People v. Wilson

66 Cal.App.5th 874

281 Cal.Rptr.3d 443

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff,

v.Wesley WILSON, Defendant and Respondent;

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

A160394

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5, California.

Filed July 20, 2021

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Matthew Rodriquez, Acting Attorney General, Phillip J. Lindsay, Assistant Attorney General, Maria G. Chan, Sara J. Romano, and Jennifer G. Ross, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

Randall Conner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.

Simons, Acting P.J. Defendant and respondent Wesley Wilson (Defendant) invited the trial court to exercise its authority under Penal Code section 1203.2¹ to modify a residency restriction imposed as a condition of his parole. The trial court accepted that invitation. Real party in interest Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) appeals, arguing the trial court exceeded its authority under the statute because, at the time of the modification, there was no pending parole revocation proceeding or alleged parole violation. We agree and reverse the challenged order.

BACKGROUND

In 2009, Defendant was convicted of two counts of lewd and lascivious acts with a child under age 14 using force or violence ( § 288, subd. (b)(1) ) and one count of sexual battery ( § 243.4, subd. (a) ). After serving a state prison term, Defendant was released to parole in 2018. CDCR determined that Defendant was a "high risk" sex offender and imposed the following residency restriction as a condition of his parole: "You shall not reside within one-half mile of any public or private school (kindergarten and grades 1 through 12, inclusive) pursuant to [s]ection 3003(g)."²

In 2019, Defendant filed a motion for relief under section 1203.2, subdivision (b)(1) ( section 1203.2(b)(1) ), inviting the trial court to "act on its [own] motion and modify the conditions of his parole to exclude the residence restrictions."³ Defendant argued he was currently homeless because he was unable to reside in any home available to him, this result was harmful and contrary to the purposes of parole, and the residency restriction was therefore invalid as applied to him. CDCR opposed the motion, arguing the trial court was not authorized to modify Defendant's parole conditions under section 1203.2(b)(1) absent a pending parole violation and, in the alternative, Defendant's challenge to the residency restriction was meritless. On March 6, 2020, the trial court issued an order modifying the residency restriction. CDCR appealed.

DISCUSSION

The first question before us is whether section 1203.2(b)(1) authorized the trial court to modify Defendant's parole conditions in the absence of a pending parole revocation hearing or alleged parole violation. We review this statutory interpretation question de novo. ( Manriquez v. Gourley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1227, 1233, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 209.) "Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute's purpose, legislative history, and public policy." ( Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 676, 101 P.3d 563.)

Section 1203.2(b)(1) provides, in its entirety: "Upon its own motion or upon the petition of the supervised person, the probation or parole officer, or the district attorney, the court may modify, revoke, or terminate supervision of the person pursuant to this subdivision, except that the court shall not terminate parole pursuant to this section. The court in the county in which the person is supervised has jurisdiction to hear the motion or petition, or for those on parole, either the court in the county of supervision or the court in the county in which the alleged violation of supervision occurred. A person supervised on parole or postrelease community supervision pursuant to Section 3455 may not petition the court pursuant to this section for early release from supervision, and a petition under this section shall not be filed solely for the purpose of modifying parole. This section does not prohibit the court in the county in which the person is supervised or in which the alleged violation of supervision occurred from modifying a person's parole when acting on the court's own motion or a petition to revoke parole.

The court shall give notice of its motion, and the probation or parole officer or the district attorney shall give notice of their petition to the supervised person, the supervised person's attorney of record, and the district attorney or the probation or parole officer, as the case may be. The supervised person shall give notice of their petition to the probation or parole officer and notice of any motion or petition shall be given to the district attorney in all cases. The court shall refer its motion or the petition to the probation or parole officer. After the receipt of a written report from the probation or parole officer, the court shall read and consider the report and either its motion or the petition and may modify, revoke, or terminate the supervision of the supervised person upon the grounds set forth in subdivision (a) if the interests of justice so require."

We begin with the statutory language. The statute provides: "[u]pon its own motion ..., the court may modify ... supervision," with the only stated exception being a prohibition on terminating parole. ( § 1203.2(b)(1).) This appears to supply the requisite authority. Indeed, although the statute prohibits filing a petition "solely for the purpose of modifying parole," it expressly clarifies that it "does not prohibit the court ... from modifying a person's parole when acting on the court's own motion ...." ( § 1203.2(b)(1), italics added.) As Defendant argues, the statute thus appears to authorize the court's order.

However, as CDCR points out, indications to the contrary also appear in the statutory language. The statute provides the court "may modify, revoke, or terminate the supervision of the supervised person upon the grounds set forth in subdivision (a) if the interests of justice so require." (Italics added.) Subdivision (a) governs procedures upon the rearrest of or issuance of a warrant for a supervised person, and provides the court "may revoke and terminate the supervision of the person if the interests of justice so require and the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe from the report of the probation or parole officer or otherwise that the person has violated any of the conditions of their supervision, has become abandoned to improper associates or a vicious life, or has subsequently committed other offenses , regardless of whether the person has been prosecuted for those offenses." (Italics added.)⁴ As CDCR argues, section 1203.2(b)(1), by incorporating the reasons set forth in subdivision (a), appears to limit the court's authority to modify supervision to instances where the supervised person has violated a parole condition or committed other wrongdoing.

CDCR also points to other statutory language. Jurisdiction over parolees is vested in "either the court in the county of supervision or the court in the county in which the alleged violation of supervision occurred." ( § 1203.2(b)(1), italics added.) " ‘Court’ " is defined as "a judge, magistrate, or revocation hearing officer described in Section 71622.5 of the Government Code." (§ 1203.2, subd. (f)(1), italics added.)⁵ Although this language indicates the Legislature contemplated that many or most proceedings pursuant to this statute would be revocation proceedings, the language does not conclusively limit the statute's application to such proceedings. Similarly, CDCR notes the definition of " ‘Supervised person’ " includes a person "subject to revocation of parole pursuant to Section 3000.08," a statute setting forth parole revocation procedures (and which we discuss in greater detail below). ( § 1203.2, subd. (f)(3)(E).) This definition seems to mean a person currently subject to revocation of parole in a pending proceeding, as CDCR suggests, but it could reasonably be construed to mean a person who is on parole and therefore, unlike a person not on parole, is subject to revocation if a violation is committed.⁶

We conclude the statutory language is ambiguous, and turn to the legislative history to help us discern the Legislature's intent. Section 1203.2 was originally adopted in 1935 and governed procedures regarding rearrest of probationers and revocation proceedings. (Stats. 1935, ch. 604, § 3, p. 1709.) Subdivision (b), including much of the language present today, was added in 1970. (Stats. 1970, ch. 333, § 1, pp. 729–730.) The bill as originally introduced authorized only the district attorney to petition for modification or revocation. (Assem. Bill No. 998 (1970 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Mar. 4, 1970.) A committee report stated the bill was proposed by a district attorney's office "to increase the adequacy of probation supervision by keeping law enforcement informed (e.g., who is on probation; what the conditions of probation are) and by allowing the D.A. to go directly to the court on the basis of new information developed." (Assem. Com. on Crim. Proc., Dig. of Assem. Bill No. 998 (1970 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Mar. 4, 1970, pp. 1–2.) The...