Peterson v. Laramie City Council

1

2024 WY 23

JERRY PETERSON, Appellant (Petitioner), v. LARAMIE CITY COUNCIL, Appellee (Respondent).

No. S-23-0149

Supreme Court of Wyoming

February 28, 2024

Appeal from the District Court of Albany County, The Honorable Misha E. Westby, Judge.

Representing Appellant: Cassie Craven, Longhorn Law Limited Liability Company, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: J. Mark Stewart, Davis & Cannon LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.

KAUTZ JUSTICE.

[¶1] Jerry Peterson filed a declaratory judgment complaint against the Laramie City Council (City Council or Council), claiming it violated the Wyoming Public Meetings Act by holding its meetings remotely during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court dismissed the complaint based on laches. We reverse and remand.

ISSUE

[¶2] The dispositive issue on appeal is: Did the district court err by dismissing Mr. Peterson's declaratory judgment complaint against the City Council on the basis of laches?

FACTS

[¶3] The district court granted the City Council's motion to dismiss under Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure (W.R.C.P.) 12(b)(6); consequently, the only facts recited here are those alleged in Mr. Peterson's declaratory judgment complaint including information from attachments incorporated into the complaint. SH v. Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist., 2018 WY 11, ¶ 5, 409 P.3d 1231, 1233 (Wyo. 2018) (reviewing complaint and attachments on a motion to dismiss).

[¶4] In March 2020, the City Council began prohibiting in-person attendance at its meetings due to the COVID-19 pandemic. On March 24, 2020, it issued Resolution 2020-17, which, in accordance with the Governor's and the Wyoming State Health Officer's Public Health Orders, closed "places of public accommodation" and prohibited gatherings of "10 or more people" in "a single confined space at the same time." On April 21, 2020, the Council passed Resolution 2020-24, which allowed it to meet remotely through "telephone or web conferencing." The City Council used the Zoom web-conferencing platform, and the public apparently had the opportunity to comment through Zoom during the meetings. Resolution 2020-24 was "effective and retroactive [to] March 1, 2020[,] and until Public Health Orders restricting gatherings of 10 people or more [were] lifted or expire[d]." The Governor lifted the ban on gatherings of 10 or more people in May 2020, but the City Council continued to prohibit in-person meetings. The City Council passed Resolution 2021-07 in January 2021, reiterating the prohibition on in-person meetings based on its mistaken understanding that gatherings were still restricted to fewer than 10 people.

[¶5] In January 2022, the City Council passed resolution 2022-2 again forbidding in-person meetings and allowing attendance "only [through] telephone or web conferencing." The order was to remain in effect "until rescinded by [the] Council or the end of the COVID-19 pandemic . . . ." On March 14, 2022, the Governor signed an executive order formally "declaring the end to the State of Emergency and Public Health Emergency relating to the COVID-19 pandemic." The City Council, however, continued to meet remotely throughout 2022 and did not provide the opportunity for in-person attendance at its meetings.

[¶6] Mr. Peterson filed his declaratory judgment complaint on January 4, 2023.^[1] He alleged the City Council violated the Wyoming Public Meetings Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-4-401 through 16-4-408, by refusing to allow in-person attendance at its meetings from when the Governor lifted the restriction on gatherings of 10 or more persons in May 2020 through November 2022.^[2] Mr. Peterson asserted the City Council denied him entry to its meetings approximately four times per month during this time period. He claimed the "[Z]oom format" presented a "condition precedent" to attendance at the City Council meetings in violation of § 16-4-403(b), which states: "A member of the public is not required as a condition of attendance at any meeting to register his name, to supply information, to complete a questionnaire, or fulfill any other condition precedent to his attendance." Mr. Peterson also contested the validity of several of the Council's resolutions prohibiting in-person attendance at its meetings because they were based on incorrect information about COVID-19 restrictions. His prayer for relief requested: 1) a court order directing the Council "to conduct legal public meetings in accord with the requirements" of the Wyoming Public Meetings Act; 2) "[c]ivil damages in accord with statutory allowances"; 3) "[a]n award of attorney fees due to the willful and damaging nature of excluding the public from public meetings"; and 4) a "declaratory judgment . . . that meetings held since May 15, 2020[,] were illegal, out of accord with statute and as such void under law, including the decisions made at said illegal meetings."

