People v. Woodring

2020 IL App (4th) 180158-U

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DENISE WOODRING, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 4-18-0158

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT

November 12, 2020

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Livingston County

No. 16CF95

Honorable Jennifer H. Bauknecht, Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Cavanagh and Holder White concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding that (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it barred the testimony of a purported expert witness, (2) on this record, the appellate court was not able to conclude that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, and (3) the defendant's sentence was not excessive.

¶ 2 In March 2016, the State charged defendant, Denise Woodring, with aggravated driving under the influence of drugs (625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(F) (West 2014)), driving under the influence (id. § 11-501(a)(4)), and reckless homicide (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West 2014)). The charges alleged that in March 2016, defendant drove under the influence of a combination of drugs that rendered her incapable of safely driving and that her driving was the proximate cause of Riyaz Nomani's death.

¶ 3 In November 2017, the trial court conducted defendant's bench trial at which defendant called Ronald Henson, Ph.D., to deliver an expert opinion regarding driving under the influence and drowsy driving. However, the court sustained the State's objection that Henson was not qualified to testify as an expert witness in that field. Defendant also called Dr. Hassnain Syed, who had treated defendant and prescribed her medication, but defense counsel, seemingly for monetary reasons, failed to lay a proper foundation for Syed to testify as an expert witness. The court ultimately found defendant guilty of all counts and sentenced her to 12 years in prison.

¶ 4 Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court denied defendant her right to present a defense when it barred Henson's purported expert testimony, (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (a) lay a proper foundation, seemingly for monetary reasons, for Syed to testify as an expert witness and (b) request that the court permit Henson to testify as an expert witness in other fields in which he was qualified, and (3) defendant's 12-year sentence was excessive.

¶ 5 We disagree and affirm the trial court's judgment.

¶ 6 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 7 A. Procedural History

¶ 8 In March 2016, the State charged defendant with aggravated driving under the influence of drugs (625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(F) (West 2014)), driving under the influence (id. § 11-501(a)(4)), and reckless homicide (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West 2014)). The charges alleged that in March 2016, defendant drove under the influence of a combination of drugs that rendered her incapable of safely driving and that her driving was the proximate cause of the death of Riyaz Nomani.

¶ 9 In pretrial discovery, defendant disclosed that she intended to call Dr. Samir Sharma, Dr. Hassnain Syed, and Ronald Henson, Ph.D., as expert witnesses. According to defendant's disclosure, Syed would testify regarding (1) the psychological effects of differentprescription drugs, (2) the quantity of different drugs and their effects on defendant, (3) the amount of drugs required to affect defendant's ability to drive, and (4) his ultimate opinion as to whether defendant was capable of safely driving. Henson would testify as to (1) his study, knowledge, investigation, and experience concerning the issue of drug-impaired driving and standardized testing used for its detection, (2) studies conducted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) concerning driving under the influence of drugs and alcohol, (3) NHTSA's investigation into distracted and drowsy driving, and (4) Henson's opinion as to whether he believed that defendant was under the influence of any drug or combination of drugs that rendered her incapable of safely driving at the time of the accident.

¶ 10 B. The Bench Trial

¶ 11 In November 2017, the trial court conducted defendant's bench trial.

¶ 12 1. The State's Witnesses

¶ 13 Charles Whitten testified that on the evening of March 16, 2016, he was driving east on Route 17 in Livingston County when he observed a black car behind him, which had been following him for some time. He observed an SUV come towards him and narrowly avoid scraping his car. He then looked in his mirror and saw the SUV collide with the black car behind him. Whitten pulled over and saw residents that lived nearby come outside, call 911, and attempt to assist the drivers.

¶ 14 Jillayne Farrell testified that she was driving west on Route 17 and saw an Equinox SUV approach her quickly from behind. The SUV swerved off the side of the road and passed her. What happened next occurred too quickly for Farrell to see, but the next thing she remembered observing was the Equinox in the middle of the road and another car in a ditch.

