Peterson v. Town of Waterford

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KATHLEEN PETERSON, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF WATERFORD, Defendant.

No. 3:21-CV-332 (SVN)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

March 31, 2023

RULING AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SARALA V. NAGALA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

In this employment action, Plaintiff Kathleen Peterson alleges that her employer, the Town of Waterford, Connecticut (“Defendant” or the “Town”) interfered with her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., and retaliated against her for taking leave under the FMLA. Defendant seeks summary judgment on both of Plaintiff's claims. For the reasons described below Defendant's motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise noted herein, the parties agree on the following facts. At all relevant times, Plaintiff has been employed by Defendant, a municipality in the state of Connecticut. Ans ECF No. 10, ¶¶ 2, 7-8. Defendant's town charter vests the executive authority of the Town in a Board of Selectmen, except to the extent such authority is granted to the Town's First Selectman. Pl.'s Local Rule (“L.R.”) 56(a)2 St., ECF No. 33-2, ¶ 1.^[1] The First Selectman is supported by an executive assistant;^[2] the executive assistant position is a confidential, nonunion position that serves at the pleasure of the First Selectman. Id. ¶ 3.

In 2009, then-First Selectman Daniel Steward encouraged Plaintiff to apply for the executive assistant position, which had become vacant. Id. ¶ 8. At that time, Plaintiff and her husband were social friends with Steward and his wife. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff applied for the executive assistant position and was subsequently interviewed by Steward and the Town's Human Resources Director. Id. ¶ 10. Steward hired Plaintiff for the executive assistant position, and she began working for the Town on January 26, 2009. Id. ¶ 12.

In November of 2019, Robert Brule was elected to succeed Steward as the Town's First Selectman. Id. ¶ 13. Defendant asserts that, due to Brule's private sector experience, he wanted the executive assistant to operate in a manner akin to a chief of staff; in other words, he wanted an individual who could assist him with transitioning into office and provide him with the necessary support to implement his administration's agenda. Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 St., ECF No. 29-2, ¶ 15. Plaintiff denies this assertion but, in doing so, she cites only to a portion of her own deposition testimony in which she claimed that Brule told her, “I want you to stay if I get elected.” Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 15. Following Brule's election, Plaintiff continued to serve as his executive assistant for a period of time. Id. ¶ 14.

Defendant further asserts that, within a couple weeks of being sworn into office in December of 2019, Brule began voicing complaints about Plaintiff's job performance to Joyce Sauchuk, who was serving as Defendant's Human Resources Director at that time. Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 St. ¶ 16. Defendant asserts that Brule immediately noticed a lack of organization within the First Selectman's office and that Plaintiff could not ascertain basic information for him. Id. ¶ 18.

Defendant further asserts that Brule continued to raise concerns about Plaintiff's job performance on an almost weekly basis. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff denies each of these assertions; in doing so, she asserts that Brule testified that he made notes and sent emails commenting on Plaintiff's job performance, but these notes and emails do not exist. Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶¶ 16-18. She further asserts that the notes and emails do not exist “because Brule had no concerns with [Plaintiff's] job performance and did not express any such concerns to Sauchuk,” but she cites no evidence to support this assertion. Id. Plaintiff also contends that Brule never told Plaintiff that he was dissatisfied with her performance. Id. ¶¶ 17, 18.

Defendant claims that Brule perceived several other deficiencies in Plaintiff's job performance. First, in late 2019, Brule requested that Plaintiff update a list of the cell phone numbers of each of the Town's Department Heads; despite Sauchuk offering Plaintiff suggestions about how to compile the updated data, Human Resources personnel, rather than Plaintiff, ultimately updated the list. Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 St. ¶ 19. Plaintiff denies this allegation, averring that Human Resources personnel placed a permission lock on the list and that, because Sauchuk could not give Plaintiff access to the file, she offered to update the list herself. Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 19. Defendant also claims that Brule was concerned about the informality of Plaintiff's business interactions, including because Plaintiff called at least one Town official “honey.” Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 St. ¶ 20. Plaintiff does not deny that Brule heard her call an elected official “honey” when signing off on a phone call, but she avers that Brule did not take exception to her use of the term and instead laughed at her mistake. Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 20.

