Peter R v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

1

PETER R.,^[1] Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

Civ. No. 1:22-cv-05268-NLH

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

June 20, 2023

SAMUEL FISHMAN

CHERMOL & FISHMAN, LLC

Attorney for Plaintiff

STUART WEISS

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF PROGRAM LITIGATION OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

Attorney for Defendant

OPINION

NOEL L. HILLMAN U.S.D.J

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) regarding Plaintiff's application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). The issue before the Court is whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in finding that there was “substantial evidence” that Plaintiff was not disabled at any time since his alleged onset date of disability, February 1, 2016. For the reasons stated below, this Court will affirm that decision.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 19, 2016, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for DIB,^[2] alleging that he became disabled as of February 1, 2016. (R. at 192-193). Plaintiff claims that as of that date he could no longer work due to his “history of heart attack, extreme fatigue, high blood pressure, degenerative disc disease, gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), high cholesterol, memory problems, and asthma.” (ECF 9 at 11).

After his claim was denied on October 13, 2016 (R. at 11419), and reconsideration was denied on January 6, 2017 (R. at 121-26), Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ (R. at 12829). The hearing was held on October 26, 2018 before ALJ John Martin. (R. at 15). Plaintiff testified as well as a vocational witness. (Id.) On January 10, 2019, ALJ Martin issued an unfavorable decision. (R. at 15-24). Plaintiff's Request for Review was denied by the Appeals Council on March 17, 2020 (R. 1-6), making ALJ Martin's January 10, 2019 decision final. Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court, and on April 13, 2021, this Court entered a consent order to remand. (R. 715-16). This matter was thus remanded. (R. 718-24).

On December 2, 2021, a new hearing was held before ALJ Karen Shelton. (R. 663). Plaintiff and a different vocational witness from the first hearing testified. (Id.). On May 2, 2022, ALJ Shelton issued an unfavorable decision. (R. 640-57). Plaintiff did not appeal to the Appeals Council, but filed the instant civil action on August 28, 2022. (ECF 1).^[3]

II. DISCUSSION

a. Standard of Review

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Congress provided for judicial review of the Commissioner's decision to deny a complainant's application for social security benefits. Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995). A reviewing court must uphold the Commissioner's factual decisions where they are supported by “substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001); Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000); Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992). Substantial evidence means more than “a mere scintilla.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). In other words, “[i]t means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. The inquiry is not whether the reviewing court would have made the same determination, but whether the Commissioner's conclusion was reasonable. Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 38.

A reviewing court has a duty to review the evidence in its totality. See Daring v. Heckler, 727 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir.1984).

“[A] court must ‘take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.'” Schonewolf v. Callahan, 972 F.Supp. 277, 284 (D.N.J. 1997) (quoting Willbanks v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988)).

The Commissioner “must adequately explain in the record his reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence.” Ogden v. Bowen, 677 F.Supp. 273, 278 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (citing Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1986)). The Third Circuit has held that an “ALJ must review all of the pertinent medical evidence, explaining his conciliations and rejections.” Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 2000). Similarly, an ALJ must also consider and weigh all of the non-medical evidence before him. Id. (citing Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir. 1983)); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 707 (3d Cir. 1981).

The Third Circuit has held that access to the Commissioner's reasoning is indeed essential to a meaningful court review:

[U]nless the [Commissioner] has analyzed all evidence and has sufficiently explained the weight he has given to obviously probative exhibits, to say that his decision is supported by substantial evidence approaches an abdication of the court's duty to scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether the conclusions reached are rational.

Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). Although an ALJ, as the fact finder, must consider and evaluate the medical evidence presented, Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 42, “[t]here is no requirement that the ALJ discuss in its opinion every tidbit of evidence included in the record,” Hur v. Barnhart, 94 Fed.Appx. 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004). In terms of judicial review, a district court is not “empowered to weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions for those of the factfinder.” Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182. However, apart from the substantial evidence inquiry, a reviewing court is entitled to satisfy itself that the Commissioner arrived at his decision by application of the proper legal standards. Sykes, 228 F.3d at 262; Friedberg v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445, 447 (3d Cir. 1983); Curtin v. Harris, 508 F.Supp. 791, 793 (D.N.J. 1981).

b. Standard for DIB

The Social Security Act defines “disability” for purposes of an entitlement to a period of disability and disability insurance benefits as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).

Under this definition, a Plaintiff qualifies as disabled only if his physical or mental impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to perform his past relevant work, but cannot, given his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other type of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B) (emphasis added).

The Commissioner has promulgated regulations for determining disability that require application of a five-step sequential analysis. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. This five-step process is summarized as follows:

1. If the claimant currently is engaged in substantial gainful employment, he will be found “not disabled.”

2. If the claimant does not suffer from a “severe impairment,” he will be found “not disabled.”

3. If the severe impairment meets or equals a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 and has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months, the claimant will be found “disabled.”

4. If the claimant can still perform work he has done in the past (“past relevant work”) despite the severe impairment, he will be found “not disabled.”

5. Finally, the Commissioner will consider the claimant's ability to perform work (“residual functional capacity”), age, education, and past work experience to determine whether or not he is capable of performing other work which exists in the national economy. If he is incapable, he will be found “disabled.” If he is capable, he will be found “not disabled.”

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(g). Entitlement to benefits is therefore dependent upon a finding that the claimant is incapable of performing work in the national economy.

This five-step process involves a shifting burden of proof. See Wallace v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 722 F.2d 1150, 1153 (3d Cir. 1983). In the first four steps of the analysis, the burden is on the claimant to prove every element of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. In the final step, the Commissioner bears the burden of proving that work is available for the Plaintiff: “Once a claimant has proved that he is unable to perform his former job, the burden shifts to the [Commissioner] to prove that there is some other kind of substantial gainful employment he is able to perform.” Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 775, 777 (3d Cir. 1987); see Olsen v. Schweiker, 703 F.2d 751, 753 (3d Cir. 1983).

c. Analysis

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had “not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period from his alleged onset date of February 1, 2016 through his date last insured of December 31, 2019.” (R. at 643).

At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had severe impairments including “coronary artery disease (status post cardiac catheterization and stent implantation); obesity; degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and cervical spine; and osteoarthritis of the right acromioclavicular joint.” (Id.). The ALJ discussed additional alleged impairments that she did not find severe, including hearing loss, hypertension, gastroesophageal reflux disease, memory problems, and mental health impairments. (R. 643-45).

At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff “did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the...