Pereira v. Ganim

Maria Pereira v. Joseph P. Ganim, Mayor et al

No. CV166059229S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Fairfield, Bridgeport

November 1, 2016

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTION, REQUEST FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF, AND QUO WARRANTO ACTION

Barbara N. Bellis, J.

I FACTS

On September 12, 2016, the plaintiff, Maria Pereira, a member of the Bridgeport Board of Education (board), filed a complaint against the mayor of Bridgeport, Joseph P. Ganim; the city of Bridgeport; and the state of Connecticut. On September 22 2016, and October 13, 2016, via amended writs and summonses the plaintiff added Annette Segarra-Negron and Rafael Fonseca, Jr., respectively, as defendants to the action. Mayor Ganim had recently appointed both Segarra-Negron and Fonseca to fill vacancies on the board. This dispute arises out of the mayor's filling these vacancies, a power that the plaintiff argues lies exclusively with existing board members.

In their stipulation of facts filed on October 24, 2016, the parties agree to the following relevant facts. Under the Charter of the City of Bridgeport (charter), the board consists of nine members. The charter provides for minority representation, meaning that not more than six members of one party may be elected to the board. After the last municipal election, the board consisted of six Democrats, two Republicans, and one member of the Working Families Party. Under Chapter 15, § 1(d), of the charter, if a vacancy arises on the board, the remaining members are to elect a new member.

In November of 2013, Dave Hennessey, who was nominated for election by the Democratic party, was elected to the board. On January 5, 2016, Hennessey applied for erasure or transfer of his name from the enrollment list of Democrats to the enrollment list of Republicans. Later, on May 24, 2016 Hennessey filed a letter of resignation thereby creating a vacancy on the board. The board did not fill the vacancy in May, June, or July. On July 23, 2016, Mayor Ganim appointed Segarra-Negron, who is a resident of Bridgeport, an elector, and a Republican, to fill the vacancy created by Hennessey's resignation.

Later, on August 15, 2016, another board member, Andre Baker, resigned from his position. As per its published agenda, the board was scheduled to vote on filling Baker's vacancy at its September 12, 2016 meeting. Hours before the meeting was to begin, however, board chairman Dennis Bradley issued a press release indicating that the regular board meeting had been canceled and that he, Segarra-Negron, and board members Joe Larcheveque and Kevin McSpirit had agreed that they would " no longer, regularly attend Board of Education meetings" until Pereira resigned. The September 12 meeting was cancelled, and the vote to fill Baker's vacancy was not held. Subsequently, Bradley canceled a regular board meeting scheduled for September 26, 2016.

On September 28, 2016, Mayor Ganim appointed Fonseca, who is a resident of Bridgeport, an elector, and a Republican, to fill the vacancy created by Baker's resignation. The next day, board member McSpirit resigned. Subsequently, Bradley canceled a regular board meeting scheduled for October 11, 2016, and later, on October 20, 2016, submitted a notice purporting to cancel a regular board meeting scheduled for October 24, 2016.

In her third amended complaint, filed on October 17, 2016, the plaintiff alleges that Mayor Ganim has enacted a plan to usurp the board's sole authority, pursuant to the General Statutes and the charter, to fill vacant board seats. The plaintiff's reading of the General Statutes and the charter as granting the board exclusive power to fill vacancies, according to the plaintiff, is in accordance with the Home Rule Act, which prevents the state from acting in purely local affairs. The plaintiff further alleges that Mayor Ganim's appointment of SegarraNegron, a Republican, to fill the Democratic seat vacated by Hennessey, violated the General Statutes, the charter, and the state constitution. She alleges that Mayor Ganim's appointment of Fonseca was similarly unlawful. In addition to alleging that her constitutional rights have been violated, the plaintiff asserts a quo warranto action in which she states that the defendants have no valid claim to any authority for their actions and cannot show a valid title to the office in dispute.