¶ 15 Stephen Coady testified that he was an expert in accident reconstruction. Hedetermined that the "cause of the traffic crash in this case would have been [defendant's SUV] crossing over from the westbound lane into the eastbound lane encroaching into the traffic of the eastbound BMW and impacting the BMW in the eastbound lane of traffic." Richard Vanko, another crash reconstructionist, testified that by using the event data recorder in defendant's vehicle, he determined that defendant's speed before the crash was between 71 and 77 miles per hour. Vanko testified that the speed limit for the road on which the crash occurred was 55 miles per hour. Vanko believed there was no indication of braking.

¶ 16 The parties stipulated that Nomani, the driver of the black car, died because of the injuries he suffered in the accident.

¶ 17 Special Agent Rodney Slayback, an Illinois State Police investigator, interviewed defendant at the hospital after the accident, and a DVD recording of that interview was admitted and played for the court during his direct examination. Slayback testified that defendant told him she was coming from a 3 p.m. doctor's appointment in Hinsdale, Illinois, but had gotten lost. Defendant said she had not been sleeping much because of the medication she was taking and her use of cocaine, which she said she had taken on the evening of March 14, 2016 (two days before the accident). Defendant told Slayback that on the morning of the accident, she had taken Norco, gabapentin, diazepam, and hydrocodone. In the afternoon, following her doctor's appointment, she took a Vicodin.

¶ 18 Slayback further testified that defendant told him that she had fallen asleep, drifted into the rumble strips, and after trying to correct, crashed into another vehicle. Slayback asked defendant if she felt okay driving. She replied that she was sleepy, tired, drowsy, and was typically not okay with driving and a friend would drive her to appointments. Defendant said that although she sometimes did not take her medicine as prescribed, she had done so on the day of the crash.

¶ 19 The parties stipulated that if called to testify, Dalton Shulz, the emergency medical technician that transported defendant to the hospital, would say that defendant told him she was "driving home from Chicago and may have fallen asleep."

¶ 20 Alexandra Baluka, a forensic scientist with the Illinois State Police who was certified as an expert in forensic toxicology and pharmacology, testified that the Illinois State Police Crime Lab produced a report that showed defendant had "no volatiles detected, no cocaine detected, benzoylecgonine at a level less than 100 micrograms per liter, nordiazepam at .25 milligrams per liter, hydrocodone at a level less than 10 micrograms per liter, and alprazolam at 15 micrograms per liter" in defendant's blood. Baluka explained that nordiazepam is "an antianxiety or an antidepressant drug," hydrocodone is "an opiate and commonly referred to as Vicodin," and alprazolam is "commonly referred to as Xanax." The lab report further showed that defendant had acetaminophen, cyclobenzaprine, hydrocodone, ibuprofen, phenytoin, fluoxetine, gabapentin, benzoylecgonine, temazepam, dihydrocodeine, oxazepam, nordiazepam, alprazolam, and hyrdoxyalprazolam detected in her urine. Baluka explained that the drugs in defendant's blood and urine could have side effects of drowsiness, impaired judgment, decreased coordination, and dizziness. Baluka testified that the drugs found in defendant's blood were at the therapeutic level but those drugs at the therapeutic level could nonetheless result in those side effects. Baluka also testified that the crime lab report alone could not establish whether a person was impaired.

¶ 21 Dr. Samir Sharma testified that defendant was his patient and to deal with the medical problems in her neck and lower back, Sharma had prescribed hydrocodone. Sharma explained that hydrocodone can impair memory, judgment, and coordination. Sharma requires his patients to sign a narcotic agreement policy that includes that the patient is not to operate heavy machinery. He also testified that he would recommend someone on alprazolam, nordiazepam, andhydrocodone not operate heavy machinery.

¶ 22 Dr. Michael Kryza, an emergency room physician at Morris Hospital, testified that he treated defendant following the accident. At the hospital, in response to Kryza's questions, defendant said she did not have any chills, fatigue, or fever. He prescribed no additional medicine to defendant and noted that hospital records showed that defendant was on gabapentin, Norco, and Valium. The records also showed that defendant was a fall risk. When Kryza spoke to defendant, she was oriented as to person, place, and time and showed normal affect and judgment.

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