Petrzelka v. Goodwin

461 P.3d 1134

Peggy PETRZELKA, Appellee,

v.James E. GOODWIN, Appellant.

No. 20180923-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed March 5, 2020

Ashley E. Bown, Attorney for Appellant

Tess A. Davis, Attorney for Appellee

Judge Jill M. Pohlman authored this Opinion, in which Judges Michele M. Christiansen Forster and Ryan M. Harris concurred.

Opinion

POHLMAN, Judge:

¶1 Peggy Petrzelka and James E. Goodwin married in September 2004, separated in February 2015, and divorced in February 2018. Following a bench trial, the court entered judgment on several issues, including alimony and the division of the parties’ retirement accounts. The court declined to award Goodwin alimony, finding that he was capable of meeting his own needs. The court also determined that the marital portion of Petrzelka’s retirement account would be valued as of March 1, 2015—the approximate date of the parties’ separation. Goodwin challenges both determinations, asserting that the court erred by declining to award him alimony and by declining to value Petrzelka’s account as of the time of the divorce decree or trial. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Petrzelka and Goodwin married in September 2004. At the time, Petrzelka was forty-two years old, while Goodwin was sixty-one. During the marriage, the parties lived in a home that Petrzelka had purchased before their union. Both parties also worked. Petrzelka continued in her established teaching career, and Goodwin held jobs related to rural community development and land conservancy. While married, the parties kept their finances separate. They shared in some "very limited" joint expenses, but otherwise maintained separate bank and credit card accounts and spent their respective incomes how they wished.

¶3 Goodwin retired in 2012, and the parties separated in February 2015. After their separation, Goodwin moved to California, while Petrzelka remained in Utah. At the conclusion of a two-day trial in February 2018, the parties were granted a divorce.

¶4 Following the trial, the court entered judgment on several issues, including Goodwin’s claim for alimony and the division of the parties’ retirement accounts. Based on its assessment of Goodwin’s needs and his ability to meet them, the court declined to award alimony. It determined that Goodwin was able to meet his needs through a combination of his Social Security and retirement income, and income the court imputed to him at $15 per hour for twenty hours per week.

¶5 The court also determined that a portion of one of Petrzelka’s retirement accounts would be subject to division as marital property. Rather than setting the end date of the valuation period as the date of trial or the divorce decree as Goodwin requested, the court set the valuation period as September 4, 2004—the date of the parties’ marriage—to March 1, 2015—the month immediately following the parties’ separation.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶6 On appeal, Goodwin challenges the trial court’s decision not to award alimony. In general, trial courts in divorce actions are "permitted considerable discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties." Rayner v. Rayner , 2013 UT App 269, ¶ 4, 316 P.3d 455 (cleaned up). "Accordingly, we will reverse only if (1) there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error; (2) the factual findings upon which the award was based are clearly erroneous; or (3) the party challenging the award shows that such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Gardner v. Gardner , 2019 UT 61, ¶ 18, 452 P.3d 1134 (cleaned up). "Because we can properly find abuse only if no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court, appellants have a heavy burden to show that an alleged error falls into any of these three categories." Id. (cleaned up).

¶7 Goodwin also challenges the trial court’s division of Petrzelka’s retirement account, arguing that the court erred in setting the end date of the valuation period as March 1, 2015, shortly after the parties’ separation, rather than the date of trial or the divorce decree. "Generally, the marital estate is valued at the time of the divorce decree or trial." Jacobsen v. Jacobsen , 2011 UT App 161, ¶ 39, 257 P.3d 478 (cleaned up). However, as with alimony, the court has broad discretion to use a different date so long as its decision it supported by "sufficiently detailed findings of fact explaining its deviation from the general rule." Id. (cleaned up); see also Rayner , 2013 UT App 269, ¶ 19, 316 P.3d 455 ("A trial court has broad discretion to deviate from [the] general rule when circumstances warrant." (cleaned up)).

ANALYSIS

I. Denial of Alimony

¶8 Goodwin argues that the trial court exceeded its discretion by declining to award alimony. Alimony awards are generally aimed at "enabling the receiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, and preventing the receiving spouse from becoming a public charge." Anderson v. Anderson , 2018 UT App 19, ¶ 29, 414 P.3d 1069 (cleaned up); Rule v. Rule , 2017 UT App 137, ¶ 14, 402 P.3d 153.

