Peoples v. Fca United States, LLC

FREDERICK PEOPLES, Plaintiff, v. FCA US, LLC, Defendant.

Case No. 15-14003

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

May 24, 2017

Hon. Mark A. Goldsmith

OPINION & ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkt. 37) AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkt. 38)

This is a disability discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment case brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq., and Michigan's Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act ("PWDCRA"), Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1101 et seq.. Plaintiff also alleges negligent infliction of emotional distress under Michigan law. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 37) is granted, and Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 38) is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2011, Plaintiff Frederick Peoples began working for Defendant FCA US, LLC ("Chrysler") in the chassis department of the Sterling Heights Assembly Plant ("SHAP") in Sterling Heights, Michigan. See Pl. Statement of Material Facts ("SMF") ¶ 1, Pl. Br. at 7. In August 2011, Peoples complained to his superiors that the rotation schedule was not being observed, and management agreed. Id. ¶¶ 3-4.¹ According to Peoples, this complaint led to a confrontation with a coworker on August 15, 2011. Id. ¶ 6. Peoples claims that the co-worker initiated the confrontation. See Pl. Dep. Tr. at 25:7-9 (Dkt. 37-2). Chrysler investigated the incident, and no one was disciplined. See Def. SMF ¶ 3.

Due to a back injury, Peoples missed work from October 14, 2011 to January 4, 2012. Id. ¶ 4. Peoples then worked for two weeks, disagreed that his new duties complied with his new restrictions, and went back on approved medical leave from January 18, 2012, through April 9, 2012. Id. ¶ 5.

On May 7, 2012, Peoples was involved in another interpersonal confrontation, again based upon rotation schedules. Id. ¶ 6. Peoples claims that his co-workers were the aggressors. See Pl. Resp. at 8 (Dkt. 42) (citing Pl. Dep. Tr. at 119-121). This confrontation led to Peoples being taken to the plant medical office. Id. Subsequently, Peoples's physicians diagnosed him with post-traumatic stress disorder. See Pl. SMF ¶ 64 (citing 7/10/2012 Diagnosis, Ex. L to Pl. Mot. (Dkt. 39-12)). On the basis of this diagnosis, Peoples did not return to work until February 18, 2013. Id. ¶ 70; Def. SMF ¶ 8.²

On June 18, 2012, Peoples filed an EEOC charge in connection with the August 2011 and May 2012 disputes, alleging race and disability discrimination, as well as retaliation. See Def.SMF ¶ 25; see also 2012 EEOC Charge, Ex. Z to Def. Mot. (Dkt. 37-27). Peoples thereafter received a Right to Sue letter dated February 19, 2013. Def. SMF ¶ 25; see also 2/19/2013 Right to Sue Letter, Ex. AA to Def. Mot. (Dkt. 37-28). He had 90 days to file suit from that point, see 2/19/2013 Right to Sue Letter, but he did not file within that timeframe.

While Plaintiff was on leave from May 2012 to February 2013, he was sent for an independent medical examination ("IME") by Sedgwick, the company responsible for overseeing disability and medical leave requests for Chrysler. Def. SMF ¶ 11. The IME report recommended that Peoples be granted an accommodation in the form of "permanent transfer to a different Chrysler plant" other than SHAP. Id.; see also Wolf IME, Ex. L to Def. Mot. (Dkt. 37-13). In a letter dated January 15, 2013, Chrysler offered Peoples two reassignment options: (i) the "paint shop," which was still on the SHAP campus, but in a separate building; or (ii) the Warren truck assembly plant. See Def. SMF ¶ 12; see also 1/15/2013 Letter, Ex. M to Def. Mot. (Dkt. 37-14). Peoples selected the paint shop position. Def. SMF ¶ 13 (citing 2/6/2013 Letter, Ex. G to Def. Mot. (Dkt. 37-8)).³

When Peoples returned to work on February 18, 2013, he reported to the paint shop. Id. ¶ 13. He was again injured on March 9, 2013, allegedly due to Chrysler's rotation violations, necessitating more leave time. Id. ¶ 14; Pl. SMF ¶ 73.

While on this stretch of medical leave, Peoples contends that he was sent for another IME on February 4, 2014, this time to address his mental health. See Pl. SMF ¶¶ 73-77. He returnedto work in March 2014. Def. SMF ¶ 15. He was again injured on July 2, 2014, and he went on medical leave. Id. ¶ 16.

