89 F.4th 628
Brandon Robert PETERSON, Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Commander Roger HEINEN, in his individual capacity;
Sergeant Brandon Olson, in his individual capacity; Sergeant Nicholas Klinkner,
in his individual capacity;
Sergeant Troy Jorgenson, in his individual capacity;
Washington County, Minnesota, Defendants - Appellants
Sheriff Dan Starry, Defendant
John Warneke, Assistant Jail Administrator in his individual capacity;
Officer Kcee Cahill, in his individual capacity; Sergeant Frank Capra,
in his individual capacity, Defendants - Appellants
Officer Dan Rein, in his individual capacity, Defendant
Sgt. David Frantsi, in his individual capacity; Officer Jennifer Glassmaker,
in her individual capacity; Corporal Rebecca Dyck, in her individual capacity;
Nurse Melinda Leibel, "Mindy" in her individual capacity; Officer Chad Gaikowski,
in his individual capacity, Defendants - Appellants
Officer John Roberto, in his individual capacity, Defendant
Officer Vince Scheele, in his individual capacity, Defendant - Appellant
Officer Garrett Kleinendorst, in his individual capacity, Defendant
Officer De La Rosa, in his individual capacity;
Stephanie Kaphing, in her individual capacity, Defendants - Appellants
John Does, 1-10 in their individual capacities, Defendant
No. 22-1603
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Submitted: December 15, 2022
Filed: December 26, 2023
Appeal from United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant and appeared on the brief was Stephanie A. Angolkar, of Bloomington, MN. The following attorneys also appeared on the appellant brief; Jason Michael Hiveley, of Bloomington, MN., Julia Catherine Kelly, of Bloomington, MN.
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee and appeared on the brief was Stephen D. Morrison, III, of Minneapolis, MN. The following attorneys also appeared on the appellee brief; Carly J.T. Leopold, of Minneapolis, MN., Chelsea Bunge-Bollman, of Minneapolis, MN., Amanda Kelly Rice, of Detroit, MI.
Before LOKEN, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
KOBES, Circuit Judge.
Brandon Peterson sued Washington County Jail (WCJ) officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deprivations of his constitutional rights while incarcerated. He also brought claims under Minnesota law and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The district court denied qualified immunity to multiple officials and deferred making a definitive summary judgment ruling on the state law and Monell claims. After careful review of the district court's order and the record, including the relevant video footage, we reverse in part, dismiss in part, and vacate in part. The case is remanded to the district court.
Some orientation first. This interlocutory appeal involves 16 appellants and a hodgepodge of constitutional and state law claims.
The district court denied Sergeants Nicholas Klinkner, Brandon Olson, and David Frantsi as well as Officers De La Rosa, Rebecca Dyck, Kcee Cahill, Jennifer Glassmaker, and Vince Scheele qualified immunity for their alleged use of and failure to intervene in excessive force. It also denied Commander Roger Heinen and Nurses Stephanie Kaphing and Melinda Leibel qualified immunity for their alleged deliberate indifference to Peterson's serious medical needs, and it denied unknown defendants qualified immunity from Peterson's conditions-of-confinement claims. The court then deferred a definitive disposition of his state law and Monell claims for another day.
We first address the denial of qualified immunity. We review de novo, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Peterson and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Thurmond v. Andrews, 972 F.3d 1007, 1011 (8th Cir. 2020); see also Jackson v. Gutzmer, 866 F.3d 969, 975 (8th Cir. 2017) (discussing our limited jurisdiction to review pretrial denial of qualified immunity). We accept as true "the facts that the district court specifically found were adequately supported, along with those facts that the district court likely assumed." Roberts v. City of Omaha, 723 F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). But where those facts are "blatantly contradicted by the record," say, in video recordings, we do not "adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-81, 384, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).
To decide whether the district court should have granted qualified immunity, we ask if the facts "demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right" and if "the right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation." Handt v. Lynch, 681 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir. 2012). We review each defendant's conduct individually. Wilson v. Northcutt, 441 F.3d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 2006).1
Before addressing excessive force, we must pin down "the precise constitutional violation with which [the defendants are] charged." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). The parties spar over whether the Eighth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment applies to Peterson's excessive force claims. And understandably so: if the Fourteenth Amendment applies, Peterson has "a lighter burden to show a constitutional violation." Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 n.4 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)).
The issue boils down to whether someone detained awaiting adjudication of a probation violation is more like a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner. Pretrial detainees seeking to vindicate their rights to be free from excessive force find shelter in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396-99, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) (holding that a pretrial detainee alleging excessive force "must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable"). Convicted prisoners seeking the same must turn to the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (holding that a convicted prisoner must show that the force was applied "maliciously and sadistically to cause harm").
When Peterson first arrived at WCJ, he was being held on unadjudicated probation violation charges tied to a state conviction for disorderly conduct. He received 90 days in prison, with 60 days suspended, for that conviction, as well as one year of probation, revocable if Peterson "fail[ed] to abide by the rules." See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). If Peterson violated any conditions of his probation, the sentencing order states that the court could order him to serve "the balance of the [original] sentence."
So while on probation and before being held at WCJ, Peterson was unlike "pretrial detainees or persons enjoying unrestricted liberty." See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986); see also United States v. Haymond, — U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 n.5, 204 L.Ed.2d 897 (2019) (plurality opinion) (quoting id. at 2395 (Alito, J., dissenting)). Nevertheless, Peterson latches onto how, like criminal charges against pretrial detainees, his probation violation charge was "unadjudicated," so he says the Fourteenth Amendment applies. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535-36, 99 S.Ct. 1861.
We are unconvinced. While alleged probation violators are afforded certain protections under the Due Process Clause, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 790, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (probationer "entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing" and, in some situations, counsel); see also Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430, 432, 93 S.Ct. 2199, 37 L.Ed.2d 52 (1973) (per curiam), neither we nor the Supreme Court have afforded alleged probation violators "a substantive 'liberty' interest" to be free from excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment while detained, see Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 407, 135 S.Ct. 2466 (Scalia, J., dissenting).2
We decline "to expand the concept of substantive due process" unnecessarily, Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992), as the Eighth Amendment provides the "explicit textual source of constitutional protection" against excessive force applied to an individual incarcerated on an unadjudicated probation violation, cf. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)).
Unlike a pretrial detainee, Peterson finds himself outside any "stage of a criminal prosecution." Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756. In other words, Peterson is "in wholly different circumstances" than those of a pretrial detainee, "separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction," and held instead incident to the state's ongoing punishment following adjudication of his criminal culpability. Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976) ("Confinement in any of the State's institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose."); see also United States v. Makeeff, 820 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir. 2016) ("Probation, like incarceration, is a form of criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict, finding, or plea of guilty." (citation omitted)). His detention is part and parcel of the state's successful criminal conviction and ensuing punishment, see Bell, 441 U.S. at 537 n.16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, where any alleged excessive force claim incurred during...