¶9 To that end, in deciding whether to award alimony, a court must consider several factors relevant to alimony’s purposes, including the "financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse," "the recipient’s earning capacity or ability to produce income," and "the ability of the payor spouse to provide support." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(i)–(iii) (LexisNexis 2019); see also Jones v. Jones , 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985) (same); Barrani v. Barrani , 2014 UT App 204, ¶ 21, 334 P.3d 994 (same). In assessing the parties’ needs and their respective abilities to fulfill those needs, courts should generally look to the marital standard of living. See Rule , 2017 UT App 137, ¶ 15, 402 P.3d 153 ; see also Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(e) (instructing courts to, as a general rule, "look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation," in setting alimony awards). If a court determines that the spouse requesting alimony is able to meet his or her own needs, the court "should not award alimony." Dobson v. Dobson , 2012 UT App 373, ¶ 22, 294 P.3d 591.

¶10 Further, courts in divorce cases may consider imputing income to an unemployed spouse in assessing the spouse’s ability to produce income. See Gardner v. Gardner , 2019 UT 61, ¶ 98, 452 P.3d 1134 ; Leppert v. Leppert , 2009 UT App 10, ¶ 12, 200 P.3d 223 ; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(8)(b) (LexisNexis 2018) (setting out the considerations for imputing income to a parent for child support).¹ All else being equal, a spouse who is capable of working ought to be "accountable for meeting [his or] her own needs to the extent" of that capability. Hansen v. Hansen , 2014 UT App 96, ¶ 9, 325 P.3d 864 (explaining that imputing income to a spouse "holds [that spouse] accountable for meeting her own needs to the extent she is capable").

A. The Court’s Alimony Findings

¶11 Here, the court determined that, in light of the facts, circumstances, and equities at play, Goodwin was capable of meeting his own needs. It therefore declined to award alimony. To that end, the court made extensive findings with respect to both the facts it found relevant to the overall question of alimony and the statutory factors described in Utah Code section 30-3-5.

¶12 The court found relevant the fact that the marriage was "entered into later in life for both parties," and it considered the parties’ respective situations before, and contributions to, the marriage. For example, the court found that Goodwin "did not give up anything by entering into the marriage" and brought no "assets or real income into the marriage." With respect to Petrzelka, the court found that she brought "an established and successful teaching career into the marriage" and that there was "no evidence that [Goodwin] did anything to improve [Petrzelka’s] income or her education or her earning capacity."

¶13 The court also determined that the "most significant factor" in its alimony calculus was the parties’ agreement to share only a few joint living expenses during the marriage. The court found that during the marriage "the parties agreed to equally pay certain limited joint living expenses" and that those shared expenses were "very, very limited." In this respect, the court noted and "place[d] great weight on the fact that the parties essentially maintained separate standards of living," where each party kept "separate accounts and expenses during the marriage," which accordingly "allowed each party to spend their respective income how they wished."

¶14 Regarding their separate living standards, the court also found "very persuasive" that Goodwin had "always lived beyond his means with his separate credit cards," noting that he entered the marriage with a credit card balance and that he continued to carry one "after the date of separation due to his continual over-spending." The court found such facts as "strong evidence of the parties’ standard of living during the marriage and especially [Goodwin’s] standard of living."

¶15 As to Goodwin’s needs, the court accepted his stated monthly expenses of $3,349, finding them, "for the most part, reasonable," though noting that his cable TV expenses, food budget, and credit card bills were "too high."

¶16 With regard to Goodwin’s ability to meet his needs, the court found that Goodwin had a gross income of $3,571 per month. It reached this figure by adding Goodwin’s Social Security and retirement income, which it found was $2,271 per month, and imputing to Goodwin additional income of $1,300 per month based on a finding that Goodwin could work part-time (i.e., twenty hours per week) at $15 per hour. The court’s imputation determination was based on several findings about Goodwin’s ability to produce income. For example, the court found that Goodwin had "very marketable" and "extensive job skills," given...