Peoples v. Oswego Cmty. Sch. Dist.

ARNOLD PEOPLES and J.P., by her father and next friend, ARNOLD PEOPLES, Plaintiffs, v. OSWEGO COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

No. 19-cv-00568

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

March 22, 2020

Judge Edmond E. Chang

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Arnold Peoples brings this case on behalf of his daughter, J.P.,¹ after she was strip searched at her elementary school.² R. 19, Am. Compl.³ Peoples is alleging both federal and state law violations against Oswego Community School District and four of its employees—school nurse Dinah Meyers, teacher Tiffani Simmons, social worker Christine Nelson, and assistant principal Alex Gonzalez. The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services and one of its investigators, Imara Negron, are also named as defendants. Peoples brings a variety of claims for violations of J.P.'s First and Fourth Amendment rights, as well as state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, battery, and false imprisonment.Peoples also asserts First Amendment and emotional-distress claims on his own behalf. All of the defendants have moved to dismiss the claims. For the reasons discussed below, the DCFS Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted, while the Oswego Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.

I. Background

For purposes of this motion, the Court accepts as true the factual allegations in the Complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Because Peoples was proceeding in a quasi-pro se manner at the time of filing, the Complaint is entitled to liberal construction. Id. To provide some context, in 2017, Arnold Peoples' daughter J.P. was a student at Long Beach Elementary School in the Oswego Community School District. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2-3. At the time of the relevant events, J.P. was seven or eight years old.⁴

Starting in March 2017, Peoples emailed, called, and met with various School District employees about his concerns that J.P. was being bullied and treated unfairly at school. Am. Compl. ¶ 10. According to Peoples, the School District employees determined that he "was a hindrance and an annoyance to them, lacked what they approved of as parenting skills, and was an unfit parent." Id. ¶ 11.

On January 29, 2018, Oswego teacher Tiffani Simmons, social worker Christine Nelson, and assistant principal Alex Gonzalez allegedly called the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (commonly known as "DCFS") to reportthat Peoples had struck his daughter in the mouth. Am. Compl. ¶ 12. According to Peoples, the school employees had not actually observed any injuries on J.P., and the complaint was based only on "hearsay information." Id. Then, when DCFS apparently did not respond, Simmons, Nelson, and Gonzalez tried again the next day, on January 30. Id. ¶ 14. This time they called DCFS and "communicated falsely ... based on hearsay information," that Peoples had struck his daughter "thirty times." Id.

After that second call, on January 31, 2018, DCFS sent one of its investigators, Imara Negron, to investigate the accusations. Am. Compl. ¶ 15. At the elementary school, Negron met with Simmons, Nelson, and the school nurse, Dinah Meyers. Id. Negron, Meyers, and Gonzalez decided to strip search J.P. Id. ¶ 16. According to Peoples, Negron and Meyers escorted J.P. into a school bathroom and removed her clothes to expose "intimate body areas despite the protestations of [J.P.] against being taken into the bathroom and against the removal of her clothing." Id. While this was happening, Negron allegedly "used her personal camera to take photos of [J.P.'s] disrobed, intimate body areas in violation of DCFS rules and regulations[,] which required her to use only DCFS photographic equipment." Id. ¶ 18. The Defendants did not contact Peoples before examining his daughter. Id. ¶ 17.

At some point on that same day, Negron visited Peoples' home, where she left her business card. Am. Compl. ¶ 19. Later, Peoples called Negron and arranged to meet with her on February 2, 2018. Id. Finally, on February 1, 2018, Gonzalez allegedly urged Negron to take protective custody of J.P., but Negron refused becauseshe determined that J.P. "had not been harmed and was not in danger of being harmed" by Peoples. Id. ¶ 20.

According to Peoples, this whole ordeal caused J.P. to suffer severe emotional distress, for which she continues to receive medical treatment. Am. Compl. ¶ 22.

II. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the...claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cleaned up).⁵ The Seventh Circuit has explained that this rule "reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to 'focus litigation on the merits of a claim' rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court." Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).

"A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). These allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above thespeculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual, rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.

III. Analysis

As a threshold matter, Peoples now acknowledges that the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services and the Oswego Community School District are not proper defendants in this lawsuit. The Eleventh Amendment bars lawsuits against states and state agencies, including DCFS, for monetary damages. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Indeed, the states and their agencies are not even considered "persons" that are suable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 71. So any claims against DCFS are dismissed with prejudice. This dismissal does not extend to Negron herself, however, because she is being sued in her individual capacity, not in her official capacity. See Luder v. Endicott, 253 F.3d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2001).

With regard to the School District, Peoples proposes to file an amended complaint replacing the School District with the Oswego Community School District Board of Education, which would be a proper defendant under these circumstances.⁶ R. 49, Pl.'s Resp. Br. at 6. There is no need to do so. It is clear that Peoples intendedto sue the Board, so the Court will go ahead and construe the suit against the School District as a suit against the Board.⁷ But that being said, all claims against the Board are still dismissed because Peoples has failed to allege that the conduct at issue in this case was caused by any official policy or custom of the Board for purposes of establishing a Monell violation.⁸ See Teesdale v. City of Chi., 690 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2012). This dismissal is without prejudice, though, in case Peoples believes he can identify a Monell policy or custom.

With that, the Court will now turn to the claims against the individual defendants—Meyers, Simmons, Nelson, and Gonzalez (together, the Oswego Defendants); and Negron, the DCFS investigator.⁹

A. Fourth Amendment (Count 1)

First, Peoples argues that the strip search and photographing of J.P. constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of J.P.'s Fourth Amendment rights. Am. Compl. ¶ 45. The public-school context is subject to a somewhat lower standard of Fourth Amendment scrutiny than the typical law-enforcement case (for instance, neither probable cause nor a warrant is necessarily required for public school administrators to search a student in school). Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370 (2009). But that does not mean that public school students are offered no Fourth Amendment protections at all. Instead, school searches are governed by a reasonable suspicion standard. Id. In general, "the measures adopted [must be] reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985). When applied to the specific context of strip searches, however, the Supreme Court has explained that the "categorically extreme intrusiveness" of a strip search "requires some justification in suspected facts." Safford, 557 U.S. at 376. In other words, given the "degree of intrusion" that a strip search entails, "general background possibilities fall short; a reasonable search that extensive calls for suspicion that it will pay off." Id. (emphasis added).

Here, there is no dispute that an extremely intrusive strip search of a seven-or eight-year-old girl has been alleged, so the only question is whether Peoples has adequately alleged that the Defendants did not have reasonable suspicion to justify that search.¹⁰

1. Oswego Defendants

Peoples argues that the Oswego Defendants instigated the DCFS investigation (and ensuing strip search) based on "hearsay and a false hearsay report" to DCFS.¹¹ Pl.'s Resp. Br. at 11. Specifically, Peoples alleges that the Oswego Defendants reached out to DCFS on three separate occasions: (1) the January 29, 2018 telephone call reporting that Peoples had struck J.P. in the mouth; (2) the January 30 call reporting that Peoples had struck J.P. thirty times, which then led to J.P. being strip...