Peters v. United States

1

TINA PETERS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and MERRICK B. GARLAND, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 23-cv-03014-NYW-JPO

United States District Court, D. Colorado

May 20, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Nina Y. Wang, United States District Judge

In this action, Plaintiff Tina Peters asks this Court to intervene to prevent the United States of America from continuing its ongoing federal criminal investigation of Ms. Peters. See [Doc. 33]. Defendants United States of America and Merrick B Garland, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief brought against the United States, arguing, inter alia, that this Court lacks equitable authority over and must abstain from interfering with the ongoing federal criminal investigation. [Doc. 57, filed February 5, 2024]. Based on the record before it, this Court concludes that Ms. Peters has failed to establish an exception to warrant the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction over her claim and accordingly, dismissal is appropriate.

BACKGROUND

The Court has previously discussed the background of this case in detail, see [Doc. 39], and therefore, limits this discussion to the most pertinent facts to the instant Motion to Dismiss filed by the Federal Defendants, drawing the following facts from the First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (the “First Amended Complaint”),^[1] [Doc. 33], and the docket for the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.^[2] Plaintiff Tina Peters (“Plaintiff” or “Ms. Peters”) is the former Clerk and Recorder for Mesa County, Colorado. [Id. at ¶ 5]. On March 8, 2022, a grand jury for Mesa County, Colorado, returned an Indictment against Ms Peters (the “Indictment” or “Mesa County Indictment”), charging her with 10 criminal counts arising from the Colorado Secretary of State's trusted build election management software update (the “trusted build”) that was scheduled to begin in Mesa County on May 25, 2021. [Doc. 1-28].

Specifically Ms. Peters is charged with three counts of Attempt to Influence a Public Servant, in violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-306; two counts of Conspiracy to Commit Criminal Impersonation, in violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-5-113(1)(B)(I), 182-201; one count of Criminal Impersonation, in violation of § 18-5-113(1)(B)(I); one count of Identity Theft, in violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-5-902(1); one count of First Degree Official Misconduct, in violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-404; one count of Violation of Duty, in violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-13-107(1); and one count of Failure to Comply with Requirements of Secretary of State, in violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-13-114. [Doc. 1-28 at 1-2]. Ms. Peters's trial was originally set for March 2023 but, several continuations later, now is set to begin July 29, 2024. [Coomer, Case No. 22-cv-01129, ECF No. 111-1 at ¶ 3]; [Doc. 20 at 2]. Ms. Peters contends that her actions related to the trusted build were efforts to protect the integrity of the election process and to comply with federal law to maintain election records. See generally [Doc. 33].

In 2022, the Department of Justice convened a grand jury to investigate Ms. Peters's actions with respect to the trusted build, invoking three federal statutes in the process: 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (identity theft); 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (intentional damage to a protected computer); and 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to commit identity theft and/or cause intentional damage to a protected computer). See [id. at ¶¶ 107, 11114]. No federal criminal charges have been filed against Ms. Peters.

Believing that the state prosecution and associated state and federal investigations of her election-related activities were in retaliation for her public challenges to the validity of the 2020 presidential election and the reliability of the electronic voting system used by Mesa County as well as her criticism of the trusted build, Ms. Peters initiated this action on November 14, 2023, against the United States of America; Defendant Merrick B. Garland, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States (“Defendant Garland” or “Attorney General Garland”, and collectively with the United States, “Federal Defendants”),^[3] Defendant Jena Griswold, in her official capacity as Colorado Secretary of State (“Defendant Griswold”); and Defendant Daniel P. Rubinstein, in his official capacity as District Attorney for Mesa County, Colorado, (“Defendant Rubinstein”), invoking this Court's jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), and 1346(a)(2). [Doc. 1].

Only Count I of the operative First Amended Complaint remains before this Court, and Ms. Peters alleges that the Federal Defendants retaliated against Ms. Peters for her exercise of her First Amendment rights of free speech, free association, and petition for redress by investigating her election-related conduct. [Doc. 33 at ¶¶ 147-53].^[4] Ms. Peters seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. [Id. at 42-43]. On February 5, 2024, the Federal Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint [ECF No. 33] (the “Motion to Dismiss”). [Doc. 57]. The crux of the Federal Defendants' request for dismissal is their argument that the Court lacks equitable jurisdiction over Ms. Peters's remaining claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. [Id. at 1, 4-9]. The Federal Defendants also moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of standing and failure to state a claim, respectively. See [id. at 9-15].

Ms. Peters filed her Response to Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 57) (“Response”) on February 26, 2024, [Doc. 58], and the Federal Defendants filed their Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint [ECF No. 57] (“Reply”) on March 11, 2024, [Doc. 61]. Neither Party sought an evidentiary hearing nor identified any evidence to be presented beyond documents already on the Court's docket with respect to the instant Motion. See [Doc. 57; Doc. 58; Doc. 61]. The Motion to Dismiss is now ripe for review, and this Court concludes, based on its review of the record, that oral argument will not materially contribute to the resolution of the issues before it.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Equitable Jurisdiction

While Ms. Peters frames her response to the Federal Defendants' equitable jurisdiction argument as one of subject matter jurisdiction, see [Doc. 58 at 1], it is not. Equitable jurisdiction, much like subject matter jurisdiction, is a limitation on federal courts. See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 754 (1975). Equitable jurisdiction is concerned with “whether consistently with the principles governing equitable relief the court may exercise its remedial powers.” Id. Both subject matter jurisdiction and equitable jurisdiction are required for a federal court to hear the merits of an equitable claim. Even when a court has subject matter jurisdiction, “[t]here remains the question of equitable jurisdiction” before “the District Court properly [can] reach the merits.” Id. Therefore, whenever a federal court is presented with an equitable claim, it must first determine whether it possesses equitable jurisdiction before it can address the merits. See Guzman v. Polaris Indus., 49 F.4th 1308, 1314 (9th Cir. 2022).

It is axiomatic that “a suit in equity does not lie where there is a plain[,] adequate[,] and complete remedy at law.” Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214 (1923). Under the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence, “courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.” O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974) (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971)). “Only the narrowest of circumstances permit a district court to invoke equitable jurisdiction. Such decisions must be exercised with caution and restraint, as equitable jurisdiction is appropriate only in exceptional cases where equity demands intervention.” Trump v. United States, 54 F.4th 689, 697 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted). Ultimately, the exercise of equitable jurisdiction by a district court lies squarely in its discretion. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 400 (1946); Agee v. United States ex rel. Drug Enf't Admin., 992 F.2d 1222, 1993 WL 128708 (10th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table opinion).

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing it. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Since the elements of standing “are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.” Id. “At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice,” since the Court “presume[es] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” Id. (quoting Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)). In considering jurisdiction, the Court “can elicit information outside the pleadings. This permits the court to undertake an independent investigation to assure itself of its own subject matter jurisdiction.” Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 908 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

Proper Record. With respect to the proper record, the Court may consider evidence outside the four corners of the operative pleading in deciding whether it has...