People v. Wilson

500 Mich. 521

902 N.W.2d 378

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Dwayne Edmund WILSON, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 154039.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued on application for leave to appeal April 13, 2017

Decided July 25, 2017

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Eric J. Smith, Prosecuting Attorney, Joshua D. Abbott, Chief Appellate Attorney, and Emil Semaan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

State Appellate Defender (by Peter Jon Van Hoek ) for defendant.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

OPINION

Larsen, J.Defendant, Dwayne Edmund Wilson, has two prior convictions for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm) arising from a single incident. He has once again been convicted of felony-firearm. May he now be properly sentenced as a third felony-firearm offender under MCL 750.227b(1) ? Relying on binding precedent from this Court, see People v. Stewart , 441 Mich. 89, 490 N.W.2d 327 (1992), the Court of Appeals answered "no." We now overrule that precedent because nothing in the text of MCL 750.227b(1) requires that a repeat felony-firearm offender's prior felony-firearm convictions arise from separate criminal incidents, and the stare decisis factors do not counsel in favor of retaining the erroneous rule. Accordingly, we reverse, in part, the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant was convicted by a jury of one count of felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b, and two counts of unlawful imprisonment, MCL 750.349b. He was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment as a third felony-firearm offender under MCL 750.227b(1), followed by concurrent terms of 100 to 180 months' imprisonment for the unlawful-imprisonment counts. Defendant objected at sentencing, arguing that his felony-firearm sentence was improper because his previous convictions for felony-firearm arose from a single incident.¹ In support, defendant cited Stewart , which held that, in assessing whether a defendant is a third felony-firearm offender under MCL 750.227b(1), prior felony- firearm convictions must arise out of separate criminal incidents. Stewart , 441 Mich. at 95, 490 N.W.2d 327. The trial court agreed with the prosecution that Stewart was no longer good law because it relied on People v. Preuss , 436 Mich. 714, 461 N.W.2d 703 (1990), which had been overruled by People v. Gardner , 482 Mich. 41, 753 N.W.2d 78 (2008). The trial court further agreed that nothing in the language of MCL 750.227b(1) requires the previous felony-firearm convictions to have arisen from separate incidents.

Defendant successfully sought relief in the Court of Appeals, which appropriately reasoned that all lower courts remain bound by Stewart unless and until this Court overrules it. People v. Wilson , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 10, 2016 (Docket No. 324856), p. 7, 2016 WL 2731096, citing Paige v. Sterling Hts. , 476 Mich. 495, 524, 720 N.W.2d 219 (2006) ; see also Associated Builders & Contractors v. Lansing , 499 Mich. 177, 191–192, 880 N.W.2d 765 (2016). The Court of Appeals, therefore, remanded the case to the trial court and ordered that defendant's felony-firearm sentence be reduced to five years' imprisonment. Wilson , unpub. op. at 8.

The prosecution seeks this Court's leave to appeal, arguing that Stewart does not comport with the plain language of MCL 750.227b(1) and should be overruled. We ordered oral argument on the application. People v. Wilson , 500 Mich. 889, 886 N.W.2d 710 (2016).

II. ANALYSIS

A.

Under the plain language of MCL 750.227b(1), a defendant convicted of felony-firearm who has two prior felony-firearm convictions is a third felony- firearm offender subject to imprisonment for 10 years, regardless of whether the prior two convictions arose out of the same or separate criminal incidents. MCL 750.227b(1) provides:

A person who carries or has in his or her possession a firearm when he or she commits or attempts to commit a felony, except a violation of section 223, 227, 227a, or 230, is guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for 2 years. Upon a second conviction under this subsection, the person shall be punished by imprisonment for 5 years. Upon a third or subsequent conviction under this subsection, the person shall be punished by imprisonment for 10 years.

The statute plainly directs courts to count convictions and apply enhanced punishments accordingly. See MCL 750.227b(1) ("Upon a second conviction under this subsection, the person shall be punished by imprisonment for 5 years" and "[u]pon a third or subsequent conviction under this subsection, the person shall be punished by imprisonment for 10 years.") (emphasis added). The Legislature did except certain convictions from the statute: convictions for violations of "section 223, 227, 227a, or 230" are not to be counted. Id . But the text contains no similar exception for convictions arising out of the same criminal incident. The presence of one limitation on the kinds of convictions that are to be counted strongly suggests the absence of others unstated. See Pittsfield Charter Twp. v. Washtenaw Co. , 468 Mich. 702, 712, 664 N.W.2d 193 (2003) (applying "the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of all others").