[¶7] The City Council filed a motion to dismiss under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) arguing Mr. Peterson's claims were barred by laches because he inexcusably delayed filing suit. It asserted: 1) Mr. Peterson delayed for approximately two and one-half years in filing his claim about the 2020 meetings because it ripened in May 2020 when the Governor revoked the restriction on in-person meetings of 10 persons or more; 2) he delayed two years in registering his claim about the 2021 meetings because it matured when the City Council adopted Resolution 2021-07 in January 2021 prohibiting in-person meetings based on the mistaken belief that meetings were still restricted to fewer than 10 persons; and 3) he delayed over nine months in bringing his claim about the 2022 meetings because it ripened when the Governor declared an end to the Public Health Emergency on March 14, 2022. The City Council also maintained that granting Mr. Peterson's requested relief by declaring all its actions during the relevant period null and void would injure and prejudice the Council and the "citizenry" which relied on those actions, including for example, businesses, vendors, and contractors that obtained licenses or were paid during the period. To support its claim of prejudice, the Council attached an affidavit from the City Clerk which included a list of actions taken in August 2022 and general links to the City Council's website where its meeting minutes and ordinances were posted.

[¶8] After a hearing, the district court granted the City Council's motion to dismiss. Although it did not convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, it considered information outside the complaint by taking "judicial notice" of it. The court grouped all of Mr. Peterson's claims together and ruled they were barred by laches because they "ripened" in May 2020, and the injury and prejudice which would result from "undoing nearly three-years' worth of decisions" by the City Council was "manifest and need[ed] no further elaboration." Mr. Peterson filed a timely notice of appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶9] The district court dismissed Mr. Peterson's complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, "[w]e conduct a de novo review of the materials that were before the district court." Matter of Est. of Britain, 2018 WY 101, ¶ 11, 425 P.3d 978, 981 (Wyo. 2018) (citing Bush Land Dev. Co. v. Crook Cnty. Weed & Pest Control Dist., 2017 WY 12, ¶ 7, 388 P.3d 536, 539 (Wyo. 2017)) (other citations omitted). "'[W]e accept the facts stated in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Woodie v. Whitesell, 2019 WY 115, ¶ 22, 451 P.3d 1152, 1158 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting DeLoge v. Homar, 2013 WY 33, ¶ 9, 297 P.3d 117, 120 (Wyo. 2013)). Dismissal is a drastic remedy which should be used cautiously; however, a motion to dismiss "'is the proper method for testing the legal sufficiency of the allegations and will be sustained when the complaint shows on its face that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.'" Britain, ¶ 11, 425 P.3d at 981-82 (quoting WW Enters., Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, 956 P.2d 353, 355 (Wyo. 1998), and Feltner v. Casey Fam. Program, 902 P.2d 206, 208 (Wyo. 1995)) (other citations omitted).

[¶10] The parties suggest the district court's decision on laches should be reviewed using an abuse of discretion standard. In doing so, they ignore that the district court dismissed this case under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. There is no place for an abuse of discretion analysis in reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. See generally, Guy v. Lampert, 2015 WY 148, ¶¶ 2, 12, 362 P.3d 331, 333, 335 (Wyo. 2015) (reviewing a dismissal using the typical Rule 12(b)(6) analysis instead of the abuse of discretion standard suggested by the appellant in his statement of the issues on appeal); Feltner, 902 P.2d at 207-08 (same).

DISCUSSION

[¶11] The district court dismissed Mr. Peterson's complaint after concluding his claims were barred by laches.

"Laches bars a claim when a party has delayed in enforcing its rights to the disadvantage of another. Windsor Energy Grp., L.L.C. v. Noble Energy, Inc. 2014 WY 96, ¶ 12, 330 P.3d 285, 288 (Wyo. 2014) (citing Dorsett v. Moore, 2003 WY 7, ¶ 9, 61 P.3d 1221, 1224 (Wyo. 2003)). The defense of laches is based in equity and whether it applies in a given case depends upon the circumstances. Id., ¶ 12, 330 P.3d at 288-89 (quoting Ultra Resources, Inc. v. Hartman, 2010 WY 36, ¶ 123, 226 P.3d 889, 929 (Wyo. 2010)). Two elements must be proven to establish laches: 1) inexcusable delay; and 2) injury, prejudice, or disadvantage to the defendants or others. Id., ¶ 12, 330 P.3d at 289 (cit

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