was at his family's...