Petri v. Erie Cnty. Children & Youth, Case No. 1:19-cv-00243 (Erie)

MARYANN PETRI, Plaintiff v. ERIE COUNTY CHILDREN AND YOUTH,TINA TROHOSKE AMY DALEY, RALPH FERRIS, Defendants

Case No. 1:19-cv-00243 (Erie)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

July 17, 2020

RICHARD A. LANZILLO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

ECF NO. 20

ECF NO. 29

I. Introduction

Before the Court are two motions to dismiss filed by the Defendants in this action. Pro Se Plaintiff Maryann Petri (Petri) has filed a Complaint alleging violations of federal and state law by the Erie County Office of Children and Youth (Erie County or OCY) and two of its employees, Tina Trohoske and Amy Daley (collectively, the OCY Defendants). She has also sued her former husband, Ralph A. Ferris (Ferris), who has custody of their children. For the reasons that follow, the motions to dismiss will be GRANTED.¹

II. Procedural History

Petri began this civil rights action by filing a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on August 26, 2019. See ECF No. 1. The Court granted the motion for IFP and docketed her Complaint on the same day. ECF No. 4; ECF No. 5. Petri drafted her Complaint using the publicly available form complaint (Pro Se 1, revised 12/16). ECF No. 5. See, e.g., Smith v. Dunn, et al., 2020 WL 3317947, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 3316919 (W.D. Pa. June 18, 2020).² In completing the form complaint, Petri identified a federal question as the basis for this Court's jurisdiction over her claims but did not specify the federal question or questions she is raising, leaving that section of the form blank. But she did file two addenda in support of her motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, one of which contains "additional information to establish validity of claim."³ ECF No. 2. The Court will also consider the information set forth in this addendum in determining the sufficiency of her Complaint. See, e.g., Patterson v. Chester Police, 2019 WL 265135, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2019) (relying on plaintiff's addendum to the form complaint to identify defendants).

Petri appears to allege state law claims of defamation, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress as well as violations of her Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the Constitution. ECF No. 2, p. 9. She contends that "due to false, fraudulent, back to back accusations within 4 days of each other" by the Defendants, she lost her career, forfeited her Registered Nurse's license, surrendered custody of her children, and was stripped of her good reputation. ECF No. 5, p. 5.

The OCY Defendants moved to dismiss her Complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, alternatively, for summary judgment under Rule 56 and filed a brief in support of their motion.⁴ ECF No. 20; ECF No. 21. In response, Petri moved to "Disqualify Opposing Counsel for Conflict of Interest," which the Court again denied the next day on November 20, 2019. ECF Nos. 23, 24. When Defendant Ferris failed to respond to the Complaint within the time allotted by applicable rules, Petri filed a motion on December 12, 2019 requesting that the Court order Ferris to show cause why a default judgment should not be entered against him. ECF No. 26. The Court granted this motion on January 7, 2020. ECF No. 27.

After the Court granted Ferris leave to respond nunc pro tunc, he filed a motion to dismiss the claims against him for lack of jurisdiction and a brief in support of his motion. See ECF Nos. 28-32. Petri, once again, moved to disqualify opposing counsel for a conflict of interest along with a Motion for Contempt and a Motion for Judgment on January 27, 2020. The Court denied these motions on January 28, 2020. ECF Nos. 34-37. She then filed a Response in opposition to the motions to dismiss. ECF No. 45. The Defendants' motions are now ready for disposition.

III. Legal Standards

A. Motions to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not deciding whether a plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; instead, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it fails to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (rejecting the traditional Rule 12 (b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff in making this determination. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).

While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955. See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) ("The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.").

Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:

First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief."

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. 1937.

B. Pro Se Litigants

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, a court must employ less stringent standards in considering pro se pleadings than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). Despite this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996). Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Phillips v. County of Allegheny has ruled that if a District Court is dismissing a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) in a civil rights case, it must sua sponte "permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile." 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).

IV. Discussion

A. Factual Background

Taking Petri's allegations as true, this dispute arose in 2014 when Defendant Trohoske initiated a report indicating suspected emotional abuse by Petri against her daughter.⁵ ECF No. 2, p. 2. See also Ferris v. Petri, 2017 WL 6603480, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 27, 2017). As a result of this charge, Petri was "placed on suspension" from her position as an emergency room nurse. Id. She also lost custody of her children and her former husband sought child support. Id. at p. 3. The charges against her were later expunged. Id. A second charge was then filed against Petri for her purported treatment of her son. Id. These charges prevented her from getting required clearances and her job at a local hospital was terminated. Id., p. 4. Even though the abuse indications against her were later expunged, Petri claims that she was unable to return to work as a result. Id. She likewise failed to re-secure joint custody of her children. Id. A previous award of child support against her was later adjusted. Id., p. 5. As a result of the litigation in state court, Petri suffered mental and physical injuries, as well as the loss of her nursing licenses. Id.

B. Defendant Ferris' motion to dismiss for a lack of jurisdiction will be granted.

Defendant Ferris has moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to dismiss the claims against him for lack of jurisdiction. ECF No. 29. That motion will be granted, with prejudice.

A federal district court's subject matter jurisdiction is typically based on federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction does not apply here, as all parties are citizens of Pennsylvania. Instead, Petri's Complaint invokes this Court's federal question subject matter jurisdiction, which...