PÉrez–gonzÁlez v. Municipality of AÑasco

769 F.Supp.2d 52

Hortensia PÉREZ–GONZÁLEZ, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.MUNICIPALITY OF AÑASCO, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 09–1560 (MEL).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Dec. 30, 2010.

Diana Sanchez–Quintana, Anasco, PR, pro se.Jacqueline Ortiz–Lopez, Anasco, PR, pro se.Hector L. Rodríguez–Carrero, Anasco, PR, pro se.Alejandro Duran–Ayala, Anasco, PR, pro se.Ariana Perez–Soto, Anasco, PR, pro se.David Matos–Martinez, Anasco, PR, pro se.Moises Colon–Gomez, Anasco, PR, pro se.Joel H. Roman, Anasco, PR, pro se.Dariana Toro–Malavé, Anasco, PR, pro se.Sharayma Roman–Velez, Anasco, PR, pro se.Jose A. Morales–Torres, Anasco, PR, pro se.John S. Nieves–Gonzalez, Anasco, PR, pro se.Edwin Villanueva–Mendez, Anasco, PR, pro se.Freddie De–Jesus–Ramirez, Anasco, PR, pro se.Michael A. Marquez–Zayas, Anasco, PR, pro se.Maria J. Mangual–Fuentes, Anasco, PR, pro se.Rosa A. Rosado–Crespo, Anasco, PR, pro se.Glenis V. Oyarzabal–Soria, Anasco, PR, pro se.Miguel Hernandez, Anasco, PR, pro se.Wilson Valentin–Caban, Anasco, PR, pro se.Hector L. Vargas–Nieto, Anasco, PR, pro se.

Richard Schell–Asad, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.Juan M. Rivera–Gonzalez, Yadhira Ramirez–Toro, Department of Justice, Juan M. Rivera–Gonzalez, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER

MARCOS E. LÓPEZ, United States Magistrate Judge.I. Procedural History

On January 12, 2010, a second amended complaint (the “complaint”) was filed in the instant action against defendants Jorge Estevez–Martínez (“Estevez”), Herminio Martínez (“Martínez”), Carlos Ruiz (“Ruiz”), Monserrate Carrero Candelaria (“Carrero”), and the Municipality of Añasco by the following plaintiffs: Hortencia Pérez González, Manuel Rodríguez Morales, Diana Sánchez–Quintana, Marilyn Valentín–Ramírez, Jacqueline Ortiz–López, Héctor L. Rodríguez–Carrero, Jeffrey Feliciano, Waleska E. Malavé Carrero, Lydia Torres Escalón, Marisol Agostini–Rodríguez, Héctor L. Vargas–Nieto, Alejandro Durán–Ayala, Ariana Pérez–Soto, David Matos–Martínez, William Matías–Datiz, Moisés Colón–Gómez, Joel H. Román, Misael Lugo–González, Anabel Vélez–Rosado, Héctor Omar González–Angueira, Elizabeth Nieves–Nieves, Freddie de Jesús Ramírez, Dariana Toro–Malavé, Iris Pérez–Crespo, Sharayma Román–Vélez, Suhaill Martínez–Robles, José A. Morales–Torres, John S. Nieves–González, Jaime Vega–Santiago, Hilario Cruz–Quintana, Nelson M. Ruiz, Gilberto Román–Valentín, Melissa Matías–Matías, Santos Matías–Mufiiz, Manuel Rodríguez–Morales, Edwin Villanueva–Méndez, Michael A. Márquez–Zayas, Angel Ramos–Malavé, María J. Mangual–Fuentes, Celso Cruz–Babilonia, Jose A. Crespo, Norberto Carrero–Carrero, Rosa A. Rosado–Crespo, Glenis V. Oyarzabal–Soria, Luis A. Lugo–Rivera, Herminio Torres González, Miguel Hernández and Wilson Valentín–Cabán.¹ (Docket No. 31.) Claiming, inter alia, that defendants targeted plaintiffs for discrimination due to their political affiliation, the complaint asserts federal causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) for violations of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), as well as supplemental state law claims, to wit: Puerto Rico's Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 146–151 (“Law 100”); Law No. 80 of May 30, 1976, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 185 et seq. (“Law 80”); Law No. 44 of July 2, 1985, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1, §§ 502 et seq. (“Law 44”); Article 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 31, §§ 5141, 5142; the Libel and Slander Law of February 19, 1902, P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 32, §§ 3141 et. seq. ; and Article II, §§ 1, 4, 6, 7, and 8 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Id. Estevez and the Municipality of Añasco filed an answer on March 29, 2010, and the other named defendants joined their answer on April 21, 2010. (Docket Nos. 38; 39.)

