Peterson v. Warren

WILLIE PETERSON, Petitioner, v. CHARLES WARREN, et al., Respondents.

Civil Action No. 13-4250 (JLL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

June 20, 2018

OPINION

LINARES, Chief District Judge,

Presently before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus of Willie Peterson ("Petitioner") brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging Petitioner's state court manslaughter conviction (ECF No. 6-3). Following an order to answer, Respondents filed a response in opposition to the petition (ECF No. 11). For the following reasons, this Court will deny the petition and will deny Petitioner a certificate of appealability.

I. BACKGROUND

In its opinion affirming the denial of Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief, the Superior Court of New Jersey - Appellate Division summarized the background of this matter as follows:

Following an eight-day jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree aggravated manslaughter, third-degree theft, fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose in the stabbing death of his girlfriend. Defendant was acquitted of felony murder.

At sentencing, the court imposed an extended term sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1(b)(2) on the aggravated manslaughter conviction, ordering defendant's incarceration for sixty years, subject to an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility on the first thirty years pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The trial judge merged the weapons convictions and imposed a concurrent five-year term of imprisonment. Finally, the court imposed a consecutive five-year term of imprisonment for the third-degree theft conviction.

On appeal, defendant's convictions were affirmed, as was his extended term sentence for aggravated manslaughter. However, we remanded for resentencing on the convictions for the third-degree offenses of theft and weapons possession. State v. Peterson, No. A-1930-03 (App.Div. Mar. 6, 2006) (slip op. at 17). Defendant's petition for certification was denied. State v. Peterson, 193 N.J. 223, 936 A.2d 970 (2007).

Defendant's first PCR petition was filed on November 26, 2007. He sought an evidentiary hearing to review claims of trial counsel's negligent representation and imposition of an unlawful sentence. The PCR judge denied defendant's request for a hearing and, following review of the issues presented, denied relief. Defendant filed a pro se motion for reconsideration. The PCR judge issued a letter opinion denying the motion on January 25, 2011.

State v. Peterson, 2012 WL 3870319, at *1-2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 7, 2012), certif. denied, 221 N.J. 219 (2015).

Shortly after filing a federal habeas petition in this Court on July 10, 2013, the Court granted Petitioner's Motion for Stay and Abeyance in order for him to exhaust claims in the state court. (ECF Nos. 1, 3). Petitioner subsequently filed a second post-conviction relief ("PCR") petition on August 13, 2013. (ECF No. 11-12 at 41-47). The second PCR petition denial was affirmed on procedural default grounds in a sua sponte order issued on September 5, 2014. (ECF No. 11-6). Petitioner filed the instant amended petition for habeas relief under § 2254 on April 23, 2015.¹ (ECF No. 6-3). He raises the following claims; the first fifteen of which, were raised in his initial federal habeas filing:

1. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for inadequate preparation;

2. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to present a diminished capacity defense;

3. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to move for suppression of portions of Investigator Raccioppi's testimony;

4. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to suppress Petitioner's statements to police;

5. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to advise Petitioner of a trial memorandum;

6. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to engage in meaningful plea negotiations.;

7. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to advise Petitioner of his potential sentence exposure;

8. Ineffective assistance of PCR counsel for failing to raise Petitioner's absence from certain trial and pre-trial proceedings;

9. Prosecutorial misconduct for improper remarks during closing arguments;

10. Trial court erroneously admitted hearsay statements;

11. Trial court erroneously admitted prejudicial evidence;

12. Trial court erroneously admitted evidence of strained relationship between Petitioner and decedent;

13. Trial court erroneously provided jury instruction on consciousness of guilt;

14. Trial court erroneously failed to provide a jury instruction on witness bias;

15. Trial court erroneously denied Petitioner's motion for new counsel in light of a conflict of interest; and

16. PCR court erroneously denied Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance and due process violations by the trial court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), the district court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus [o]n behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." A habeas petitioner has the burden of establishing his entitlement to relief for each claim presented in his petition based upon the record that was before the state court. See Eley v. Erickson, 712 F.3d 837, 846 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 40-41 (2012). Under the statute, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 ("AEDPA"), district courts are required to give great deference to the determinations of the state trial and appellate courts. See Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 772-73 (2010).

Where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by the state courts, the district court shall not grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court adjudication

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Federal law is clearly established for these purposes where it is clearly expressed in "only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta" of the opinions of the United States Supreme Court. See Woods v. Donald, --- U.S. ---, ---, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015). "When reviewing state criminal convictions on collateral review, federal judges are required to afford state courts due respect by overturning their decisions only when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong." Id. Where a petitioner challenges an allegedly erroneous factual determination of the state courts, "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct [and the] applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

III. ANALYSIS

The petition raises sixteen grounds for relief, eight of which are ineffective assistance of trial and/or appellate counsel. For the reasons explained in this section, the Court finds that Petitioner's claims do not warrant federal habeas relief.

The standard which applies to Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims is as follows:

[c]laims of ineffective assistance are governed by the two-prong test set forth in the Supreme Court's opinion in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To make out such a claim under Strickland, a petitioner must first show that "counsel's performance was deficient. This requires [the petitioner to show] that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687; see also United States v. Shedrick, 493 F.3d 292, 299 (3d Cir. 2007). To succeed on an ineffective assistance claim, a petitioner must also show that counsel's allegedly deficient performance prejudiced his defense such that the petitioner was "deprive[d] of a fair trial . . . whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Shedrick, 493 F.3d at 299.

In evaluating whether counsel was deficient, the "proper standard for attorney performance is that of 'reasonably effective assistance.'" Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 102 (3d Cir. 2005). A petitioner asserting ineffective assistance must therefore show that counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" under the circumstances. Id. The reasonableness of counsel's representation must be determined based on the particular facts of a petitioner's case, viewed as of the time of the challenged conduct of counsel. Id. In scrutinizing counsel's performance, courts "must be highly deferential . . . a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

Even where a petitioner is able to show that counsel's representation was deficient, he must still affirmatively demonstrate that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner's defense. Id. at 692-93. "It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding." Id. at 693. The petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694; see also Shedrick, 493 F.3d at 299. Where a "petition contains no factual matter regarding Strickland's prejudice prong, and [only provides] . . . unadorned legal conclusion[s] . . . without supporting factual allegations," that petition is

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