The plaintiff seeks a declaratory ruling that the appointment of Segarra-Negron and any board decisions decided by a vote of Segarra-Negron are invalid, a temporary injunction preventing Mayor Ganim from taking any further action with regard to appointing board members, a writ of mandamus ordering the seat held by Segarra-Negron to be vacated, injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from preventing or hindering the plaintiff from performing the rights, privileges, powers and duties of her office, and damages.

On October 21, 2016, the city of Bridgeport and Mayor Ganim filed a memorandum in opposition to the plaintiff's application for a temporary injunction. On October 24, 2016, the plaintiff filed her memorandum in support of her application. On the same day, the court heard argument and rendered judgment for the defendants. This memorandum explains the basis for that judgment.

II DISCUSSION

At oral argument, the parties framed the following two issues for the court to decide: (1) whether the mayor was authorized to fill the vacancy on the board pursuant to General Statutes § 7-107^[1] and (2) whether the person whom the mayor appointed was qualified. The parties agreed that the court would first rule on the plaintiff's request for declaratory relief by answering these two questions and would then determine how the declaratory judgment decision would apply to the plaintiff's quo warranto action and request for injunctive relief.

In order to resolve these two issues, the court must answer the following three questions: (1) How do General Statutes § § 7-107 and 10-219^[2] and Chapter 15, § 1(d), of the charter^[3] interact? (2) Does the Home Rule Act prevent the mayor from exercising a power pursuant to § 7-107? (3) How does General Statutes § 9-167a(g)^[4] apply in order to determine an individual's political party affiliation? There is no Connecticut case law, controlling or otherwise, directly addressing these issues.

A General Statutes § § 7-107 and 10-219 and Chapter 15, § 1 of the Charter of the City of Bridgeport

The plaintiff argues that, as demonstrated by its plain language, § 7-107 is a catchall provision intended to fill a vacuum where no other procedure for filling vacancies exists. Section 10-219, the plaintiff's argument continues, is more specific, supersedes § 7-107, and is subject to charter provisions that otherwise provide a procedure for filling vacancies. Accordingly, the plaintiff concludes, the court should look to Chapter 15, § 1 of the charter for the proper procedure to follow in this case.

The defendants contend that § 7-107 is a deadlock breaking statute meant to address a situation in which any board or commission, such as a school board of education, fails to act. They further argue that § § 7-107 and 10-219, Chapter 15, § 1 of the charter, and bylaws of the board of education may be read harmoniously because § 7-107 only applies when the board has failed to act pursuant to the other provisions.

Due to the dearth of appellate authority on this issue of how General Statutes § § 7-107 and 10-219 and Chapter 15, § 1 of the charter interact, the court must examine the language of the provisions at issue. Gonzales v. Langdon, 161 Conn.App. 497, 515-16, 128 A.3d 562 (2015). " [W]hen construing a statute, [the court's] fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . [The court] seek[s] to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply . . . In seeking to determine that meaning . . . [General Statutes § ]1-2z directs [the court] first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of [the] text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Astoria Federal Mortgage Corp. v. Genesis Ltd. Partnership, 167 Conn.App. 183, 196, 143 A.3d 1121 (2016).

" It is an accepted principle of statutory construction that if possible, the component parts of a statute should be construed harmoniously in order to render an overall reasonable interpretation . . . [T]he legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law . . . [T]his tenet of statutory construction . . . requires [a court] to read statutes together when they relate to the same subject matter . . . Accordingly, [i]n determining the meaning of a statute . . . [courts] look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction . . . [T]he General Assembly is always presumed to know all the existing statutes and the effect that its action or non-action will have upon any one of them." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. " If a court can by any fair interpretation find a reasonable field of operation for two allegedly inconsistent statutes, without destroying or preventing their evident meaning and intent, it is the duty of the court to do so . . . Therefore, [courts] must, if possible, read the two statutes together and construe each to leave room for the meaningful...