The parties have since stipulated to a partial settlement agreement, whereby all claims brought by the following plaintiffs have been dismissed with prejudice: Marilyn Valentín, Waleska E. Malavé Carrero, Manuel Rodríguez Morales, Hortencia Pérez González, Marisol Agostini Rodríguez, Suhail Martínez Robles, Lydia Torres Escalón, Norberto Carrero Carrero, Jaime Vega Santiago, Gilberto Román Valentín, Celso Cruz Babiloni, José Crespo Lugo, Elizabeth Nieves, Herminio Torres González, Luis Lugo Rivera, Santos Matías Mufiiz, Héctor O. González Angueiro, Hilario Cruz Quintana, Jeffrey Feliciano, Anabel Vélez Rosado, Misael Lugo González, Iris Y. Pérez Crespo, Angel Ramos Malavé, William Matías–Datiz and Melissa Matías Matías. (Docket No. 83.) Pending before the court is defendants Estevez, Martínez, Ruiz and Carrero's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings—joined by the Municipality of Añasco—and the remaining plaintiffs' opposition.² (Docket Nos. 58; 61; 68.)

II. Statement of Factual Allegations

Following several terms under New Progressive Party (“NPP”) control, the Municipality of Añasco elected Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”) candidate defendant Estevez mayor on November 4, 2008. (Docket No. 31, ¶¶ 18, 27.) Soon after Estevez took office in January 2009, he named defendant Martínez as Administrator of the Municipality, defendant Carrero as Director of Human Resources and defendant Ruiz as a supervisor at the Department of Recreation. (Docket No. 31, ¶¶ 21, 27.) Plaintiffs assert that “immediately” after being sworn in, Estevez implemented a policy of discrimination against municipal employees that had been retained from the prior administration and that were identified with the NPP and the former mayor. (Docket No. 31, ¶ 28.) Specifically, plaintiffs assert that through defendants Martínez and Ruiz, the mayor undertook a pattern of discrimination against plaintiffs, relieving them of their duties, removing them from their offices, publicly and privately insulting them, accusing certain plaintiffs of committing crimes, and, in one case, physically assaulting one of the plaintiffs. ( See, e.g., Docket No. 31, ¶¶ 50–52, 75, 77, 117.) The complaint states that this discriminatory campaign was designed to force plaintiffs to resign so that the mayor could then fill their positions with PDP sympathizers. (Docket No. 31, ¶ 30.) Further, plaintiffs allege that they reported the discriminatory conduct by defendant Martínez to the mayor, but that Estevez failed to put a stop to it. (Docket No. 31, ¶ 31.) In fact, plaintiffs assert that in a radio interview the mayor “boasted” that Martínez was doing the job that Estevez had ordered him to do.³ (Docket No. 31, ¶ 31.)III. Legal AnalysisA. Judgment on the Pleadings Standard

Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that, “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The First Circuit has held that “[t]he standard for evaluating a motion to dismiss is the same as that for a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Remexcel Managerial Consultants, Inc. v. Arlequin, 583 F.3d 45, 49 n. 3 (1st Cir.2009).

In Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), the Supreme Court held that to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege “a plausible entitlement to relief.” Rodriguez–Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 95–96 (1st Cir.2007)( quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. See Correa–Martinez v. Arrillaga–Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir.1990). While Twombly does not require of plaintiffs a heightened fact pleading of specifics, it does require enough facts to have “nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Accordingly, in order to avoid dismissal, the plaintiff must provide the grounds upon which his claim rests through factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. However, the First Circuit has recently cautioned against equating plausibility with an analysis of the likely success on the merits, affirming that the plausibility standard assumes “pleaded facts to be true and read in a plaintiff's favor.” Sepúlveda–Villarini v. Dep't of Educ. of P.R., 628 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir.2010)( citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ––– U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), the Supreme Court upheld Twombly and clarified that two underlying principles must guide this court's assessment of the adequacy of a plaintiff's pleadings when evaluating whether a complaint can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949–50. “First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 ( citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” ⁴ Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 ( citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Thus, any nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint, accepted as true, must be sufficient to give the claim facial plausibility. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Determining the existence of plausibility is a “context-specific task” which “requires the court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’ ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Id. ( quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Furthermore, such inferences must be at least as plausible as any “obvious alternative...