Petersen v. State

937 N.W.2d 136

Ryan David PETERSEN, Appellant,

v.STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.

A19-0686

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: December 26, 2019

Ryan David Petersen, Oak Park Heights, Minnesota, pro se appellant.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County Attorney, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.

OPINION

ANDERSON, Justice.

Appellant Ryan David Petersen was convicted of the first-degree premeditated murder of Chase Passauer. On direct appeal, we affirmed his conviction. State v. Petersen , 910 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2018). Petersen then sought postconviction relief, asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The district court denied his petition without a hearing. Because we conclude that Petersen’s claim fails on the merits, we affirm the district court.

FACTS

The murder of Chase Passauer arose from a dispute between Petersen and his criminal defense attorney.¹ On the day of the murder, Petersen exchanged a series of text messages with his attorney concerning a parking ticket. When the attorney informed Petersen that he was unable to talk by phone because he was preparing for court, and he would not handle Petersen’s parking ticket, Petersen fired the attorney and demanded a refund of the $7,000 retainer he had previously paid. Petersen told his girlfriend that he intended to get his money back from, and shoot, the attorney. Petersen then drove five miles to the attorney’s office and, with a hidden .40-caliber semiautomatic handgun in his waistband, entered the building, ascended the stairs, and entered the law office through unlocked doors.

Petersen confronted Passauer, a law clerk who was seated at the reception desk in the law office, demanding to know where the attorney was located. Angry that Passauer did not know where the attorney was, Petersen shot Passauer in the chest five times. As Petersen left the office, he shot Passauer three more times through a glass window separating the reception area from the entryway. Petersen fled, leaving Passauer to die from the eight gunshot wounds to his chest.

The State charged Petersen by complaint with second-degree intentional murder. Just before his second court appearance,² Petersen informed the State that he intended to enter a straight plea to the charge of second-degree intentional murder. The State filed an amended complaint charging Petersen with first-degree premeditated murder, second-degree intentional murder, and possession of a firearm by an ineligible person. The State also informed the district court that a grand jury proceeding would be convened to consider the first-degree murder charge.

Petersen still attempted to plead guilty to the second-degree murder charge, but the district court did not accept his plea. Five days later, a grand jury indicted Petersen on all three charges. The district court denied Petersen’s motion to dismiss the grand jury indictment.

After a bench trial, the district court found Petersen guilty of all three charges. The district court sentenced Petersen to life in prison without the possibility of release for first-degree premeditated murder and a concurrent 60-month sentence for possession of a firearm by an ineligible person; it did not sentence Petersen on the second-degree intentional murder count.

Petersen filed a direct appeal. See Petersen , 910 N.W.2d at 1. We determined that (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to accept Petersen’s guilty plea to second-degree intentional murder, and (2) sufficient evidence supported the district court’s finding of premeditation. Id. at 6, 8. Accordingly, we affirmed Petersen’s convictions. Id. at 9.

Petersen filed a petition for postconviction relief. He argued that his conviction for first-degree premeditated murder must be set aside and that, based on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, he should receive a new sentencing hearing for his conviction of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person. The district court denied Petersen’s petition without a hearing, and Peterson now appeals.

ANALYSIS

A person convicted of a crime may petition for postconviction relief under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2018). A district court is required to hold an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact and conclusions of law "[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief." Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2018). We review a district court’s denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion, and we review any embedded issues of law de novo. Reed v. State , 793 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010). An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court has "exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings." Id. at 729.

To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Petersen must show that (1) his appellate counsel’s representation on direct appeal "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and (2) "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; see also Dukes v. State , 621 N.W.2d 246, 252 (Minn. 2001). Courts "may analyze the Strickland requirements in either order and may dispose of a claim on one prong without considering the other." Lussier v. State , 853 N.W.2d 149, 154 (Minn. 2014). In addition, when determining whether an attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, courts do not second-guess the decision of appellate counsel not to raise a claim that "counsel could have legitimately concluded would not prevail." Reed , 793 N.W.2d at 733 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

On appeal, Petersen raises four claims of error in the district court’s summary dismissal of his postconviction petition. We consider each claim in turn.

A.

Petersen first argues that the district court erred by determining that his appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that his convictions for first-degree murder and second-degree murder violated Minn. Stat. §§ 609.04 and 609.035 (2018).

"Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both." Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1. In other words, "the State may not convict a person for both a crime and its lesser-included offense." State v. Johnson , 773 N.W.2d 81, 89 (Minn. 2009) ; see also State v. Wipper , 512 N.W.2d 92, 94 (Minn. 1994) (explaining that the defendant could not be convicted of both first-degree murder and second-degree murder for the same conduct). "We have long recognized that the ‘conviction’ prohibited by [ Minn. Stat. § 609.04 ] is not a guilty verdict, but is rather a formal adjudication of guilt." Pierson v. State , 715 N.W.2d 923, 925 (Minn. 2006) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A] conviction occurs only after the district court judge accepts, records, and adjudicates" a finding of guilt. Id. Accordingly, the procedure a district court should follow when a defendant is convicted of a charged offense and a lesser-included offense is "to adjudicate formally and impose sentence on one count only." State v. Martinez , 725 N.W.2d 733, 739 (Minn. 2007) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although similar to section 609.04, section 609.035 focuses on the issue of sentences, as opposed to conviction. It states:

Except [for subdivisions and sections that do not apply to this case], if a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses and a conviction or acquittal of any one of them is a bar to prosecution for any other of them.

Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1. " Section 609.035 contemplates that a defendant will be punished for the most serious of the offenses arising out of a single behavioral incident because imposing up to the maximum punishment for the most serious offense will include punishment for all offenses."³ State v. Ferguson , 808 N.W.2d 586, 589 (Minn. 2012) (citation omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted). The purpose of section 609.035 is "to limit punishment to a single sentence where a single behavioral incident result[s] in the violation of more than one criminal statute." State v. Bookwalter , 541 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Minn. 1995) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Multiple punishment refers not to multiple convictions but multiple sentences." Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). When a defendant is found guilty of both first-degree and second-degree murder, no violation of section 609.035 occurs when "the district court convict[s] him of first-degree murder and sentence[s] him on that count" only. Rhodes v. State , 735 N.W.2d 315, 320 n.7 (Minn. 2007).

In this case, the district court acknowledged that the sentencing order arising from the court trial erroneously states that Petersen was "convicted" of second-degree intentional murder. More specifically, the district court acknowledged that "the sentencing order dated October 7, 2016 contains a clerical error in indicating [that Petersen] was convicted of" second-degree intentional murder; thus, the court directed that the order "be corrected to reflect [that Petersen] was found guilty by the court but no conviction was entered by the court." The district court also observed that no punishment was imposed for the second-degree murder offense.⁴ In other words, the district court acknowledged the need to correct a clerical error in the sentencing order...