People v. Williamson

1

2024 IL App (4th) 230291-U

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTONIO CORTEZ WILLIAMSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 4-23-0291

Court of Appeals of Illinois, Fourth District

May 20, 2024

This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Mercer County No. 19CF66 Honorable Norma Kauzlarich, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Cavanagh and Justice Knecht concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

DOHERTY JUSTICE

¶ 1 Held: Defendant's conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial where the trial court denied defendant his constitutional right to a public trial by excluding all spectators from the courtroom without conducting the required constitutional analysis.

¶ 2 Defendant Antonio Cortez Williamson was convicted after a bench trial of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2018)) and sentenced to three consecutive terms of 15 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. During the testimony of Mercer County Sheriff's Deputy Anthony Baugh, the State played a 33-minute video of Baugh's interview of the minor victim the day after defendant was alleged to have committed the charged offenses. The trial court, evidently believing it was compelled to close the courtroom under section 115-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115-11 (West 2022)) directed everyone to exit the courtroom except defendant, the attorneys, Baugh, and court personnel. The court reopened the courtroom after the video was played.

¶ 3 Defendant argues that the trial court denied him his constitutional right to a public trial because (1) section 115-11 did not authorize the court to close the courtroom while the video was being played and (2) the court failed to conduct the strict constitutional analysis the United States Supreme Court has required courts to conduct before excluding the public from a criminal trial. Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 214 (2010) (per curiam). We agree. Because this error was adequately raised at trial and falls within the narrow class of errors for which automatic reversal is constitutionally required, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 We need not recount the facts of this case in detail because the issues addressed in this decision are narrow.

¶ 6 On August 28, 2019, defendant was alleged to have committed three acts of sexual assault against his girlfriend's daughter K.C., then age nine. The following day, defendant was arrested and charged with three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2018)). K.C. was taken to the Aledo Crisis Center, where she was interviewed by Baugh. The interview was recorded on video.

¶ 7 The trial court granted the State's motion to introduce the video into evidence and held a bench trial beginning in February 2022. The video was introduced into evidence as follows:

"THE COURT: We're back on the record.

I think we were at the point of Ms. Simpson playing the People's Exhibit No. 1, correct?

MS. SIMPSON [(ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY)]: Yes, Your Honor. This will elicit statements by the minor. I would make a motion to exclude at this time.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Larson?

MR. LARSON [(DEFENSE ATTORNEY)]: Your Honor, it is an open and public courtroom, but I realize there are Supreme Court Rules regarding testimony of witnesses and it does seem to me that this is not testimony of the young lady, but-

THE COURT: She's a minor.

MR. LARSON:-it is her statements.

THE COURT: It's her statements, so at this time, I need to clear the courtroom, please.

MR. LARSON: If we could make a record, Your Honor, once it's cleared, please, of who is present for the record. (Spectators vacated the courtroom.)

THE COURT: We will.

So all the spectators or whoever was in the back of the courtroom were asked to leave because we are going to play the minor child's statements during a Child Advocacy Center interview.

In the courtroom is the deputy that has custody of the evidence and is sitting with the evidence. Q, my bailiff, is here. Ms. Simpson, [defendant], Mr. Larson. The officer that accompanies [defendant] is here. My clerk, my court reporter, and Investigator Baugh that is still sitting up on the witness stand, and myself.

MR. LARSON: Thank you.

THE COURT: Uh-huh. (Video playing.)

MS. SIMPSON: And I just have a few-

THE COURT: We need to let-the people can come back in, if you want to shut that off."

¶ 8 After Baugh's testimony, the courtroom was again closed, and K.C. took the stand herself. Her testimony was brief and consistent with her statements to Baugh. Although the State attempted to introduce DNA evidence linking defendant to the offense, the State could not establish the chain of custody with admissible evidence and ultimately proved only that male DNA and sperm cells were present on K.C.'s body.

¶ 9 After concluding the trial in April 2022, the trial court found defendant guilty on all three counts, explaining its reasoning as follows:

"[THE COURT]: What this comes down to, once upon a time we didn't have DNA. We didn't have scientific measures. It comes down to credibility of a now-12-year-old child, and the Court finds that she is credible. She's been consistent from the initial report all the way through trial. She has bravely, the Court considers, testified at least two hearings here with the motion hearing and the trial hearing. And the Court notes that there were two younger boys, her brothers, in the house and the only other person in the house was [defendant].

***

The credibility of this child surpasses everything. The fact that there was male DNA found consistent what she's been telling from the beginning only further bolsters-as much as I hate that word-her credibility. For those reasons, the Court is going to find that the State has met their burden of proof and find [defendant] guilty."

¶ 10 The trial court sentenced defendant to three consecutive terms of 15 years' imprisonment. Defendant failed to file a posttrial motion, and the court denied defendant's motion for reconsideration of his sentence.

¶ 11 This appeal followed.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 A criminal defendant's right to a public trial is guaranteed by the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. VI; accord Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. The right has ancient roots and exists "for the benefit of the accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984); see In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-70 (1948) (discussing the history of the public-trial right).

¶ 14 In deciding this case, we take significant guidance from the supreme court's recent discussions of the public-trial right and explain why the circumstances of this case compel reversal as opposed to affirmance. See generally People v. Radford, 2020 IL 123975; People v. Schoonover, 2021 IL 124832. Our standard of review of the constitutional and statutory questions presented in this case is de novo. Schoonover, 2012 IL 124832, ¶ 19.

¶ 15 A. Preservation of the Issue

¶ 16 The parties dispute whether defendant properly preserved this issue for appeal by raising it in (1) a contemporaneous objection at trial and (2) a written posttrial motion. See People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48 ("To preserve a purported error for consideration by a reviewing court, a defendant must object to the error at trial and raise the error in a posttrial motion. [Citation.] Failure to do either results in forfeiture."). We address each component separately.

¶ 17 1. Contemporaneous Objection

¶ 18 The supreme court has stressed that "[a] contemporaneous objection is particularly crucial when challenging any courtroom closure." Radford, 2020 IL 123975, ¶ 37. Defendant argues that his objection at trial was sufficient; the State responds that defendant failed to object to the procedure followed and in fact acquiesced to the closure of the courtroom. Defendant has the better of this argument.

¶ 19 Before the courtroom was closed, defendant's counsel asserted that the courtroom was open and public and that the State was introducing only K.C.'s statements, not her testimony. The trial court interrupted this assertion to state that "[s]he's a minor" and immediately ruled that it "need[ed] to clear the courtroom" because the video included "her statements." This objection and ruling addressed the precise argument we discuss below. See In re Estate of Mercier, 2011 IL App (4th) 110205, ¶ 16 (noting that objections must be timely and must rest on the same basis as the objecting party's argument on appeal).

¶ 20 On the question of acquiescence, the only procedure followed here was that the trial court asked the spectators to leave the courtroom and they left; defendant did not acquiesce by failing to physically prevent them from leaving after the court asked them to leave. Instead, defendant's counsel ensured that the record reflected the exclusion of all spectators. This stands in significant contrast to a case in which this court found acquiescence because "the trial judge asked defense counsel, 'Are you satisfied in [the defendant's] right to a public trial?'" and "[d]efense counsel responded 'Yes, Judge.' "People v. Webb, 267 Ill.App.3d 954, 956 (1994). To the extent the State is arguing that defendant acquiesced by...