Peterson v. iCare Mgmt., LLC

203 Conn.App. 777

250 A.3d 720

Jon PETERSON et al.

v.ICARE MANAGEMENT, LLC, et al.

Karen Mundle et al.

v.iCare Management, LLC, et al.

AC 42885, (AC 42886)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 14, 2020

Officially released April 13, 2021

Jonathan M. Starble, for the appellants (defendants in each case).

Kevin P. Walsh, North Haven, for the appellees (plaintiffs in each case).

Bright, C. J., and Cradle and Bear, Js.

CRADLE, J.

These two appeals arise from consolidated cases.¹ The defendants in both actions, iCare Management, LLC, SecureCare Realty, LLC, and SecureCare Options, LLC (defendants), appeal from the judgments of the trial court denying their motions for summary judgment, in which they argued that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by res judicata and/or collateral estoppel.² On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court erred in denying their motions because the plaintiffs’ claims were previously litigated in an earlier action.³ We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiffs own residential properties neighboring the property owned by SecureCare Realty, LLC, located at 60 West Street in Rocky Hill (60 West).⁴ From 2012 through 2015, the town of Rocky Hill (town) brought several related actions against the defendants based on their proposed use of 60 West as a nursing care facility for prison inmates. On December 21, 2012, the town brought an action against SecureCare Realty, LLC, and iCare Management, LLC, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. See Rocky Hill v. SecureCare Realty, LLC , Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Land Use Litigation Docket, Docket No. CV-13-6037949-S (SecureCare I ). In SecureCare I , the town asserted that the defendants’ proposed use of 60 West, to house prison inmates in a residential zone, violates the town's zoning regulations. The defendants in SecureCare I moved to dismiss that action. On April 23, 2013, the court, Robaina , J. , dismissed SecureCare I , reasoning that "the defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity ... [because they] ... are engaging in government functions on behalf of the state."

In February, 2013, the plaintiffs in Peterson , Docket No. AC 42885; see footnote 1 of this opinion; brought the first underlying action against the defendants alleging private nuisance and recklessness, and seeking a declaration from the court that the defendants "cannot ... operate a nursing home facility at 60 West ...." On June 15, 2015, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include an allegation of intentional conduct in connection with the defendants’ proposed use of 60 West. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ intended use of the property, to house inmates who have been convicted of felonies, violates the town's zoning regulations and amounts to a private nuisance negatively impacting their real property values and their use and enjoyment of their properties. The plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that the defendants cannot operate a nursing care facility for inmates at 60 West, as well as damages for the diminution of their property values. On September 25, 2014, the plaintiffs in Mundle , Docket No. AC 42886; see footnote 1 of this opinion; commenced the second underlying action, which contained allegations identical to those in the February, 2013 action brought by the Peterson plaintiffs.

On January 6, 2015, our Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment in SecureCare I , and remanded that case to the trial court for a determination of whether the use proposed by the defendants complied with the town's zoning regulations. See Rocky Hill v. SecureCare Realty, LLC , 315 Conn. 265, 267, 299, 105 A.3d 857 (2015). On January 21, 2015, after the defendants began operating the facility, the town⁵ brought a second action against SecureCare Realty, LLC, and SecureCare Options, LLC, alleging that the use of 60 West violates the town's zoning regulations. Rocky Hill v. SecureCare Realty, LLC , Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Land Use Litigation Docket, Docket No. CV-15-6057942-S (SecureCare II ). That complaint sought an injunction ordering the defendants to cease and desist from using 60 West "as a prison/penitentiary, nursing home and/or as an assisting living facility." The defendants in SecureCare II moved to dismiss the action based on the pending action in SecureCare I. On March 12, 2015, the court, Hon. Joseph Shortall , judge trial referee, denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss SecureCare II , and consolidated the two cases. The town withdrew its complaint in SecureCare I on March 17, 2015, and all issues therein were subsumed in SecureCare II .

In August, 2015, the defendants filed two administrative appeals in connection with decisions of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Rocky Hill (board).⁶

SecureCare Realty, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals , Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Land Use Litigation Docket, Docket No. CV-15-6062010-S; SecureCare Options, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals , Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Land Use Litigation Docket, Docket No. CV-15-6062012-S. SecureCare II and the two administrative appeals were consolidated and tried to the court, Hon. Marshall Berger , judge trial referee, from August 29 through September 1, 2017. In a memorandum of decision dated March 14, 2018, the court held that the defendants’ use of the property was a preexisting, nonconforming use and was not in violation of the local zoning regulations.⁷ Therefore, the court rendered judgment for the defendants in SecureCare II . The town did not file an appeal.

On June 22, 2018, the defendants in the present cases moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs’ claims were now barred by the principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel, based on the court's March 14, 2018 decision in SecureCare II . The defendants argued that the plaintiffs were in privity with the town for purposes of res judicata and that the plaintiffs’ claims were the same as those brought in SecureCare II . In addition, the defendants argued that, even if the plaintiffs’ claims were not precluded by res judicata, their nuisance, recklessness, and intentional tort claims were barred by collateral estoppel because those claims rely on the defendants’ use of the property being in violation of local zoning regulations, which already had been litigated in SecureCare II. The plaintiffs objected to the motions for summary judgment, arguing that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not bar their claims because they are not in privity with the town and their legal claims are different from those litigated in SecureCare II.

In a memorandum of decision dated April 12, 2019, the trial court, Noble , J. , denied the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, holding that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel applied because the claims and issues litigated in SecureCare II were not "sufficiently identical to those presented" in the underlying actions. The trial court stated that the "sole question before the court in [SecureCare II ] was whether the defendants’ use of 60 West was a violation of Rocky Hill zoning regulations. ... [T]he trial court was tasked with making a determination of whether the facility complied with the zoning regulations. ... This in turn involved the determination of whether the property was in use as a nursing home ... and whether the use of the property by the defendants was an illegal expansion of a prior nonconforming use. ... Judge Berger found that the defendants were using the property as a nursing home and that this use was not an illegal expansion of the prior nonconforming use. The latter conclusion requires the consideration of three factors: (1) the extent to which the current use reflects the nature and purpose of the original use; (2) any differences in the character, nature and kind of use involved; and (3) any substantial difference in effect upon the neighborhood resulting from differences in the activities conducted on the property. ... The court found consideration of the first two factors militated in favor of a determination that the defendants’ use of the property was not an illegal expansion of a nonconforming use. ... As a consequence, the court held that it did not need to address whether there was a substantial difference in effect upon the neighborhood resulting from differences in the activities conducted at the property." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

The court differentiated the claims in the present cases from the claims litigated in SecureCare II by observing that the "present claims are not that the defendants violated zoning regulations, but that the defendants are liable for nuisance, recklessness and intentional conduct. These claims differ from a pure consideration of whether the use of the property violates zoning regulations in that a common-law private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land. ... Moreover, there can be no doubt that a use which does not violate zoning restrictions may nonetheless create a common-law nuisance." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Because the underlying claims were not the same in both actions, the court concluded that the judgment in SecureCare II "cannot serve as the basis for res judicata" and that there "is nothing in [the SecureCare II ] decision that dispositively addresses the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their properties, a necessary element of a nuisance claim." Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiffs’ claims were not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. These appeals followed.

On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court erred in failing to grant their motions for summary judgment on the grounds of res judicata or collateral...