Defendant further claims that, at or around the time of Plaintiff's phone call incident, Plaintiff was routinely receiving personal Amazon packages at her office, and that Brule spoke to her about this practice; Plaintiff denies that she had such packages delivered. Def.'s L.R. 56(a) 1 St. ¶ 21.

Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff was frequently observed using her personal cell phone during work hours. Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff does not deny the substance of this allegation, but she claims that she used her cell phone to make updates to the Town's website because a firewall was installed on Defendant's computers after a security breach; she further claims that when she informed Brule about this reason for using her cell phone at work, he said “okay.” Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 22.

Defendant contends that Brule found Plaintiff's work product lacking sufficient attention to detail, that she presented final drafts with typographical errors and misaligned margins, and that she used various forms and templates for the same work product, Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 St. ¶ 23; Plaintiff denies each of these allegations, Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 23. According to Defendant, Brule also noticed that Plaintiff was failing to provide him with all pertinent information about missed telephone calls and that she was unable to distinguish between matters that should be elevated to the First Selectman and matters that should be handled at lower levels of Town government. Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 St. ¶ 24. Plaintiff denies Defendant's allegations about how she handled phone calls, averring that, after Brule instructed her to stop putting voicemails through to his extension, she began to write out messages and place them on her desk in an organized fashion. Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 24. She further avers that, because Brule would sometimes miss her paper messages, she would send him email and text message reminders. Id.

Finally, Defendant asserts that, despite the highly confidential nature of the executive assistant position, Brule believed that Plaintiff was not keeping confidences. Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 St. ¶ 25. Brule purportedly based this belief on information being discussed around Town and among Town employees, and Defendant asserts that this impacted Brule's ability to speak freely or candidly about business affairs without fear of discussions being leaked. Id. Plaintiff denies that she failed to keep information confidential or leaked any confidential information. Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 25.

Defendant contends that, in late 2019, and early 2020, Brule had numerous conversations with Sauchuk, Defendant's Town Attorney, and Defendant's labor counsel, all of whom confirmed to him that the executive assistant position served at the pleasure of the First Selectman and that he had the discretion to choose the person serving in the position. Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 St. ¶ 26. Defendant further contends that, in December of 2019, Brule decided to replace Plaintiff as executive assistant, and informed Sauchuk of that decision. Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiff does not dispute that Brule had hiring and firing authority, but she denies that Brule had discussions about replacing Plaintiff due to job performance concerns and that she had any performance issues. Pl.'s L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶¶ 26, 27.

On or about March 17, 2020, after the COVID-19 pandemic commenced, Plaintiff began taking paid leave to care for her adult son, who suffers from a physical disability. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. Plaintiff informed Defendant of this paid leave in person. Id. ¶ 29.^[3]Brule informed Sauchuk of Plaintiff's leave, and the reason for Plaintiff's leave was determined to be an FMLA qualifying event. Id. ¶ 33. The Town sent Plaintiff notice that her FMLA leave was approved, as well as a “Designation Notice.” Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff initially sought leave from March 17, 2020, until April 1, 2020, but she requested an extension until April 13, 2020, which the Town approved. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff then sought an additional extension of leave until May 1, 2020, and ultimately returned to work part-time on May 4, 2020. Id. ¶ 36. Upon her return, Plaintiff worked Tuesdays and Thursdays until May 20, 2020; all other weekdays were considered “intermittent” FMLA leave. Id. Plaintiff's last day of FMLA leave was May 20, 2020. Id. ¶ 38. It is undisputed that the Town approved all of Plaintiff's requests for FMLA leave in 2020. Id. ¶ 39.^[4]

When she returned to work on May 4, 2020, Plaintiff returned to her position of executive assistant to the First Selectman. Id. ¶ 37. On that very day, however, Brule informed Plaintiff that he intended to change the nature of the executive assistant position and referenced the need to have the role filled by someone with a different skill set. Id. ¶ 40...