Peoples returned to work on October 14 or 15, 2014. Id. ¶ 17 (October 15); Pl. SMF ¶ 78 (October 14). For four days, Peoples trained on a stationary car door to learn the position of paint seal operator, after which, on October 21, 2014, he was directed to perform his tasks on the assembly line. Def. SMF ¶ 17. In uncertain terms, Peoples claims that this work violated his medical restrictions and that he told Chrysler so. See Pl. Resp. at 9 (citing Pl. Dep. Tr. at 178-183). The plant doctor, however, had determined that the job did not violate Peoples's restrictions. See Devine Dep. Tr., Ex. K to Pl. Mot., at 125:9-15 (Dkt. 39-11) ("Dr. McCormick determined that the operation did not violate his restrictions . . . .").⁴ Peoples could not keep up with the line's pace, the line had to be shut down, and he was disciplined via written warning. Def. SMF ¶ 17; Pl. SMF ¶ 81.

The next day, on October 22, 2014, Peoples went to the plant medical office to complain that he was physically unable to perform the functions of a paint seal operator. Def. SMF ¶¶ 19-20. When a doctor was not immediately available, Peoples called himself an ambulance. Id.; Pl. SMF ¶ 83. That trip to the hospital resulted in a note excusing Peoples from work for October 22-23. Def. SMF ¶ 19; Pl. SMF ¶ 84. Also on October 22, 2014, after Peoples left work, the plant medical doctor, Peoples's supervisor, plant HR staff, and UAW representatives visitedPeoples's work station to evaluate whether a paint seal operator could perform his assigned tasks within Peoples's bending and lifting restrictions; the plant doctor determined that he could do so. Def. SMF ¶ 20.

On October 24, 2014, Peoples was sent a "5-day letter," stating that he had been off work since "July 2, 2014" [sic];⁵ it stated that Peoples's absence "was established for a certain period, but has not been currently justified" and asked him to report to SHAP's HR office by October 31, 2014, "unless on or before this date the Plant Employment Office receives satisfactory evidence as to the reason for your absence." Id. ¶ 21; Pl. SMF ¶ 85. The letter warned that failure to provide satisfactory documentation excusing the absence could result in termination of seniority. See 10/24/2014 Letter, Ex. W to Def. Mot. (Dkt. 37-24).

On October 29, 2014, in response to the 5-day letter, Peoples went to HR, which directed him to the plant medical office to be cleared to work. Def. SMF ¶ 22. Peoples claims that he gave documentation to the plant medical office that excused him from work from October 23 through February of 2015, but, in support of this fact, he cites only to an illegible copy of the doctor's note he claims to have submitted. See Pl. SMF ¶¶ 86, 89 (citing identical Exs. I & N to Pl. Mot. (Dkts. 39-9, 39-14). Peoples did not wait to see a doctor as Chrysler directed he do; rather, he went home and did not return. See Def. SMF ¶ 22; Pl. SMF ¶¶ 90-91. On November 13, 2014, after Peoples had been absent from work for two weeks, Chrysler terminated his employment. Def. SMF ¶ 24; Pl. SMF ¶ 92. "[Chrysler]'s reason for termination was Plaintiff's failure to properly comply with the 10/24/2014 5-day letter, and for not being medically clearedto return to work." Def. SMF ¶ 24; see also Termination Letter, Ex. X to Def. Mot. ("[Y]our employment will be terminated due to not following the reinstatement procedure.") (Dkt. 37-25); Def. Resp. to 11/20/2014 Termination Grievance, Ex. Y to Def. Mot. (stating in response to union grievance that Peoples was terminated because he "did not follow through on 5 Day letter request and substantiate absences[.] Also not following management instructions.") (Dkt. 37-26).

After his termination, Peoples filed a second EEOC charge, dated February 26, 2015, alleging disability discrimination and retaliation beginning on October 22, 2014. See EEOC Charge, Ex. BB to Def. Mot. (Dkt. 37-29). The EEOC dismissed the 2015 charge and issued a right-to-sue letter on August 13, 2015. See 8/13/2015 Letter, Ex. CC to Def. Mot. (Dkt. 37-30). Peoples filed his complaint on November 14, 2015 (Dkt. 1).

II. STANDARD OF DECISION

On a motion for summary judgment, "facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a 'genuine' dispute as to those facts." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff's Proffered Record Evidence

Much of Peoples's version of the facts is "supported" only by unsworn letters he claims he provided to Chrysler contemporaneously with the events underlying this case. See, e.g., Pl.SMF ¶ 2 (citing 8/16/2011 Letter, Ex. A to Pl. Mot. (Dkt. 39-1)).⁶ Chrysler takes special issue with this, including in its response a "Rule 56(c)(2) Objection" that highlights the letters' character as unsworn hearsay. See Def. Resp. to Pl. Mot. at 2 (Dkt. 41). Chrysler also lists each paragraph of Peoples's Statement of Material Facts that contains no citation to the record whatsoever. See id.

Peoples, in his reply brief, attempts to retroactively attach "id." citations to the factual assertions having no citation to the record. See Pl. Reply at 1 (Dkt. 47).⁷ The Court declines to constructively amend Peoples's brief in this way.⁸ He also claims that his letters fall under three hearsay exceptions: (i) admissions of a party-opponen...