The text of the felony-firearm statute does not differ in any meaningful way from the habitual-offender statutes this Court interpreted in Gardner . The habitual-offender statutes read: "If a person has been convicted of any combination of [X] or more felonies or attempts to commit felonies, ... the person shall be punished upon conviction of the subsequent felony ... as follows: ...." MCL 769.11(1) ; MCL 769.12(1). In Gardner , we explained:

The text clearly contemplates the number of times a person has been "convicted" of "felonies or attempts to commit felonies." Nothing in the statutory text suggests that the felony convictions must have arisen from separate incidents. To the contrary, the statutory language defies the importation of a same-incident test because it states that any combination of convictions must be counted. [ Gardner , 482 Mich. at 50–51 [753 N.W.2d 78].]

As with the habitual-offender statutes, the felony-firearm statute "clearly contemplates the number of times a person has been ‘convicted’ of" felony-firearm. Id .

Defendant argues, however, that our reasoning in Gardner rested on the Legislature's inclusion of the phrase "any combination of" in the habitual-offender statutes; and so, he argues, the absence of those or similar words in the felony-firearm statute leaves the Legislature's intent unclear. It is true, as defendant points out, that this Court in Gardner twice highlighted the "any combination of" language. See id . at 51, 66, 753 N.W.2d 78. The presence of that language in the habitual-offender statutes surely emphasized the fact that the Legislature had placed no restrictions on the kinds of convictions that should count. But it does not follow that the absence of such emphasizing language would have created exceptions otherwise not present. Stripped of the "any combination of" language, the text of the habitual-offender statutes at issue in Gardner would still contain no limitations on which convictions to count. See id . at 50–51, 753 N.W.2d 78. In the felony-firearm statute at issue in this case, the only statutory exceptions pertain to underlying felonies. There is no mention in either the habitual-offender or felony-firearm statute of a "separate incidents" requirement. Thus, the absence of the "any combination of" language in the felony-firearm statute does not render the statute ambiguous. "[W]hen statutory language is unambiguous, judicial construction is not required or permitted." Id . at 50, 753 N.W.2d 78.

A defendant with two prior felony-firearm convictions who is again convicted of felony-firearm is a third felony-firearm offender under MCL 750.227b(1), regardless of whether the two prior felony-firearm convictions arose out of the same criminal incident.² This Court erred in Stewart "by judicially engrafting [a separate-incidents test] onto the unambiguous statutory language" of the felony-firearm statute. Id . at 68, 753 N.W.2d 78. Stewart was wrongly decided.

B.

That Stewart was wrongly decided does not end our inquiry. We must still ask whether we should overrule it. "The application of stare decisis is generally the preferred course, because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." People v. Tanner , 496 Mich. 199, 250, 853 N.W.2d 653 (2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). But "stare decisis is a ‘principle of policy’ rather than ‘an inexorable command,’ " Robinson v. Detroit , 462 Mich. 439, 464, 613 N.W.2d 307 (2000)citation omitted), and so, if a case is wrongly decided, "we have a duty to reconsider whether it should remain controlling law," Gardner , 482 Mich. at 61, 753 N.W.2d 78. Our stare decisis principles direct us to consider whether there has been such reliance on the decision that overruling it would work an undue hardship, whether changes in the law or facts no longer justify the decision, and whether the decision defies practical workability. Robinson , 462 Mich. at 464, 613 N.W.2d 307.

Most significantly, any reliance that defendant, or others, might reasonably have placed on this Court's prior holding in Stewart was undercut by our decision in Gardner .³ Stewart drew its "separate incidents" rule entirely from our prior decision in Preuss which, along with People v. Stoudemire , 429 Mich. 262, 278, 414 N.W.2d 693 (1987), had announced the rule in the course of construing the habitual-offender statutes.⁴ In Stewart , this Court imported the Stoudemire – Preuss separate-incidents requirement from the habitual-offender context into the...